

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

DAMIEN C ADAMS

Claimant

APPEAL 16A-UI-06190-LJ-T

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

REMEDY INTELLIGENT STAFFING INC

Employer

OC: 05/01/16

Claimant: Appellant (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct
Iowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quitting
Iowa Code § 96.5(1)j – Voluntary Quitting – Temporary Employment

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed an appeal from the May 27, 2016 (reference 03) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits based upon a determination that claimant voluntarily quit work because of commuting distance. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on June 20, 2016. The claimant, Damien C. Adams, participated. The employer, Remedy Intelligent Staffing, Inc., participated through Becky DeBoer, staffing consultant.

ISSUE:

Did claimant voluntarily leave the employment with good cause attributable to the employer or did employer discharge the claimant for reasons related to job misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of benefits?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full time as a put-away employee from March 1, 2016 until this employment ended on April 22, 2016, when he was discharged from his temporary work assignment and then quit his employment.

Claimant was most recently assigned to work in or near Evansdale, Iowa. He was discharged from this assignment due to absenteeism. According to DeBoer, claimant was tardy on four occasions. His most recent tardy arrival occurred on April 5, 2016, when he was 13 minutes late. He was counseled for this incident on April 6. Several weeks later, the assignment site notified the employer that it no longer wished to employ claimant; due to his tardiness. Claimant had three prior late arrivals: on April 3, claimant was 21 minutes late; on March 27, claimant was three minutes late; and on March 7, claimant was 18 minutes late.

DeBoer contacted claimant to inform him that his assignment had ended. At this time, she asked him if he wanted additional work and he said he did. She then offered him an assignment at Omega Cabinets in Waterloo, Iowa. Claimant refused this assignment and referred to it as “slave labor.” DeBoer never heard back from claimant after this conversation.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from the assignment for no disqualifying reason. The same day, the administrative law judge finds, claimant voluntarily left the employment without good cause attributable to the employer.

It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.* In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id.*

After assessing the credibility of the witnesses who testified during the hearing, considering the applicable factors listed above, and using her own common sense and experience, the administrative law judge finds DeBoer provided credible testimony regarding claimant's separation from employment. DeBoer was able to recall dates, specific details, and quotations from her conversation with claimant. In contrast, claimant did not recall any dates involved in his employment and he provided inconsistent testimony.

The first separation that will be analyzed is claimant's separation from his temporary assignment.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

The employer has the burden to prove the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes

misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).

Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7); *Cosper*, supra; *Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007).

The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. *Higgins* at 192. Second, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper* at 10. The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," *Higgins* at 191, or because it was not "properly reported," holding excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." *Cosper* at 10. The term "absenteeism" also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as "tardiness." An absence is an extended tardiness, and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

A lapse of 11 days from the final act until discharge when claimant was notified on the fourth day that his conduct was grounds for dismissal did not make the final act a "past act." Where an employer gives seven days' notice to the employee that it will consider discharging him, the date of that notice is used to measure whether the act complained of is current. *Greene v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 426 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). An unpublished decision held informally that two calendar weeks or up to ten work days from the final incident to the discharge may be considered a current act. *Milligan v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, No. 10-2098 (Iowa Ct. App. filed June 15, 2011). In reviewing past acts as influencing a current act of misconduct, the ALJ should look at the course of conduct in general, not whether each such past act would constitute disqualifying job misconduct in and of itself. *Attwood v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, No. __-__, (Iowa Ct. App. filed __, 1986).

Inasmuch as the employer had warned claimant about the final incident on April 6 and there were no incidents of alleged misconduct thereafter, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or negligently after the most recent warning. The employer has not established a current or final act of misconduct, and, without such, the history of other incidents need not be examined. Accordingly, claimant's separation from his temporary assignment is a qualifying separation.

The same day, claimant separated from his permanent employment with the employer. Therefore, that separation must also be analyzed.

Iowa Code § 96.5-1-j provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department but the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:

j. The individual is a temporary employee of a temporary employment firm who notifies the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment and who seeks reassignment. Failure of the individual to notify the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment within three working days of the completion of each employment assignment under a contract of hire shall be deemed a voluntary quit unless the individual was not advised in writing of the duty to notify the temporary employment firm upon completion of an employment assignment or the individual had good cause for not contacting the temporary employment firm within three working days and notified the firm at the first reasonable opportunity thereafter.

To show that the employee was advised in writing of the notification requirement of this paragraph, the temporary employment firm shall advise the temporary employee by requiring the temporary employee, at the time of employment with the temporary employment firm, to read and sign a document that provides a clear and concise explanation of the notification requirement and the consequences of a failure to notify. The document shall be separate from any contract of employment and a copy of the signed document shall be provided to the temporary employee.

For the purposes of this paragraph:

(1) "Temporary employee" means an individual who is employed by a temporary employment firm to provide services to clients to supplement their work force during absences, seasonal workloads, temporary skill or labor market shortages, and for special assignments and projects.

(2) "Temporary employment firm" means a person engaged in the business of employing temporary employees.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.26(19) provides:

Voluntary quit with good cause attributable to the employer and separations not considered to be voluntary quits. The following are reasons for a claimant leaving employment with good cause attributable to the employer:

(19) The claimant was employed on a temporary basis for assignment to spot jobs or casual labor work and fulfilled the contract of hire when each of the jobs was completed. An election not to report for a new assignment to work shall not be construed as a voluntary leaving of employment. The issue of a refusal of an offer of suitable work shall be adjudicated when an offer of work is made by the former employer. The provisions of Iowa Code section 96.5(3) and rule 24.24(96) are controlling in the determination of suitability of work. However, this subrule shall not apply to substitute school employees who are subject to the provisions of Iowa Code section 96.4(5) which denies benefits that are based on service in an educational institution when the individual declines or refuses to accept a new contract or reasonable assurance of continued employment status. Under this circumstance, the substitute school employee shall be considered to have voluntarily quit employment.

The purpose of the statute is to provide notice to the temporary agency employer that the claimant is available for work at the conclusion of each temporary assignment so they may be reassigned and continue working. The plain language of the statute allows benefits for a claimant “who notifies the temporary employment firm of completion of an assignment *and* who seeks reassignment.” (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the employer had notice of the claimant’s availability because it notified him of the end of the assignment. During the conversation in which DeBoer told claimant his assignment was ending, she offered him a new assignment. Claimant refused this assignment. He did not report back to the employer subsequently to indicate he was seeking additional work. Claimant’s decision to refuse the assignment the employer offered him is the equivalent of claimant quitting his employment. Nothing about claimant’s conduct demonstrates that he sought additional work. Claimant may have had transportation concerns around this time but these are not good cause for quitting attributable to his former employer. Benefits must be withheld.

DECISION:

The May 27, 2016 (reference 03) unemployment insurance decision is affirmed. Claimant’s separation from the employer was not attributable to the employer. Benefits are withheld until such time as he has worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times his weekly benefit amount, provided he is otherwise eligible.

Elizabeth Johnson
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

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