#### IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

	68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - El
CHRISTINE F WILLIAMS Claimant	APPEAL NO: 11A-UI-04095-DT
	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION
THOMAS L CARDELLA & ASSOCIATES Employer	
	OC: 02/20/11
	Claimant: Respondent (1)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge

# STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Thomas L. Cardella & Associates, Inc. (employer) appealed a representative's March 22, 2011 decision (reference 01) that concluded Christine F. Williams (claimant) was qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on May 13, 2011. The claimant participated in the hearing. Tom Kuiper of TALX Employer Services appeared on the employer's behalf and presented testimony from three witnesses, Dana Callahan, Dillon Hutton, and Lynne Zinnel. During the hearing, Employer's Exhibits One, Two, and Five were entered into evidence. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

### **ISSUE:**

Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

### FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer on July 6, 2010. She worked full time as an account specialist in the employer's Coralville, Iowa telemarketing call center. Her last day of work was February 22, 2011. The employer discharged her on that date. The reason asserted for the discharge was excessive absenteeism.

The employer's attendance policy provides for discharge if an employee has four occurrence points in a 90-day period. The employer considered the claimant to have reached this level as of February 21 because of a half point for being late on February 21, a full point for an absence due to illness on February 18, one point for an absence on January 24 due to no ride, a half point for being late on December 13, 2010, and one point for an absence on November 30. The most recent warning actually given to the claimant prior to the final incident on February 21 was a warning given to her on December 1 after the November 30 absence.

The claimant had not realized after her February 18 absence that the employer considered her to be at 3.5 points. In January 2011 she was being given rides to work from the employer's site

manager. For her absence from work on January 24, she had not had transportation because her ride, the site manager, had not gone into work. He had told her that her absence that day would not count against her as an occurrence. However, by February 22 that site manager was no longer in his position, and the employer retroactively did count the January 24 occurrence. Therefore, after the claimant's tardy on February 22, the employer determined the claimant was at four occurrence points, rather than the three she believed she had.

#### **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The question is not whether the employer was right to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate matters. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988).

In order to establish misconduct such as to disqualify a former employee from benefits an employer must establish the employee was responsible for a deliberate act or omission which was a material breach of the duties and obligations owed by the employee to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 1979); <u>Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The conduct must show a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; <u>Huntoon</u>, supra; <u>Henry</u>, supra. In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; <u>Huntoon</u>, supra; <u>Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984).

Excessive unexcused absences can constitute misconduct, however, in order to establish the necessary element of intent, the final incident must have occurred despite the claimant's knowledge that the occurrence could result in the loss of her job. 871 IAC 24.32(7); <u>Cosper</u>, supra; <u>Gaborit v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa App. 2007). In this case the claimant had not previously been effectively warned that an additional occurrence after January 24 could result in termination. <u>Higgins</u>, supra. The employer has failed to meet its burden to establish misconduct. <u>Cosper</u>, supra. The claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

# **DECISION:**

The representative's March 22, 2011 decision (reference 01) is affirmed. The employer did discharge the claimant but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if she is otherwise eligible.

Lynette A. F. Donner Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/pjs