

**BEFORE THE  
EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD  
Lucas State Office Building  
Fourth floor  
Des Moines, Iowa 50319**

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**DELANIE N PARKER**

Claimant

and

**TYSON FRESH MEATS INC**

Employer

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**HEARING NUMBER: 15B-UI-10142**

**EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD  
DECISION**

**NOTICE**

**THIS DECISION BECOMES FINAL** unless (1) a **request for a REHEARING** is filed with the Employment Appeal Board within **20 days** of the date of the Board's decision or, (2) a **PETITION TO DISTRICT COURT IS FILED WITHIN 30 days** of the date of the Board's decision.

A **REHEARING REQUEST** shall state the specific grounds and relief sought. If the rehearing request is denied, a petition may be filed in **DISTRICT COURT** within **30 days** of the date of the denial.

**SECTION: 96.5-2-A**

**DECISION**

**UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS ARE DENIED**

The Employer appealed this case to the Employment Appeal Board. The members of the Employment Appeal Board reviewed the entire record. A majority of the Appeal Board, one member dissenting, finds it cannot affirm the administrative law judge's decision. The majority of the Employment Appeal Board **REVERSES** as set forth below.

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Delanie Parker (Claimant) worked for Tyson Fresh Meats (Employer) as a full-time maintenance worker from August 2014 until she was fired on August 13, 2015 because she left work without permission.

Claimant was scheduled to work 8 hours on August 11, 2015. The management team noticed that there were some items that needed cleaned and prepped to continue operations. The maintenance team was contacted by management and told that the team would have to work a 12-hour shift on that date to get the work done. The Claimant was told of this requirement around 10:45. The Claimant reacted to the news by throwing a face shield and yelling that there was "no fucking way" she was going to work the 12 hours, or words to that effect. At the end of the 8 hours the Claimant came to Ki Schmidt, Maintenance Supervisor, to turn in her time sheet to get signed. Mr. Schmidt refused, reiterating that she had to work 12 hours and warning her that leaving would be considered job abandonment. The Claimant indicated that she did not care, and left.

## REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) (2015) provides:

*Discharge for Misconduct.* If the department finds the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and been paid wages for the insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

The Division of Job Service defines misconduct at 871 IAC 24.32(1)(a):

*Misconduct* is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in the carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

"This is the meaning which has been given the term in other jurisdictions under similar statutes, and we believe it accurately reflects the intent of the legislature." *Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 275 N.W.2d, 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden to prove the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The propriety of a discharge is not at issue in an unemployment insurance case. An employer may be justified in discharging an employee, but the employee's conduct may not amount to misconduct precluding the payment of unemployment compensation. The law limits disqualifying misconduct to substantial and willful wrongdoing or repeated carelessness or negligence that equals willful misconduct in culpability. *Lee v. Employment Appeal Board*, 616 NW2d 661 (Iowa 2000).

More specifically, continued failure to follow reasonable instructions constitutes misconduct. *See Gilliam v. Atlantic Bottling Company*, 453 N.W.2d 230 (Iowa App. 1990). An employee's failure to perform a specific task may not constitute misconduct if such failure is in good faith or for good cause. *See Woods v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 327 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Iowa 1982). The Board must analyze situations involving alleged insubordination by evaluating the reasonableness of the employer's request in light of the circumstances, along with the worker's reason for non-compliance. *See Endicott v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 367 N.W.2d 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).

Good faith is measured by an objective standard of reasonableness. “The key question is what a reasonable person would have believed under the circumstances.” *Aalbers v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 431 N.W.2d 330, 337 (Iowa 1988); *accord O’Brien v. EAB*, 494 N.W.2d 660 (Iowa 1993)(objective good faith is test in quits for good cause).

It is the duty of the Board as the ultimate trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The Board, as the finder of fact, may believe all, part or none of any witness’s testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, as well as the weight to give other evidence, a Board member should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In determining the facts, and deciding what evidence to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other evidence the Board believes; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness’s conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). The Board also gives weight to the opinion of the Administrative Law Judge concerning credibility and weight of evidence, particularly where the hearing is in-person, although the Board is not bound by that opinion. Iowa Code §17A.10(3); *Iowa State Fairgrounds Security v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission*, 322 N.W.2d 293, 294 (Iowa 1982). The findings of fact show how we have resolved the disputed factual issues in this case. We have carefully weighed the credibility of the witnesses and the reliability of the evidence considering the applicable factors listed above, and the Board’s collective common sense and experience. We have found credible the evidence provided by the Employer, including the witness statements, setting out that the Claimant was told of the requirement to stay, was warned that she would be considered to have abandoned work, but angrily refused.

In insubordination cases such as this we balance the employer’s interests against the good faith reasons, if any, a claimant may have for refusing to comply with an order. The Employer’s interest is the typical one of having its employees come to work when they tell them to. The Claimant’s interest seems to be little more than she really didn’t want to work the additional hours. The Claimant was told hours beforehand that she would be needed to work 12 hours that day. But the Claimant then refused to stay, and cursed while doing so, and provides no explanation for why she refused. The only way this isn’t misconduct is if a worker can just leave whenever they want. But this is not the rule. This case is similar to *Endicott v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Service*, 367 N.W.2d 300 (Iowa App.1985) where the court found misconduct based on refusal of overtime. This case has the added aspect of the disrespectful comments made at the time that the Claimant refused the overtime. This case is more clearly a case of misconduct than *Endicott*. Benefits are denied.

Finally, since the Administrative Law Judge allowed benefits and in so doing affirmed a decision of the claims representative the Claimant falls under the double affirmance rule:

871 IAC 23.43(3) Rule of two affirmances.

- a. Whenever an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative or the employment appeal board of the Iowa department of inspections and appeals affirms the decision of an administrative law judge, allowing payment of benefits, such benefits shall be paid regardless of any further appeal.

b. However, if the decision is subsequently reversed by higher authority:

- (1) The protesting employer involved shall have all charges removed for all payments made on such claim.
- (2) All payments to the claimant will cease as of the date of the reversed decision unless the claimant is otherwise eligible.
- (3) No overpayment shall accrue to the claimant because of payment made prior to the reversal of the decision.

Thus the Employer's account may not be charged for any benefits paid so far to the Claimant for the weeks in question, but the Claimant will not be required to repay benefits already received.

**DECISION:**

The administrative law judge's decision dated October 5, 2015 is **REVERSED**. The Employment Appeal Board concludes that the claimant was discharged for disqualifying misconduct. Accordingly, she is denied benefits until such time the Claimant has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the Claimant's weekly benefit amount, provided the Claimant is otherwise eligible. See, Iowa Code section 96.5(2)"a".

No remand for determination of overpayment need be made under the double affirmance rule, 871 IAC 23.43(3), but still the Employer's account may not be charged.

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Kim D. Schmett

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James M. Strohman

**DISSENTING OPINION OF ASHLEY R. KOOPMANS:**

I respectfully dissent from the majority decision of the Employment Appeal Board; I would affirm the decision of the administrative law judge in its entirety.

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Ashley R. Koopmans