IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

PAULA L BROOKS 1011 UNIVERSITY APT 301 DES MOINES IA 50314

DES STAFFING SERVICES INC 3326 INDIANOLA AVE DES MOINES IA 50315

Appeal Number:04A-UI-06380-S2TOC 05/09/04R 02Claimant:Respondent (2)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party request the Appeals Section to reopen the record at the address listed at the top of this decision or appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.*

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

- 1. The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- 3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)

(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Section 96.6-2 – Timeliness of Appeal Section 96.5-1-j – Separation from Temporary Employer Section 96.3-7 – Overpayment

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Paula Brooks (employer) appealed a representative's May 27, 2004 decision (reference 01) that concluded she (claimant) was discharged and there was no evidence of willful or deliberate misconduct. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on July 7, 2004. The claimant did not provide a telephone number where she could be reached and, therefore, did not participate. The employer participated by Kathy Anderson, Human Resources Coordinator. Exhibit D-1 was admitted into evidence.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The administrative law judge, having heard the testimony and considered all of the evidence in the record, finds that: The claimant was hired on September 19, 2003, as a temporary worker. She signed a document on September 16, 2003, indicating that she was to contact the employer within three days following the completion of an assignment to request placement in a new assignment. The claimant was given a copy of the document. The claimant completed her last assignment on March 17, 2004, but did not seek reassignment from the employer.

A disqualification decision was mailed to the employer's last known address of record on May 27, 2004. The employer did receive the decision. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by Sunday, June 6, 2004. The employer faxed the appeal to a Workforce Center on June 7, 2004, thinking it was the proper place to fax the appeal. The Workforce Center faxed the appeal to the Appeals Section on June 8, 2004. The appeal was not filed until June 8, 2004, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision. The Workforce Center received the faxed appeal on the last day the employer had to file its appeal.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code Section 96.6-2 provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disgualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disgualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5. except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disgualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disgualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5. subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise

corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. <u>Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.</u>, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); <u>Johnson v. Board of Adjustment</u>, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. <u>Messina v. IDJS</u>, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. <u>Franklin v. IDJS</u>, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. <u>Beardslee v. IDJS</u>, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also In re Appeal of Elliott 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. <u>Hendren v. IESC</u>, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); <u>Smith v. IESC</u>, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did not have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

The administrative law judge concludes the employer failed to effect a timely protest within the time period prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law, and the delay was due to Agency error or misinformation pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal was timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code Section 96.6-2, and the administrative law judge has jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See <u>Beardslee v. IDJS</u>, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and <u>Franklin v. IDJS</u>, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).

The issue is becomes whether the claimant was separated from the employer for any disqualifying reason. As an employee of a temporary service, the claimant was required to request reassignment after the completion of her last assignment.

Iowa Code Section 96.5-1-j provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department, But the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:

j. The individual is a temporary employee of a temporary employment firm who notifies the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment and who seeks reassignment. Failure of the individual to notify the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment within three working days of the completion of each employment assignment under a contract of hire shall be deemed a voluntary quit unless the individual was not advised in writing of the duty to notify the temporary employment firm upon completion of an employment assignment or the individual had good cause for not contacting the temporary employment firm within three working days and notified the firm at the first reasonable opportunity thereafter. To show that the employee was advised in writing of the notification requirement of this paragraph, the temporary employment firm shall advise the temporary employee by requiring the temporary employee, at the time of employment with the temporary employment firm, to read and sign a document that provides a clear and concise explanation of the notification requirement and the consequences of a failure to notify. The document shall be separate from any contract of employment and a copy of the signed document shall be provided to the temporary employee.

For the purposes of this paragraph:

(1) "Temporary employee" means an individual who is employed by a temporary employment firm to provide services to clients to supplement their work force during absences, seasonal workloads, temporary skill or labor market shortages, and for special assignments and projects.

(2) "Temporary employment firm" means a person engaged in the business of employing temporary employees.

The claimant did not request reassignment and has, therefore, failed to satisfy the requirements of Iowa Code Section 96.5-1-j. Benefits are denied.

Iowa Code Section 96.3-7 provides:

7. Recovery of overpayment of benefits. If an individual receives benefits for which the individual is subsequently determined to be ineligible, even though the individual acts in good faith and is not otherwise at fault, the benefits shall be recovered. The department in its discretion may recover the overpayment of benefits either by having a sum equal to the overpayment deducted from any future benefits payable to the individual or by having the individual pay to the department a sum equal to the overpayment.

If the department determines that an overpayment has been made, the charge for the overpayment against the employer's account shall be removed and the account shall be credited with an amount equal to the overpayment from the unemployment compensation trust fund and this credit shall include both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The claimant has received benefits in the amount of \$1,280.00 since filing her claim herein. Pursuant to this decision, those benefits now constitute an overpayment which must be repaid.

DECISION:

The decision of the representative dated May 27, 2004 (reference 01) is reversed. The appeal in this case was timely. The claimant was separated from the employer on March 17, 2004 for no good cause attributable to the employer. Benefits are withheld until she has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times her weekly benefit amount provided she is otherwise eligible. The claimant is overpaid benefits in the amount of \$1,280.00.

bas/b