

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

TIFFANY A BOLL
Claimant

APPEAL NO. 12A-UI-00638-LT

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

CARE INITIATIVES
Employer

**OC: 12/04/11
Claimant: Appellant (2)**

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct
Iowa Code § 96.5(1)d – Voluntary Leaving/Illness or Injury
Iowa Code § 96.4(3) – Ability to and Availability for Work

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Claimant filed an appeal from the January 6, 2012 (reference 01) decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held by telephone conference call on February 15, 2012. Claimant participated. Employer participated through Assistant DON Heather William and Payroll Clerk Michelle Jungjohann and was represented by David Williams of TALX. Claimant's Exhibit A was admitted to the record.

ISSUE:

Did claimant voluntarily leave the employment with good cause attributable to employer or did employer discharge claimant for reasons related to job misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of benefits and was she able to and available for work effective December 4, 2011?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full-time as a CNA and was separated from employment on December 8, 2011. Her last day of work was October 31, 2011. Employer terminated her employment at the end of her Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave period because of a non-work-related medical issue. She was invited to "reapply" for employment upon a full medical release. (Claimant's Exhibit A) She remains on light duty requiring part-time hours, without prolonged standing. She is seeking work in customer service or a call center and is a substitute teacher. She is exploring going back to school.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant did not quit but was discharged for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-1-d provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department. But the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:

d. The individual left employment because of illness, injury or pregnancy upon the advice of a licensed and practicing physician, and upon knowledge of the necessity for absence immediately notified the employer, or the employer consented to the absence, and after recovering from the illness, injury or pregnancy, when recovery was certified by a licensed and practicing physician, the individual returned to the employer and offered to perform services and the individual's regular work or comparable suitable work was not available, if so found by the department, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.25(35) provides:

Voluntary quit without good cause. In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.5. However, the claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving Iowa Code § 96.5, subsection (1), paragraphs "a" through "i," and subsection 10. The following reasons for a voluntary quit shall be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer:

(35) The claimant left because of illness or injury which was not caused or aggravated by the employment or pregnancy and failed to:

- (a) Obtain the advice of a licensed and practicing physician;
- (b) Obtain certification of release for work from a licensed and practicing physician;
- (c) Return to the employer and offer services upon recovery and certification for work by a licensed and practicing physician; or
- (d) Fully recover so that the claimant could perform all of the duties of the job.

An absence is not voluntary if returning to work would jeopardize the employee's health. A physician's work restriction is evidence an employee is not medically able to work. *Wilson Trailer Co. v. Iowa Emp't. Sec. Comm'n*, 168 N.W.2d 771, 775-6 (Iowa 1969). Where an employee did not voluntarily quit but was terminated while absent under medical care, the employee is allowed benefits and is not required to return to the employer and offer services pursuant to the subsection d exception of Iowa Code § 96.5(1). *Prairie Ridge Addiction Treatment Svcs. v. Jackson and EAB*, ___ N.W.2d ___, No. 11-0784 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2012). The court in *Gilmore v. Empl. Appeal Bd.*, 695 N.W.2d 44 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004) noted that:

"Insofar as the Employment Security Law is not designed to provide health and disability insurance, only those employees who experience illness-induced separations that can fairly be attributed to the employer are properly eligible for unemployment benefits."

White v. Employment Appeal Bd., 487 N.W.2d 342, 345 (Iowa 1992) (citing *Butts v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 328 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Iowa 1983)).

The statute provides an exception where:

The individual left employment because of illness, injury or pregnancy upon the advice of a licensed and practicing physician, and upon knowledge of the necessity for absence immediately notified the employer, or the employer consented to the absence, and after recovering from the illness, injury or pregnancy, when recovery was certified by a licensed and practicing physician, the individual returned to the employer and offered to perform services and ... the individual's regular work or comparable suitable work was not available, if so found by the department, provided the individual is otherwise eligible. Iowa Code § 96.5(1)(d).

Section 96.5(1)(d) specifically requires that the employee has recovered from the illness or injury, and this recovery has been certified by a physician. The exception in section 96.5(1)(d) only applies when an employee is fully recovered and the employer has not held open the employee's position. *White*, 487 N.W.2d at 346; *Hedges v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 368 N.W.2d 862, 867 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); see also *Geiken v. Lutheran Home for the Aged Ass'n*, 468 N.W.2d 223, 226 (Iowa 1991) (noting the full recovery standard of section 96.5(1)(d)).

The claimant is not required to return to the employer to offer services after the medical recovery because she had already been involuntarily terminated from the employment while under medical care. Although an employer is not obligated to provide light-duty work for an employee whose illness or injury is not work-related, the involuntary termination from employment while under medical care was a discharge from employment. Thus, the burden of proof shifts to the employer.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of

recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

Iowa Code § 96.5-1-d provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department. But the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:

d. The individual left employment because of illness, injury or pregnancy upon the advice of a licensed and practicing physician, and upon knowledge of the necessity for absence immediately notified the employer, or the employer consented to the absence, and after recovering from the illness, injury or pregnancy, when recovery was certified by a licensed and practicing physician, the individual returned to the employer and offered to perform services and the individual's regular work or comparable suitable work was not available, if so found by the department, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

In spite of the expiration of the FMLA leave period, since claimant was still under medical care and had not yet been released to return to work without restriction as of the date of separation, no disqualifying reason for the separation has been established. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Code § 96.4-3 provides:

An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if the department finds that:

3. The individual is able to work, is available for work, and is earnestly and actively seeking work. This subsection is waived if the individual is deemed partially unemployed, while employed at the individual's regular job, as defined in section 96.19, subsection 38, paragraph "b", unnumbered paragraph 1, or temporarily unemployed as defined in section 96.19, subsection 38, paragraph "c". The work search requirements of this subsection and the disqualification requirement for failure to apply for, or to accept suitable work of section 96.5, subsection 3 are waived if the individual is not disqualified for benefits under section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraph "h".

871 IAC 24.22(1)a provides:

Benefits eligibility conditions. For an individual to be eligible to receive benefits the department must find that the individual is able to work, available for work, and earnestly and actively seeking work. The individual bears the burden of establishing that the individual is able to work, available for work, and earnestly and actively seeking work.

(1) Able to work. An individual must be physically and mentally able to work in some gainful employment, not necessarily in the individual's customary occupation, but which is engaged in by others as a means of livelihood.

a. Illness, injury or pregnancy. Each case is decided upon an individual basis, recognizing that various work opportunities present different physical requirements. A statement from a medical practitioner is considered prima facie evidence of the physical ability of the individual to perform the work required. A pregnant individual must meet the same criteria for determining ableness as do all other individuals.

871 IAC 24.23(35) provides:

Availability disqualifications. The following are reasons for a claimant being disqualified for being unavailable for work.

(35) Where the claimant is not able to work and is under the care of a physician and has not been released as being able to work.

Inasmuch as the medical condition was not work-related but employer involuntarily terminated the employment before she was released to return to work without restriction, and claimant has established her ability to and availability for work in other jobs such as substitute teaching, benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The January 6, 2012 (reference 01) decision is reversed. The claimant did not quit but was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Claimant is able to and available for work effective December 4, 2011. Benefits are allowed, provided she is otherwise eligible.

Dévon M. Lewis
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

dml/kjw