IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

MARTHA J ESTABROOK 6 DEBBIE AVE MUSCATINE IA 52761

MANPOWER INTERNATIONAL INC MANPOWER TEMPORARY SERVICES C/o TALX UC EXPRESS PO BOX 66864 ST LOUIS MO 63166-6864 Appeal Number: 06A-UI-05549-DT

OC: 04/16/06 R: 04 Claimant: Respondent (1)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board*, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

- The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)
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(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Manpower International, Inc. (employer) appealed a representative's May 18, 2006 decision (reference 01) that concluded Martha J. Estabrook (claimant) was qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on June 14, 2006. This appeal was consolidated for hearing with one related appeal, 06A-UI-05550-DT. The claimant participated in the hearing. Maria Way appeared on the employer's behalf. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The employer is a temporary employment firm. The claimant began taking assignments with the employer on March 9, 2004. Her final assignment began on July 6, 2004 at a Muscatine, lowa, business client. Her last day on the assignment was December 13, 2005. The assignment ended because of an accident that occurred at the worksite on that date. As a result of the accident, the claimant performed light duty clerical work in the employer's own office from January 4 through January 12, 2006; on January 12 she was discharged from eligibility for employment through the employer. The reason asserted for the discharge was a safety violation at the business client.

Since August 12, 2005, the claimant worked in the business client's corrugated box manufacturing facility as a taper/gluer. On December 13, the claimant had started work two hours early on overtime. She and her partner had been having numerous problems with the adjustments on their machine. On approximately the 20th time, the claimant's partner went to the back of the machine to do the lock out/tag out, and the claimant proceeded toward the adjustment mechanism. The claimant does not remember how it occurred, whether she lost her balance and reached up, but before the machine was shut off, the fingers of the claimant's right hand were caught in the moving chain and sprocket mechanism that is above but not part of the adjustment mechanism. The tip of the claimant's fourth finger was amputated, and her middle finger suffered a compound fracture. As a result, the claimant was briefly hospitalized and taken off work until January 4, when she was released for light duty. She was fully released as of April 7, 2006.

There was a transition in the employer's local business management, and about the first week of January 2006 the employer's regional director began more direct oversight of the employer's local Muscatine office. After reviewing the situation of the claimant's injury, he determined on January 12 that the claimant should be removed from employment with the employer due to the safety violation of failing to wait for the lock out/tag out on December 13, 2005. The claimant had received no prior warnings for safety violations.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The issue in this case is whether the employer discharged the claimant for reasons establishing work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. The issue is not whether the employer was right to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. <u>Infante v. IDJS</u>, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate questions. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988).

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The focus of the definition of misconduct is on acts or omissions by a claimant that "rise to the level of being deliberate, intentional or culpable." <u>Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The acts must show:

- 1. Willful and wanton disregard of an employer's interest, such as found in:
 - a. Deliberate violation of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of its employees, or
 - b. Deliberate disregard of standards of behavior the employer has the right to expect of its employees; or
- 2. Carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to:
 - a. Manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design; or
 - b. Show an intentional and substantial disregard of:
 - 1. The employer's interest, or
 - 2. The employee's duties and obligations to the employer.

Henry, supra. The reason cited by the employer for discharging the claimant is a safety violation on December 13, 2005. First, there is no current act of misconduct as required to

establish work-connected misconduct. 871 IAC 24.32(8); <u>Greene v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 426 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa App. 1988). The incident in question occurred nearly a month prior to the employer's discharge of the claimant, and over a week after the claimant returned to work after her injury. Further, under the circumstances of this case, the claimant's accident was the result of inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, inadvertence, or ordinary negligence in an isolated instance, and was a good faith error in judgment or discretion. The employer has not met its burden to show disqualifying misconduct. <u>Cosper</u>, supra. Based upon the evidence provided, the claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

DECISION:

The representative's May 18, 2006 decision (reference 01) is affirmed. The employer did discharge the claimant, but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if she is otherwise eligible.

ld/kkf