IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

SANDRA L GANDARA

Claimant

APPEAL 14A-UI-11758-H2T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

NORDSTROM INC

Employer

OC: 08/31/14

Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge/Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed an appeal from the November 10, 2014, (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on December 4, 2014. Claimant participated. Employer participated through Jill McDowell, Human Resources Assistant; Brandy Lindsey, Human Resources Director and was and was represented by Tom Kuiper of Talx UCM Services Inc.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged due to job connected misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full-time as a returns inspection processor beginning on November 1, 2007 through December 26, 2012 when she was discharged. The claimant last actually worked on October 5, 2011 after sustaining a work-related injury in February 2011. She was released to return to work with permanent work restrictions effective December 26, 2012. The employer was unable to accommodate her permanent work restrictions and return her to her former position of returns inspection processor. The claimant had exhausted all of her FMLA leave and any other leave afforded her by the employer. The claimant was not offered a job that complied with her work restrictions but was offered the opportunity to apply for open positions within the company and if she was able to pass the assessments she had the chance of being offered another position. The claimant's employment ended when she was not able to return to her former position due to her work restrictions that arose for her work-related injury.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. lowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (lowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (lowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (lowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Newman v. lowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (lowa App. 1984). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. *Miller v. Employment Appeal Board*, 423 N.W.2d 211 (lowa App. 1988).

The claimant is not able to return to her former position because the employer is not able to accommodate her permanent work restrictions. The claimant has work restrictions as a result of the injury she sustained while at work. In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to

public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. The conduct for which claimant was discharged; physically being unable to perform all of the functions of her job due to a work related injury is not job connected misconduct. The employer is not able to accommodate the claimant's permanent work restrictions. The claimant was not offered another position, but only the chance to apply for other positions. Her separation is properly classified as a discharge. The employer has not met their burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or with recurrent negligence in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

DECISION:

The November 10, 2014 (reference 02) decision is affirmed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

Teresa K. Hillary Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

tkh/pjs