IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section
1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319
DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

KAYE I HIGDON BOX C-1 2600 CARLTON LN SPRINGVILLE IA 52336

MERCY MEDICAL CENTER 701 – 10TH ST SE CEDAR RAPIDS IA 52403 Appeal Number: 04A-UI-02457-LT

OC 02-01-04 R 03 Claimant: Respondent (1)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319*.

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

- The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- 3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)	
(Decision Dated & Mailed)	

Section 96.5-2-a - Discharge/Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed a timely appeal from the February 26, 2004, reference 01, decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on March 25, 2004. The claimant did participate. The employer did participate through Debbie McDermott, Marilyn Schnack, Mary Ann Arndorfer and Barb Tupper.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed as a full-time LPN through February 4, 2004 when she was discharged. On February 2, 2004, Sally Rayhill, a charge nurse, told Debbie McDermott that Agnes accused the claimant of pushing her back to bed "execution" (hands on chest and back) style and had

been told to go back to sleep. There were no witnesses nor were there related disciplinary actions within the last two to three years of employment. Agnes is a long-term resident with dementia and weakness. The claimant did not push her back to bed, but helped Agnes get dressed, as was the normal routine. Sometimes Agnes sits after having dressed until it is time for the claimant to assist her to the breakfast area. Agnes was very confused during the claimant's shifts from Sunday evening through Tuesday morning. She had never complained about claimant helping get her dressed and they had pleasant conversations when Agnes was lucid.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code Section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. <u>Cosper v. lowa Department of Job Service</u>, 321 N.W.2d 6 (lowa 1982). Misconduct serious enough to

warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. Newman v. lowa Department of Job Service, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. Miller v. Employment Appeal Board, 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa App. 1988).

When the record is composed solely of hearsay evidence, that evidence must be examined closely in light of the entire record. Schmitz v. IDHS, 461 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Iowa App. 1990). Both the quality and the quantity of the evidence must be evaluated to see whether it rises to the necessary levels of trustworthiness, credibility, and accuracy required by a reasonably prudent person in the conduct of serious affairs. See, Iowa Code Section 17A.14(1). In making the evaluation, the fact-finder should conduct a common sense evaluation of (1) the nature of the hearsay; (2) the availability of better evidence; (3) the cost of acquiring better information; (4) the need for precision; and (5) the administrative policy to be fulfilled. Schmitz, 461 N.W.2d at 608.

Although the employer claims the patient was lucid during the interview, there is no credible evidence she was lucid when the alleged events described took place or whether the events were imagined or dreamed. To the contrary, the claimant's recollection was that the patient was confused early that week. The hearsay accusation of a dementia patient, without witnesses or other complaint in two to three years, is incredible when compared with claimant's reasonable and credible rebuttal of the employer's allegation. Benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The February 26, 2004, reference 01, decision is affirmed. The claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

dml/d