IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

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### IOWA DERMATOLOGY CLINIC PLC 6000 UNIVERSITY AVE #350 WEST DES MOINES IA 50266

# Appeal Number:05A-UI-11011-LTOC:10-09-05R:Olaimant:Respondent (1)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.* 

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

#### STATE CLEARLY

- 1. The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- 3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)

(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a - Discharge/Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Employer filed a timely appeal from the October 25, 2005, reference 01, decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on November 10, 2005. Claimant did participate. Employer did participate through Charles Love, M.D.; and Kristina Warren, RN.

## FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed as a full-time nurse from June 1 2005 through October 10, 2005, when she was discharged. Lisa Donato, head nurse and claimant's immediate supervisor, advised her on or about September 20 that she needed to look for another job but did not tell her why or confront her about using "pain lollipops" (phentonal) during the work day, slurred speech or "spaciness." Donato did not participate in the hearing. Nor did anyone else confront her about the issue,

require a drug screen, or advise her to discontinue her pain medication while at work or face discharge. Donato initially said she would allow her to work until November 1, but after claimant declined to submit a letter of resignation, Donato discharged her on October 10. The only issues employer had raised with claimant were that she was "not fast enough", did not help enough in the office with phone calls, and called patients "kiddo" and "honey." Claimant advised Donato in June 2005 after she was hired that she took prescribed pain medications for several chronic pain conditions (fibromyalgia, peripheral myopathy and degenerative disc disease). She also showed her the pain lollipops.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

871 IAC 24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. <u>Cosper v.</u> <u>Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. <u>Infante v. IDJS</u>, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. <u>Pierce v. IDJS</u>, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. <u>Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. Miller v. Employment Appeal Board, 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa App. 1988).

While it is inappropriate for a health care professional to work while ingesting narcotics, even if prescribed, employer did not warn her to stop or ever directly confront her about that concern. An employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. Inasmuch as employer had not previously warned claimant about consuming narcotics during the workday, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or negligently against a specific instruction or rule. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written) and reasonable notice should be given.

Because employer delayed the separation for about three weeks after the announced discharge so she could look for a job, it has not established a current or final act of misconduct. If employer believed the conduct was so heinous as to require her discharge, then immediate termination would have been in order, but employer essentially acquiesced to the consumption of narcotics by allowing her to continue working after the decision was made to discharge on September 20. Accordingly, benefits are allowed.

## DECISION:

The October 25, 2005, reference 01, decision is affirmed. The claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

dml/kjw