

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

VERENIS VILLA RODRIGUEZ
Claimant

APPEAL NO. 13A-UI-04403-LT

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC
Employer

OC: 03/17/13
Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed an appeal from the April 3, 2013 (reference 01) decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held by telephone conference call on May 20, 2013. Claimant participated. Employer participated through benefits counselor Dzemal Grcic. The administrative law judge took judicial notice of the administrative record.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job related misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed part-time as a production worker and was separated from employment on March 19, 2013. On March 14 production worker Kiana Bradford approached claimant who was working in the area while on light duty. Bradford believed claimant was going to take her job and pushed her and struck her on the face with a mesh glove. Others moved to the area and Bradford pushed her against the machinery. Claimant pushed Bradford away in order to leave the area. Bradford followed yelling at her. Both were terminated from employment.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." *Newman v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). Where a claimant participated in a confrontation without attempt to retreat, the Iowa Court of Appeals rejected a self-defense argument stating that to establish such a defense the claimant must show freedom from fault in bringing on the encounter, a necessity to fight back, and an attempt to retreat unless there is no means of escape or that peril would increase by doing so. *Savage v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 529 N.W.2d 640 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).

When the record is composed solely of hearsay evidence, that evidence must be examined closely in light of the entire record. *Schmitz v. IDHS*, 461 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Iowa App. 1990). Both the quality and the quantity of the evidence must be evaluated to see whether it rises to the necessary levels of trustworthiness, credibility, and accuracy required by a reasonably prudent person in the conduct of serious affairs. See, Iowa Code § 17A.14 (1). In making the evaluation, the fact-finder should conduct a common sense evaluation of (1) the nature of the hearsay; (2) the availability of better evidence; (3) the cost of acquiring better information; (4) the need for precision; and (5) the administrative policy to be fulfilled. *Schmitz*, 461 N.W.2d at 608. The Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that if a party has the power to produce more explicit and direct evidence than it chooses to present, the administrative law judge may infer that evidence not presented would reveal deficiencies in the party's case. *Crosser v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Safety*, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976).

Mindful of the ruling in *Crosser*, and noting that the claimant presented direct, first-hand testimony while the employer relied upon hearsay statements, the administrative law judge concludes that the claimant's testimony is credible and the employer has not met its burden of proof. Claimant was not at fault in bringing on the encounter and only pushed Bradford in an attempt to get away from her. Benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The April 3, 2013 (reference 01) decision is reversed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed. The benefits withheld shall be paid, provided she is otherwise eligible.

Dévon M. Lewis
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

dml/pjs