

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

KATHY J SALOW
Claimant

MANCHESTER FAMILY VISION CENTER PC
Employer

APPEAL 15A-UI-00707-H2T

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

OC: 11/30/14
Claimant: Appellant (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Leaving
Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge/Misconduct
Iowa Code § 96.6-2 – Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed an appeal from the December 30, 2014, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits through December 20, 2014. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on February 26, 2015. Claimant participated. Employer participated through Dianna Schwery, Office Manager. Department's Exhibit D-1 was entered and received into the record.

ISSUES:

Did the claimant file a timely appeal?

Did the claimant voluntarily quit her employment without good cause attributable to the employer or was she discharged due to job connected misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full-time as a front desk clerk optometric assistant beginning on November 4, 1998 through November 26, 2014 when she was discharged. The claimant gave the employer her notice of intent to quit on November 17 and indicated her last day of work would be December 19. The claimant was quitting because she had accepted another job that was to begin on January 5, 2015. The claimant has since started working with for her new employer. The employer hired her replacement before December 17 so they let her go prior to the expiration of her notice period.

The claimant received the decision that allowed benefits only until December 20, 2014 before the due date of the appeal on January 9, 2015. She did not read the decision thoroughly enough to understand that she had to file her appeal before January 9, 2015. The claimant filed her appeal on January 15, 2015 which is after the due date listed in the decision.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant's appeal is untimely.

Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. *Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.*, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); *Johnson v. Board of Adjustment*, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. *Messina v. IDJS*, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott*, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion.

Hendren v. IESC, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); *Smith v. IESC*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.6(2), and the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).

If a higher authority should determine the claimant's appeal timely, for the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant voluntarily left the employment without good cause attributable to the employer, but was discharged for no disqualifying reason prior to the intended resignation date.

Iowa Code § 96.5-1 provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency,

unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(38) provides:

Voluntary quit without good cause. In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.5. However, the claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving Iowa Code section 96.5, subsection (1), paragraphs "a" through "i," and subsection 10. The following reasons for a voluntary quit shall be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer:

(38) Where the claimant gave the employer an advance notice of resignation which caused the employer to discharge the claimant prior to the proposed date of resignation, no disqualification shall be imposed from the last day of work until the proposed date of resignation; however, benefits will be denied effective the proposed date of resignation.

Claimant's decision to quit because to accept another job was not a good cause reason attributable to the employer. Because the discharge was in response to a resignation notice no misconduct is established and since the employer terminated the employment relationship in advance of the resignation notice effective date, the claimant is entitled to benefits from the date of termination until the effective date of the proposed resignation.

DECISION:

The December 30, 2014 (reference 01) decision is affirmed. The claimant's appeal was not timely. The claimant voluntarily left her employment without good cause attributable to the employer, but was discharged prior to the resignation effective date. Benefits are allowed until December 20, 2014. Thereafter, benefits are withheld until such time as the claimant works in and has been paid wages equal to ten times her weekly benefit amount.

Teresa K. Hillary
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

tkh/pjs