

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

KELSEY C ANTHONY
Claimant

APPEAL NO. 15A-UI-08940-JTT

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

APAC CUSTOMER SERVICES INC
Employer

OC: 07/12/15
Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) – Discharge for Misconduct
Iowa Code Section 96.3(7) – Overpayment

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed a timely appeal from the July 30, 2015, reference 01, decision that that allowed benefits to the claimant provided she was otherwise eligible and that held the employer's account could be charged for benefits, based on an Agency conclusion that the claimant had been discharged for no disqualifying reason. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on August 27, 2015. Claimant Kelsey participated. Tammy Mason represented the employer and presented additional testimony through Veronica Porter. The administrative law judge took official notice of the Agency's record of benefits disbursed to the claimant and received Exhibits One through Eight into evidence.

ISSUES:

Whether the claimant was discharged for misconduct in connection with the employment that disqualifies the claimant for unemployment insurance benefits.

Whether the employer's account may be charged.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Kelsey Anthony was employed by APAC Customer Service, Inc., as a full-time customer service representative from September 2014 until July 16, 2015, when the employer discharged her for attendance when she exceeded the allowable number of points under the employer's attendance point system. The final absences that triggered the discharge occurred on July 13 and 14, 2015. The absences on both dates were due to a bonafide illness and were properly reported to the employer. In addition, Ms. Anthony's absences on both days were supported by a doctor's note. Ms. Anthony had several additional absences between May 28, 2015 and July 7, 2015, but each was due to illness and properly reported to the employer. Ms. Anthony had additional earlier absences, most of which were due to illness and properly reported to the employer. The employer moved forward with discharging Ms. Anthony after warning her on July 8, 2015 that her employment was in jeopardy.

Ms. Anthony established a claim for benefits that was effective July 12, 2015 and received benefits.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in this matter. See Iowa Code section 96.6(2). Misconduct must be substantial in order to justify a denial of unemployment benefits. Misconduct serious enough to warrant the discharge of an employee is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits. See Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000). The focus is on deliberate, intentional, or culpable acts by the employee. See Gimbel v. Employment Appeal Board, 489 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of the current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act(s). The termination of employment must be based on a current act. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). In determining whether the conduct that prompted the discharge constituted a "current act," the administrative law judge considers the date on which the conduct came to the attention of the employer and the date on

which the employer notified the claimant that the conduct subjected the claimant to possible discharge. See also Greene v. EAB, 426 N.W.2d 659, 662 (Iowa App. 1988).

Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. See 871 IAC 24.32(4). When it is in a party's power to produce more direct and satisfactory evidence than is actually produced, it may fairly be inferred that the more direct evidence will expose deficiencies in that party's case. See Crosser v. Iowa Dept. of Public Safety, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976).

In order for a claimant's absences to constitute misconduct that would disqualify the claimant from receiving unemployment insurance benefits, the evidence must establish that the claimant's *unexcused* absences were excessive. See 871 IAC 24.32(7). The determination of whether absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. However, the evidence must first establish that the most recent absence that prompted the decision to discharge the employee was unexcused. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation and oversleeping are considered unexcused. On the other hand, absences related to illness are considered excused, provided the employee has complied with the employer's policy regarding notifying the employer of the absence. Tardiness is a form of absence. See Higgins v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984). Employers may not graft on additional requirements to what is an excused absence under the law. See Gaborit v. Employment Appeal Board, 743 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). For example, an employee's failure to provide a doctor's note in connection with an absence that was due to illness properly reported to the employer will not alter the fact that such an illness would be an excused absence under the law. Gaborit, 743 N.W.2d at 557.

The discharge was triggered by absences that were due to illness and that were properly reported to the employer. Despite the employer's no-fault attendance policy and despite the warning on July 8, 2015, both of those absences were excused absences under the applicable law. Likewise, all of Ms. Anthony's absences going back to May 28, 2015 were excused absences under the applicable law. Accordingly, the evidence fails to establish a current act of misconduct and the discharge was for no disqualifying reason. Ms. Anthony is eligible for benefits, provided she is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged for benefits.

DECISION:

The July 30, 2015, reference 01, decision is affirmed. The claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. The claimant is eligible for benefits, provided she is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged.

James E. Timberland
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

jet/css