IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

	68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - El
JOSE J BERBER Claimant	APPEAL NO: 11A-UI-00756-DT
	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION
MARSDEN BLDG MAINTENANCE LLC Employer	
	OC: 10/17/10 Claimant: Appellant (2)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Jose J. Berber (claimant) appealed a representative's January 7, 2011 decision (reference 02) that concluded he was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment with Marsden Building Maintenance, L.L.C. (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on March 14, 2011. The claimant participated in the hearing. The employer's representative received the hearing notice and responded by calling the Appeals Section on February 18, 2011. The representative indicated that Jeffrey Allen would be available at the scheduled time for the hearing at a specified telephone number. However, when the administrative law judge called that number at the scheduled time for the hearing, Mr. Allen was not available; therefore, the employer did not participate in the hearing. Steven Rhoades served as interpreter. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the claimant, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

After a prior period of employment with the employer, the claimant most recently began working for the employer on May 4, 2010. He worked full-time as special service provider doing carpet cleaning, normally working 5:00 p.m. to 1:30 a.m., Monday through Friday. His last day of work was a special overtime shift on Sunday, October 10, 2010. The employer suspended him on October 11 and discharged him on October 13, 2010. The reason asserted for the discharge was that he had come back early from his overtime assignment.

The overtime was to do a special cleaning job that had been indicated would take eight hours. The claimant finished the job in seven hours, and so he returned to the employer's offices. Because he had not stayed for the full eight hours, he was suspended and discharged.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-

a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. <u>Cosper v. IDJS</u>, 321 N.W.2d 6 (lowa 1982). The question is not whether the employer was right to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. <u>Infante v. IDJS</u>, 364 N.W.2d 262 (lowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate matters. <u>Pierce v. IDJS</u>, 425 N.W.2d 679 (lowa App. 1988).

In order to establish misconduct such as to disqualify a former employee from benefits, an employer must establish the employee was responsible for a deliberate act or omission that was a material breach of the duties and obligations owed by the employee to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 1979); <u>Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The conduct must show a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; <u>Huntoon</u>, supra; <u>Henry</u>, supra. In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good-faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; <u>Huntoon</u>, supra; <u>Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984).

The reason cited by the employer for discharging the claimant is his leaving the job when it was done an hour prior to the estimated time. Under the circumstances of this case, the claimant's early departure was at worst the result of inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, inadvertence, or ordinary negligence in an isolated instance, and was a good-faith error in judgment or discretion. The employer has not met its burden to show disqualifying misconduct. <u>Cosper</u>, supra. Based upon the evidence provided, the claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

DECISION:

The representative's January 7, 2011 decision (reference 02) is reversed. The employer did discharge the claimant, but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if he is otherwise eligible.

Lynette A. F. Donner Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/kjw