

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

BLAKE C HAND
Claimant

APPEAL NO: 13A-UI-11937-DT

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

ARCHER-DANIELS-MIDLAND COMPANY
Employer

OC: 09/01/13
Claimant: Appellant (1)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge
Section 96.6-2 – Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Blake C. Hand (claimant) appealed a representative's October 8, 2013 decision (reference 04) that concluded he was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment from Archer-Daniels-Midland Company (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on November 18, 2013. This appeal was consolidated for hearing with one related appeal, 13A-UI-11938-DT. The claimant participated in the hearing. Dean Petroff appeared on the employer's behalf. During the hearing, Exhibit A-1 was entered into evidence. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant's appeal timely or are there legal grounds under which it can be treated as timely?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The representative's decision was mailed to the claimant's last-known address of record on October 8, 2013. The claimant received the decision. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by October 18, 2013. The appeal was not filed until it was postmarked on October 21, 2013, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision.

On October 18 the claimant realized his appeal was due; at about 3:30 p.m. he called his local Agency office and asked what he should do. When asked if he had access to a fax machine, he responded that he did not. He was then advised to get his appeal written and sent in as soon as possible, and that he should try to get it to his local post office box by 5:00 p.m. so it could be postmarked yet that day. The claimant then wrote his appeal; however, it was after 5:00 p.m. when he dropped the appeal into the mail box, and the final mail pick up for the day had already occurred.

The claimant started working for the employer on December 17, 2012. He worked full time as a switchman at the employer's Cedar Rapids, Iowa railroad repair shop. His last day of work was September 5, 2013. The employer discharged him on that date. The reason asserted for the discharge was destruction of company property.

On September 4 the claimant had become upset due to problems with another employee. At about 1:30 p.m., about two hours before the scheduled end of his shift, the claimant informed his supervisor that he was frustrated and was leaving for the day. As he left by going through the break room to the exit door, he forced the exit door open with such force, possibly by using his foot, that the opener/tensioner at the top of the door was broken to the point where the screws were torn out of the top and the door would no longer fully close properly. As a result, when the claimant returned to work on September 5, he was discharged.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

If a party fails to make a timely appeal of a representative's decision and there is no legal excuse under which the appeal can be deemed to have been made timely, the decision as to the merits has become final and is not subject to further review. Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides that unless the affected party (here, the claimant) files an appeal from the decision within ten calendar days, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied as set out by the decision.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. *Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.*, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); *Johnson v. Board of Adjustment*, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976). Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. *Messina v. IDJS*, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott*, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case then becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. *Hendren v. IESC*, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); *Smith v. IESC*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973).

A party does not have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal if the delay is due to Agency error or misinformation or to delay or other action of the United States postal service. 871 IAC 24.35(2). Failing to read and follow the instructions for filing an appeal is not a reason outside the appellant's control that deprived the appellant from having a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal. The appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the prescribed time was not due to a legally excusable reason so that it can be treated as timely. The administrative law judge further concludes that because the appeal was not timely, the

administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal, regardless of whether the merits of the appeal would be valid. See, *Beardslee*, supra; *Franklin*, supra; and *Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company v. Employment Appeal Board*, 465 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa App. 1990).

However, in the alternative, even if the appeal were to be deemed timely, the administrative law judge would affirm the representative's decision on the merits. A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. *Cosper v. IDJS*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982); Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a.

In order to establish misconduct such as to disqualify a former employee from benefits an employer must establish the employee was responsible for a deliberate act or omission which was a material breach of the duties and obligations owed by the employee to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; *Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 275 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 1979); *Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The conduct must show a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; *Huntoon*, supra; *Henry*, supra. In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; *Huntoon*, supra; *Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984).

The claimant's use of force on the door because of his frustration shows a willful or wanton disregard of the standard of behavior the employer has the right to expect from an employee, as well as an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests and of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. The employer discharged the claimant for reasons amounting to work-connected misconduct.

DECISION:

The representative's October 8, 2013 decision (reference 04) is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely, and the decision of the representative has become final and remains in full force and effect. Benefits are denied.

Lynette A. F. Donner
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/pjs