

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

**ACEA B CLUBB**

Claimant

**APPEAL NO: 12A-UI-09362-DT**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**MANPOWER INTERNATIONAL INC**

Employer

**OC: 02/05/12**

**Claimant: Appellant (1)**

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge  
Section 96.6-2 – Timeliness of Appeal

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

Acea B. Clubb (claimant) appealed a representative's July 6, 2012 decision (reference 02) that concluded he was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment from Manpower International, Inc. (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on September 17, 2012. This appeal was consolidated for hearing with one related appeal, 12A-UI-09363-DT. The claimant participated in the hearing. Bill Schiller appeared on the employer's behalf. During the hearing, Exhibit A-1 was entered into evidence. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

**ISSUES:**

Was the claimant's appeal timely or are there legal grounds under which it should be treated as timely? Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

**OUTCOME:**

Affirmed. Benefits denied.

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

The representative's decision was mailed to the claimant's last-known address of record on July 6, 2012. The claimant did not receive the decision. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by July 16, 2012. The appeal was not filed until it was hand-delivered to a local Agency office on August 2, 2012, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision. The claimant appealed when he did because he was not aware of the disqualification decision until he received the resulting overpayment decision issued on July 24, 2012 (reference 03), the subject of 12A-UI-09363-DT.

The employer is a temporary employment firm. After a prior period of employment working with the employer's Fremont, Iowa business client through another temporary employment firm, the

claimant started working on the assignment for the employer as of October 31, 2011. He worked full time as a general laborer working on the third shift. His last day of work was February 2, 2012. The employer discharged him on that date. The stated reason for the discharge was engaging in horseplay in violation of the employer's safety policies.

The claimant acknowledged that he had shut off gases and valves and taken off hoses that other employees were using; his explanation was that even though this was prohibited horseplay, it was a "common thing that people did." As a result of this safety violation, the business client dismissed the claimant from the assignment.

### **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

The preliminary issue in this case is whether the claimant timely appealed the representative's decision. Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides that unless the affected party (here, the claimant) files an appeal from the decision within ten calendar days, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied as set out by the decision.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. *Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.*, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); *Johnson v. Board of Adjustment*, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. *Messina v. IDJS*, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott*, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. *Hendren v. IESC*, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); *Smith v. IESC*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did not have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was due to Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2), or other factor outside of the claimant's control. The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal should be treated as timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.6-2. Therefore, the administrative law judge has jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See, *Beardslee*, supra; *Franklin*, supra; and *Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company v. Employment Appeal Board*, 465 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa App. 1990).

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer

has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. *Cosper v. IDJS*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982); Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a.

In order to establish misconduct such as to disqualify a former employee from benefits an employer must establish the employee was responsible for a deliberate act or omission which was a material breach of the duties and obligations owed by the employee to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; *Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 275 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 1979); *Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The conduct must show a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; *Huntoon*, supra; *Henry*, supra. In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; *Huntoon*, supra; *Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984).

The claimant's engaging in horseplay contrary to the safety policies shows a willful or wanton disregard of the standard of behavior the employer has the right to expect from an employee, as well as an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests and of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. The employer discharged the claimant for reasons amounting to work-connected misconduct.

#### **DECISION:**

The appeal in this case is treated as timely. The representative's July 6, 2012 decision (reference 02) is affirmed. The employer discharged the claimant for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits as of February 2, 2012. This disqualification continues until the claimant has been paid ten times his weekly benefit amount for insured work, provided he is otherwise eligible. The employer's account will not be charged.

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Lynette A. F. Donner  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

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