

observed Ms. Vessell was still working. She made eye contact with him, at which time they traded greetings with each other. (8:48-9:15; 10:54-11:00) He then ordered lunch and left. The next day, the Employer terminated the Claimant "for deceit." (5:24-5:28)

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) (2013) provides:

Discharge for Misconduct. If the department finds the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and been paid wages for the insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

The Division of Job Service defines misconduct at 871 IAC 24.32(1)(a):

Misconduct is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in the carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The Iowa Supreme court has accepted this definition as reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Lee v. Employment Appeal Board*, 616 N.W.2d 661, 665, (Iowa 2000) (quoting *Reigelsberger v. Employment Appeal Board*, 500 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Iowa 1993)).

The employer has the burden to prove the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The propriety of a discharge is not at issue in an unemployment insurance case. An employer may be justified in discharging an employee, but the employee's conduct may not amount to misconduct precluding the payment of unemployment compensation. The law limits disqualifying misconduct to substantial and willful wrongdoing or repeated carelessness or negligence that equals willful misconduct in culpability. *Lee v. Employment Appeal Board*, 616 NW2d 661 (Iowa 2000).

The Employer was the only party to participate in the hearing in which he provided credible testimony that the Claimant was absent purportedly due to illness, but yet reported to work at her other place of employment. The Claimant was unavailable to refute the Employer's testimony that he witnessed her on two different occasions on that same day she called off work, actually performing services as an employee at Taco Bell on both occasions.

The Employer was not unreasonable in presuming the Claimant was dishonest about her absence. The Claimant needn't have been forewarned that such behavior could put her job in jeopardy, as any reasonable person should know that skipping work by calling in sick to work for another employer is fraudulent. An Employer has a right to expect its employees to report to work when scheduled. Ms. Vessell's calling off work at Panera's when she could have reported to work there (yet went to work at Taco Bell) goes against the Employer's interests. Based on this record, we conclude that the Employer satisfied their burden of proof.

DECISION:

The administrative law judge's decision dated March 27, 2018 is **REVERSED**. The Employment Appeal Board concludes that the Claimant was discharged for disqualifying misconduct. Accordingly, she is denied benefits until such time she has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times her weekly benefit amount, provided she is otherwise eligible. See, Iowa Code section 96.5(2)"a".

The Employer submitted additional evidence to the Board which was not contained in the administrative file and which was not submitted to the administrative law judge. While the additional evidence was reviewed for the purposes of determining whether admission of the evidence was warranted despite it not being presented at hearing, the Employment Appeal Board, in its discretion, finds that the admission of the additional evidence is not warranted in reaching today's decision. There is no sufficient cause why the new and additional information submitted by the Employer was not presented at hearing. Accordingly all the new and additional information submitted has not been relied upon in making our decision, and has received no weight whatsoever, but rather has been wholly disregarded.

Kim D. Schmett

Ashley R. Koopmans

James M. Strohman