

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

CUTTICCA D CALDWELL

Claimant

APPEAL NO: 07A-UI-06009-DT

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

AFFINA LLC

Employer

**OC: 05/28/06 R: 03
Claimant: Appellant (1)**

§ 17A.12-3 – Non-appearance of Party
871 IAC 26.8(5) – Decision on the Record

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

An appeal was filed from a representative's unemployment insurance decision dated June 6, 2007 (reference 02) that concluded Cutticca D. Caldwell (claimant/appellant) was not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment from Affina, L.L.C. (employer/respondent) because that issue had been previously determined in a prior claim year. A telephone hearing was scheduled for 9:00 a.m. on July 3, 2007 in conjunction with one related appeal, 07A-UI-06008-DT. The claimant received the hearing notice and responded by calling the Appeals Section on June 19, 2007. She indicated that she would be available at the scheduled time for the hearing at a specified telephone number. However, when the administrative law judge called that number at the scheduled time for the hearing, the claimant was not available. Therefore, the claimant did not participate in the hearing. The employer responded to the hearing notice and indicated that Lynn Klein would participate as the employer's representative. When the administrative law judge contacted Ms. Klein for the hearing, she agreed that the administrative law judge should make a determination based upon a review of the information in the administrative file. Based on the appellant's failure to participate in the hearing, the administrative file, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law and decision.

ISSUE:

Should the representative's decision be affirmed on a basis of a review of the available information?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The parties were properly notified of the scheduled hearing on this appeal. The appellant failed to be available at the scheduled day and time set for the hearing and did not participate in the hearing or request a postponement of the hearing as required by the hearing notice. The reason the claimant was not available when the administrative law judge called for the hearing was that she was taking a shower and the person she had asked to listen for the phone had not realized the claimant's phone had rung because the phone had been set on vibrate.

A determination on the claimant's May 25, 2006 separation from the employer was initially determined in a representative's June 16, 2006 decision. As determined in the concurrently issued decision in appeal 07A-UI-06008-DT, that decision was not timely appealed and became final, and it has now been affirmed.

The administrative law judge has conducted a careful review of the administrative file to determine whether the unemployment insurance decision should be affirmed.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

If a party fails to make a timely appeal of a representative's decision and there is no legal excuse under which the appeal can be deemed to have been made timely, the decision as to the merits has become final and is not subject to further review.

Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides in pertinent part:

The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. . . . Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); Johnson v. Board of Adjustment, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976). Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. Messina v. IDJS, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also In re Appeal of Elliott, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. Hendren v. IESC, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); Smith v. IESC, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

871 IAC 24.35(2) provides in pertinent part:

The submission of any payment, appeal, application, request, notice, objection, petition, report or other information or document not within the specified statutory or regulatory

period shall be considered timely if it is established to the satisfaction of the department that the delay in submission was due to department error or misinformation or to delay or other action of the United States postal service or its successor.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2) or other factors outside the appellant's control. The administrative law judge further concludes that because the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.6-2, the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal, regardless of whether the merits of the appeal would be valid. See, Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979); Franklin, supra; and Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company v. Employment Appeal Board, 465 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa App. 1990).

Even if the appeal was treated as timely, the decision should be affirmed on the merits.

The Iowa Administrative Procedures Act § 17A.12-3 provides in pertinent part:

If a party fails to appear or participate in a contested case proceeding after proper service of notice, the presiding officer may, if no adjournment is granted, enter a default decision or proceed with the hearing and make a decision in the absence of the party. ... If a decision is rendered against a party who failed to appear for the hearing and the presiding officer is timely requested by that party to vacate the decision for good cause, the time for initiating a further appeal is stayed pending a determination by the presiding officer to grant or deny the request. If adequate reasons are provided showing good cause for the party's failure to appear, the presiding officer shall vacate the decision and, after proper service of notice, conduct another evidentiary hearing. If adequate reasons are not provided showing good cause for the party's failure to appear, the presiding officer shall deny the motion to vacate.

871 IAC 26.8(3), (4) and (5) provide:

Withdrawals and postponements.

(3) If, due to emergency or other good cause, a party, having received due notice, is unable to attend a hearing or request postponement within the prescribed time, the presiding officer may, if no decision has been issued, reopen the record and, with notice to all parties, schedule another hearing. If a decision has been issued, the decision may be vacated upon the presiding officer's own motion or at the request of a party within 15 days after the mailing date of the decision and in the absence of an appeal to the employment appeal board of the department of inspections and appeals. If a decision is vacated, notice shall be given to all parties of a new hearing to be held and decided by another presiding officer. Once a decision has become final as provided by statute, the presiding officer has no jurisdiction to reopen the record or vacate the decision.

(4) A request to reopen a record or vacate a decision may be heard ex parte by the presiding officer. The granting or denial of such a request may be used as a grounds for appeal to the employment appeal board of the department of inspections and appeals upon the issuance of the presiding officer's final decision in the case.

(5) If good cause for postponement or reopening has not been shown, the presiding officer shall make a decision based upon whatever evidence is properly in the record.

The administrative law judge has carefully reviewed evidence in the record and concludes that the unemployment insurance decision previously entered in this case is correct and should be affirmed. 871 IAC 26.8(5).

Pursuant to the rule, the appellant must make a written request to the administrative law judge that the hearing be reopened within 15 days after the mailing date of this decision. The written request should be mailed to the administrative law judge at the address listed at the beginning of this decision and must explain the emergency or other good cause that prevented the appellant from participating in the hearing at its scheduled time.

DECISION:

The representative's unemployment insurance decision dated June 6, 2007 (reference 02) is affirmed. The separation was previously determined to be disqualifying, and that determination was not timely appealed and became final. The decision disqualifying the claimant from receiving benefits remains in effect. This decision will become final unless a written request establishing good cause to reopen the record is made to the administrative law judge within 15 days of the date of this decision.

Lynette A. F. Donner
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/pjs