BEFORE THE EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD Lucas State Office Building Fourth floor Des Moines, Iowa 50319

PATTY SARREDONDO	:
	HEARING NUMBER: 09B-UI-10368
Claimant,	:
and	: EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD
	: DECISION
ACH FOOD CO INC	:

Employer.

NOTICE

THIS DECISION BECOMES FINAL unless (1) a request for a REHEARING is filed with the Employment Appeal Board within 20 days of the date of the Board's decision or, (2) a PETITION TO DISTRICT COURT IS FILED WITHIN 30 days of the date of the Board's decision.

A REHEARING REQUEST shall state the specific grounds and relief sought. If the rehearing request is denied, a petition may be filed in **DISTRICT COURT** within **30 days** of the date of the denial.

SECTION: 96.5-2A

DECISION

UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS ARE ALLOWED IF OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE

The claimant appealed this case to the Employment Appeal Board. The members of the Employment Appeal Board reviewed the entire record. A majority of the Appeal Board, one member dissenting, finds it cannot affirm the administrative law judge's decision. The majority of the Employment Appeal Board **REVERSES** as set forth below.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The administrative law judge's Findings of Fact are adopted by the Board as its own with the following modifications and additions:

The record does not reflect how many items were involved in the missed pick or what effect the missed pick could theoretically have had on the Employer's business. The Employer has not proven that the Claimant's errors were the result of a disregard of procedure.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) (2009) provides:

Discharge for Misconduct. If the department finds the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and been paid wages for the insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

The Division of Job Service defines misconduct at 871 IAC 24.32(1)(a):

Misconduct is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in the carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

"This is the meaning which has been given the term in other jurisdictions under similar statutes, and we believe it accurately reflects the intent of the legislature." *Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 275 N.W.2d, 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden to prove the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The propriety of a discharge is not at issue in an unemployment insurance case. An employer may be justified in discharging an employee, but the employee's conduct may not amount to misconduct precluding the payment of unemployment compensation. The law limits disqualifying misconduct to substantial and willful wrongdoing or repeated carelessness or negligence that equals willful misconduct in culpability. *Lee v. Employment Appeal Board*, 616 NW2d 661 (Iowa 2000).

When an allegation of misconduct is based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984). Carelessness may be considered misconduct when an employee commits repeated instances of ordinary carelessness. Where the employee has been repeatedly warned about the careless behavior, but continues with the same careless behavior, the repetition of the careless

behavior can constitute misconduct. *See Greene v. Employment Appeal Board*, 426 N.W.2d 659, 661-662 (Iowa App. 1988). "[M]ere negligence is not enough to constitute misconduct." *Lee v. Employment Appeal Board*, 616 N.W.2d 661, 666 (Iowa 2000). Where we are looking at an alleged pattern of negligence we

consider the previous incidents when deciding if there is indeed a "degree of recurrence" that evidences the necessary culpability.

For something to have "recurrence" it must occur more than once. The Employer proved two incidents of errors by the Claimant. Thus the Employer has proved the minimum requirement for recurrence to occur. This weighs against a finding of disgualifying negligence. Still, under the right circumstances, twice may be enough to show "equal culpability" to intentional misconduct. Based on this record, however, we have no idea how serious either error was. We do not know how much product was involved or how much money was at stake. Was she "picking" spice in bottles, boxes, crates, or pallets? We do not know. Also, we have no idea what procedures governed the making of a pick. This is important because more elaborate safeguards against mistakes means that each mistake is more likely the result of carelessness. For example, we have seen printers who have a checklist of procedures, a written description of each run, and who are required to twice proof each run before running a full print job. When such a printer commits even a single repeated error it is likely that more than ordinary negligence is at work. Here we have no evidence of any such safeguards. As far as we know the Claimant did no more than twice reach for one item but actually grab another. And as far as we know the potential for harm to the business was slight. In short, the Employer has proved only "inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances" which is not misconduct. 871 IAC 24.32(1)(a).

We do understand that the Claimant made errors and that this may be enough for the Employer to discharge, but while the employer may have compelling business reasons to terminate the claimant, conduct that might warrant a discharge from employment will not necessarily sustain a disqualification from job insurance benefits. *Budding v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 337 N.W.2d 219 (Iowa App. 1983).

DECISION:

The administrative law judge's decision dated August 6, 2009 is **REVERSED**. The Employment Appeal Board concludes that the claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Accordingly, the Claimant is allowed benefits provided the Claimant is otherwise eligible.

John A. Peno

Elizabeth L. Seiser

ERA/ss

DISSENTING OPINION OF MONIQUE KUESTER :

I respectfully dissent from the majority decision of the Employment Appeal Board; I would affirm the decision of the administrative law judge in its entirety.

Monique F. Kuester

RRA/ss