

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

**RICKABAUGH, LYNDIE, D**  
Claimant

**APPEAL NO. 11A-UI-00534-JTT**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**CASEY'S MARKETING COMPANY**  
Employer

**OC: 10/10/10**  
**Claimant: Appellant (1)**

Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) - Discharge for Misconduct  
Iowa Code Section 96.6(2) - Timeliness of Appeal

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

Lyndie Rickabaugh filed an appeal from the November 2, 2010, reference 01 decision that denied benefits in connection with a September 29, 2010 separation from Casey's. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held by telephone conference call on February 16, 2011. Ms. Rickabaugh participated personally and was represented by her mother, Jackie George. Lori Ceselski of Talx represented the employer. Matt Brown of Casey's was available to testify on behalf of the employer but did not testify. Department Exhibits D-1 and D-2 were received into evidence. The administrative law judge took official notice of the November 2, 2010, reference 03 decision concerning the claimant's separation from employer Old Navy, L.L.C.

**ISSUE:**

Whether there is good cause to treat Ms. Rickabaugh's late appeal from the November 2, 2010, reference 01 decision as a timely appeal.

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: On November 2, 2010, Iowa Workforce Development mailed a copy of the November 2, 2010, reference 01 decision to Lyndie Rickabaugh's last-known address of record. The decision denied benefits in connection with Ms. Rickabaugh's separation from Casey's. Ms. Rickabaugh received the reference 01 decision in a timely manner, prior to the deadline for appeal. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by November 12, 2010.

On November 2, 2010, Iowa Workforce Development also mailed to Ms. Rickabaugh a copy of the November 2, 2010, reference 03 decision that *allowed* benefits in connection with Ms. Rickabaugh's separation from employer Old Navy, *provided Ms. Rickabaugh "[met] all other eligibility requirements."* In other words, the Old Navy decision allowing benefits was a *conditional* allowance, *conditioned* upon Ms. Rickabaugh being otherwise eligible for benefits. Ms. Rickabaugh received both decisions at the same time. Ms. Rickabaugh has some learning

disabilities. Ms. Rickabaugh resides with her mother, Jackie George. Upon receiving the two decisions, Ms. Rickabaugh and Ms. George reviewed the decisions together. Both understood that the decision concerning the separation from Casey's denied unemployment insurance benefits. Both were confused by the presence of the other decision that allowed benefits in connection with the separation from Old Navy. But that decision had clearly indicated that there were other requirements Ms. Rickabaugh would have to meet to be eligible for benefits. Ms. George advised Ms. Rickabaugh that she needed to take steps to file an appeal. Although Ms. Rickabaugh has some learning disabilities, Ms. George wanted her daughter to take responsibility for filing the appeal or otherwise following up with Workforce Development to resolve any confusion regarding the two decisions. Both decisions contained a telephone number Ms. Rickabaugh or Ms. George could call to get answers to any questions they had about the decisions. Ms. Rickabaugh did not follow-up.

In January 2011, Ms. George contacted Workforce Development regarding Ms. Rickabaugh's eligibility for benefits and was instructed that Ms. Rickabaugh would need to file an appeal to challenge the decision that had denied benefits. On January 7, 2011, Ms. George typed an appeal letter and had Ms. Rickabaugh sign it. On or about January 13, 2011, Ms. George mailed the appeal letter from the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics. The letter bears a January 13, 2011 Cedar Rapids postmark.

#### **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

Iowa Code section 96.6-2 provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The ten-day deadline for appeal begins to run on the date Workforce Development mails the decision to the parties. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the Agency representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); Johnson v. Board of Adjustment, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

An appeal submitted by mail is deemed filed on the date it is mailed as shown by the postmark or in the absence of a postmark the postage meter mark of the envelope in which it was received, or if not postmarked or postage meter marked or if the mark is illegible, on the date entered on the document as the date of completion. See 871 AC 24.35(1)(a). See also Messina v. IDJS, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983). An appeal submitted by any other means is deemed filed on the date it is received by the Unemployment Insurance Division of Iowa Workforce Development. See 871 IAC 24.35(1)(b).

The appeal in this matter was filed on January 13, 2011, as indicated by the postmark date.

The evidence in the record establishes that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also In re Appeal of Elliott, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. Hendren v. IESC, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); Smith v. IESC, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973).

The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Workforce Development error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service. See 871 IAC 24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6(2), and the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See, Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).

**DECISION:**

The Agency representative's November 2, 2010, reference 01, decision is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely, and the decision of the representative that denied benefits in connection with the separation from Casey's remains in effect.

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James E. Timberland  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

jet/pjs