## IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

MARIA X CASTILLO Claimant

# APPEAL NO. 20A-UI-02047-JTT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

WELLS ENTERPRISES INC

Employer

OC: 09/15/19 Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) – Discharge Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(8) – Current Act Requirement

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Maria Castillo filed a timely appeal from the February 24, 2020, reference 01, decision that disqualified her for benefits and that relieved the employer's account of liability for benefits, based on the deputy's conclusion that the claimant was discharged on January 20, 2020 for excessive unexcused absences. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on April 21, 2020. Ms. Castillo participated. Stacey Roupe represented the employer. Spanish-English interpreter Illian Ramirez of CTS Language Link assisted with the hearing.

#### **ISSUE:**

Whether the claimant was discharged for misconduct in connection with the employment that disqualifies the claimant for unemployment insurance benefits.

#### FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Maria Castillo was employed by Wells Enterprises, Inc. as a full-time CATB helper from February 2018 until January 21, 2020, when the employer discharged her from the employment for attendance. The final absence that factored in the discharge was a three-day absence during the first week of November 2019, when Ms. Castillo was absent due to illness and properly reported the absences pursuant to the employer's absence reporting requirement. The employer imposed the additional requirement that any absences due to illness be approved by the employer's third-party leave administrator for coverage under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Ms. Castillo was discharged on January 21, 2020, third-party leave administrator gave notice that it would not approve the absences for FMLA coverage. The employer then discharged the claimant from the employment.

After the November absences that triggered the discharge, Ms. Castillo was again absent due to illness and with proper notice to the employer on December 4 and December 20, 2019. After each of the absences, Ms. Castillo returned to work and continued to perform her duties until she was discharged on January 21, 2020.

## **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)(a) provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits, regardless of the source of the individual's wage credits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The disqualification shall continue until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)(a) provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in this matter. See Iowa Code section 96.6(2). Misconduct must be substantial in order to justify a denial of unemployment benefits. Misconduct serious enough to warrant the discharge of an employee is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits. See *Lee v. Employment Appeal Board*, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000). The focus is on deliberate, intentional, or culpable acts by the employee. See *Gimbel v. Employment Appeal Board*, 489 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of the current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act(s). The termination of employment must be based on a current act. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). In determining whether the conduct that prompted the discharge constituted a "current act," the administrative law judge considers the date on which the conduct came to the attention of the employer and the date on which the employer notified the claimant that the conduct subjected the claimant to possible discharge. See also *Greene v. EAB*, 426 N.W.2d 659, 662 (Iowa App. 1988).

Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. See 871 IAC 24.32(4).

In order for a claimant's absences to constitute misconduct that would disqualify the claimant from receiving unemployment insurance benefits, the evidence must establish that the claimant's unexcused absences were excessive. See Iowa Administrative Code rule 871-24.32(7). The determination of whether absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. However, the evidence must first establish that the most recent absence that prompted the decision to discharge the employee was unexcused. See Iowa Administrative Code rule 871-24.32(8). Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation and oversleeping are considered unexcused. On the other hand, absences related to illness are considered excused, provided the employee has complied with the employer's policy regarding notifying the employer of the absence. Tardiness is a form of absence. See Higgins v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984). Employers may not graft on additional requirements to what is an excused absence under the law. See Gaborit v. Employment Appeal Board, 743 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). For example, an employee's failure to provide a doctor's note in connection with an absence that was due to illness properly reported to the employer will not alter the fact that such an illness would be an excused absence under the law. Gaborit, 743 N.W.2d at 557.

The evidence in the record establishes a discharge for no disqualifying reason. Each of the absences in November and December 2019 was for illness, was properly reported to the employer, and therefore was an excused absence under the applicable law, regardless of whether the employer's third-party leave administrator approved it for FMLA coverage. Even if each of the above absences had been unexcused absences under the applicable law, an absence that occurred a month or two months more prior to the discharge cannot be deemed a current act when determining eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits. Ms. Castillo is eligible for benefits, provided she meets all other eligibility requirements. The employer's account may be charged for benefits.

# DECISION:

The February 24, 2020, reference 01, decision is reversed. The claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. The discharge was effective January 21, 2020. The discharge was not based on a current act. The claimant is eligible for benefits, provided she is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged.

Tamer & Timberland

James E. Timberland Administrative Law Judge

April 22, 2020 Decision Dated and Mailed

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