

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

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**JULIE A HOUSER**  
Claimant

**APPEAL 17A-UI-00813-DG-T**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**CATHOLIC HEALTH INITIATIVES IOWA**  
Employer

**OC: 12/11/16  
Claimant: Respondent (1)**

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Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

Employer filed an appeal from a decision of a representative dated January 12, 2017, (reference 01) that held claimant eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. After due notice, a hearing was scheduled for and held on February 14, 2017. Employer participated by Lori Coniconde, Senior Business Partner. Claimant failed to respond to the hearing notice and did not participate. Employer's Exhibits 1 and 2 were admitted into evidence.

**ISSUE:**

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

The administrative law judge, having heard the testimony and considered all of the evidence in the record, finds: Claimant last worked for employer on October 20, 2016. Employer discharged claimant on December 8, 2016, because employer believed claimant was a bully and that she did not always follow employer's rules.

Claimant began working for employer on September 25, 2003. She was employed as a nursing supervisor in the emergency department at the time of the discharge. Claimant was on a leave of absence when her employment was terminated, and she was notified by a letter that was sent to claimant's last-known address on December 8, 2016.

On or about October 10, 2016 employer received information from another employer that suggested that claimant had issued notes excusing absences that were not accurate or complete. Employer conducted an investigation by interviewing all the involved parties, and the claimant. Claimant admitted that she wrote the notes, and took responsibility for not using good judgment when she wrote notes without performing due diligence as to the content and accuracy of the notes. Claimant received a formal reprimand and was suspended from work on October 21, 2016 through October 23, 2016 without pay. Claimant was also dealing with some personal or medical issues and she took a leave of absence shortly after the dates of her suspension from work.

On November 4, 2016 employer received an “anonymous note” which contained unsubstantiated information from unnamed individuals about the claimant’s misconduct she had been disciplined for on October 21, 2016. The anonymous note indicated that some person or people overheard a conversation about what claimant had done back in September of 2016 which involved the same conduct for which she had been disciplined for in October of 2016. As a result of the anonymous note employer unilaterally decided to investigate the same incident again. Claimant was not at work during that time, and she was not contacted or interviewed during the subsequent investigation. During this investigation some of claimant’s co-workers provided new facts that tended to show claimant did not tell employer the entire story during its first investigation, and it appeared that claimant was not honest about her reasons for providing inaccurate information in the medical notes she had written for individuals.

As a result of employer’s second investigation into the same events that occurred in September of 2016 employer decided to terminate claimant’s employment at that time. Employer sent claimant a letter dated December 8, 2016 which terminated her employment immediately. Claimant was not contacted or allowed to provide additional information to the employer prior to the termination.

**REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
  - a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

- a. “Misconduct” is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith

errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(4) provides:

(4) Report required. The claimant's statement and employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. In cases where a suspension or disciplinary layoff exists, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct shall be resolved.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

The gravity of the incident, number of policy violations and prior warnings are factors considered when analyzing misconduct. The lack of a current warning may detract from a finding of an intentional policy violation. The Iowa Supreme Court has opined that one unexcused absence is not misconduct even when it followed nine other excused absences and was in violation of a direct order. *Sallis v. EAB*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989). *Higgins v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984), held that the absences must be both excessive and unexcused. The Iowa Supreme Court has held that the term "excessive" is more than one. Three incidents of tardiness or absenteeism after a warning has been held to be misconduct. *Clark v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 317 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982). While three is a reasonable interpretation of "excessive" based on current case law and Webster's Dictionary, the interpretation is best derived from the facts presented.

While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based upon such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based upon a current act. A lapse of 11 days from the final act until discharge when claimant was notified on the fourth day that his conduct was grounds for dismissal did not make the final act a "past act." Where an employer gives seven days' notice to the employee that it will consider discharging him, the date of that notice is used to measure whether the act complained of is current. *Greene v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 426 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). An unpublished decision held informally that two calendar weeks or up to ten work days from the final incident to the discharge may be considered a current act. *Milligan v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, No. 10-2098 (Iowa Ct. App. filed June 15, 2011).

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions.

*Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." *Newman v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Id.* Negligence does not constitute misconduct unless recurrent in nature; a single act is not disqualifying unless indicative of a deliberate disregard of the employer's interests. *Henry v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 391 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. *Miller v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). Generally, continued refusal to follow reasonable instructions constitutes misconduct. *Gilliam v. Atlantic Bottling Co.*, 453 N.W.2d 230 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990); however, "Balky and argumentative" conduct is not necessarily disqualifying. *City of Des Moines v. Picray*, (No. \_\_\_-\_\_\_, Iowa Ct. App. filed \_\_\_, 1986).

It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.* In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id.*

When the record is composed solely of hearsay evidence, that evidence must be examined closely in light of the entire record. *Schmitz v. Iowa Dep't Human Servs.*, 461 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). Both the quality and the quantity of the evidence must be evaluated to see whether it rises to the necessary levels of trustworthiness, credibility, and accuracy required by a reasonably prudent person in the conduct of serious affairs. See, Iowa Code § 17A.14 (1). In making the evaluation, the fact-finder should conduct a common sense evaluation of (1) the nature of the hearsay; (2) the availability of better evidence; (3) the cost of acquiring better information; (4) the need for precision; and (5) the administrative policy to be fulfilled. *Schmitz*, 461 N.W.2d at 608.

The Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that if a party has the power to produce more explicit and direct evidence than it chooses to present, the administrative law judge may infer that evidence not presented would reveal deficiencies in the party's case. *Crosser v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Safety*, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976). Mindful of the ruling in *Crosser, id.*, and noting that the employer relied upon second-hand witness reports, the administrative law judge concludes that the anonymous note found by employer is not reliable evidence. It is permissible to infer that the anonymous note was not submitted because it would not have been supportive of the employer's position.

In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation.

A determination as to whether an employee's act is misconduct does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's policy or rule. A violation is not necessarily

disqualifying misconduct even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the incident under its policy.

Inasmuch as employer had warned claimant about the final incident on October 21, 2016 and there were no incidents of alleged misconduct thereafter, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or negligently after the most recent warning. The employer has not established a current or final act of misconduct, and, without such, the history of other incidents need not be examined. Accordingly, benefits are allowed.

**DECISION:**

The decision of the representative dated January 12, 2017 (reference 01) is affirmed. Claimant is eligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits, provided claimant meets all other eligibility requirements.

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Duane L. Golden  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

dlg/rvs