IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

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Claimant: Respondent (2/R)

	00-0137 (9-00) - 3091078 - El
WILLIAM C MARSHALL	APPEAL NO: 14A-UI-02170-DT
Claimant	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION
CRST VAN EXPEDITED INC Employer	
	OC: 01/19/14

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge Section 96.3-7 – Recovery of Overpayment of Benefits

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

CRST Van Expedited, Inc. (employer) appealed a representative's February 17, 2014 decision (reference 01) that concluded William C. Marshall (claimant) was qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on March 19, 2014. The claimant participated in the hearing. Sandy Matt appeared on the employer's behalf and presented testimony from one other witness, Betty Blevins. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

OUTCOME:

Reversed. Benefits denied.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer on April 4, 2012. He worked full time as an over-the-road truck driver and trainer. His last day of work was December 20, 2013. The employer discharged him on or about that date. The stated reason for the discharge was receiving a citation for improper backing only five days after having been given a speeding ticket for going 15 miles per hour over the limit.

On December 15 the claimant was driving in New Mexico when he approached a 45 mile per hour zone. He did not see the first speed limit sign, and by the time he saw the second sign, he could not get the truck's speed down in time. He was cited for driving 60 miles per hour in a 45 zone.

The employer has a strict policy against speeding which provides that a driver will be discharged for driving more than ten miles over the posted speed limit. After the claimant got his citation on December 15, the claimant's fleet manager/dispatcher told him that he would try to get an exception for the claimant because of his previous good driving record. However, on December 20 the claimant was involved in a fender bender in Illinois where he backed up and hit a car, getting a citation for improper backing. After this incident on the heels of the speeding citation which had already put his job in jeopardy, the fleet manager/dispatcher informed him that there was nothing more that he could do for the claimant, that he was discharged.

The claimant established a claim for unemployment insurance benefits effective January 19, 2014. The claimant has received unemployment insurance benefits after the separation. The evidence is not clear regarding the employer's participation in the fact-finding interview; some evidence was presented to the effect that the employer's representative was available for the fact-finding interview but was not called.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. *Cosper v. IDJS*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982); Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a.

In order to establish misconduct such as to disqualify a former employee from benefits an employer must establish the employee was responsible for a deliberate act or omission which was a material breach of the duties and obligations owed by the employee to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; *Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 275 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 1979); *Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The conduct must show a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; *Huntoon*, supra; *Henry*, supra. In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; *Huntoon*, supra; *Newman v. lowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984).

The claimant's having a second safety violation less than a week after a speeding citation that he knew was already putting his job in jeopardy shows a willful or wanton disregard of the standard of behavior the employer has the right to expect from an employee, as well as an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests and of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. The employer discharged the claimant for reasons amounting to work-connected misconduct.

The unemployment insurance law provides that benefits must be recovered from a claimant who receives benefits and is later determined to be ineligible for benefits, even though the claimant acted in good faith and was not otherwise at fault. However, the overpayment will not be recovered when it is based on a reversal on appeal of an initial determination to award benefits on an issue regarding the claimant's employment separation if: (1) the benefits were not

received due to any fraud or willful misrepresentation by the claimant and (2) the employer did not participate in the initial proceeding to award benefits. The employer will not be charged for benefits whether or not the overpayment is recovered. Iowa Code § 96.3-7. In this case, the claimant has received benefits but was ineligible for those benefits. The matter of determining the amount of the overpayment and whether the claimant is eligible for a waiver of overpayment under Iowa Code § 96.3-7-b is remanded the Claims Section.

DECISION:

The representative's February 17, 2014 decision (reference 01) is reversed. The employer discharged the claimant for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits as of December 20, 2013. This disqualification continues until the claimant has been paid ten times his weekly benefit amount for insured work, provided he is otherwise eligible. The employer's account will not be charged. The matter is remanded to the Claims Section for investigation and determination of the overpayment issue.

Lynette A. F. Donner Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/pjs