IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

GREGORY PATTON 3124 O AVE NW CEDAR RAPIDS IA 52405-1322

QWEST CORPORATION

c/o TALX EMPLOYER SERVICES
PO BOX 749000

ARVADA CO 80006-9000

Appeal Number: 06A-UI-04474-DT

OC: 02/12/06 R: 03 Claimant: Appellant (1)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board*, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

- The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)
,
(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Section 96.6-2 - Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Gregory Patton (claimant) appealed a representative's March 3, 2006 decision (reference 01) that concluded he was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment from Qwest Corporation (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on May 10, 2006. The claimant participated in the hearing and was represented by union representative Joie Welsh, who also offered testimony on his behalf. Sandy Fitch of TALX Employer Services appeared on the employer's behalf. Witnesses were available on behalf of the employer but did not participate or testify. During the hearing, Exhibit A-1 was entered into evidence. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant's appeal timely?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The representative's decision was mailed to the claimant's last-known address of record on March 3, 2006. The claimant received the decision on or about March 6, 2006. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by March 13, 2006, a Monday. The appeal was not filed until it was hand-delivered to a local Agency office on April 24, 2006, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision. The reason for the delay was that there had been a criminal charge filed against the claimant in relation to the same incident that led to the claimant's discharge from employment; a court proceeding on that charge was held on March 27, 2006. The claimant did not believe he could effectively appeal the disqualification decision until resolution of the criminal proceeding, and therefore did not file his appeal by March 13, 2006.

The criminal charges against the claimant were resolved in his favor on March 31, 2006; however, the claimant did not learn of this until April 6, 2006. He did not file an appeal of the disqualification decision until April 24, 2006, because he was waiting to speak to his attorney, was working, and was taking care of other business.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The determinative issue in this case is whether the claimant timely appealed the representative's decision.

Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides in pertinent part:

The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. . . . Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. <u>Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.</u>, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); <u>Johnson v. Board of Adjustment</u>, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. Messina v. IDJS, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The lowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative

if a timely appeal is not filed. <u>Franklin v. IDJS</u>, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (lowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. <u>Beardslee v. IDJS</u>, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (lowa 1979); see also <u>In re Appeal of Elliott</u>, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (lowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. <u>Hendren v. IESC</u>, 217 N.W.2d 255 (lowa 1974); <u>Smith v. IESC</u>, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (lowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

871 IAC 24.35(2) provides in pertinent part:

The submission of any payment, appeal, application, request, notice, objection, petition, report or other information or document not within the specified statutory or regulatory period shall be considered timely if it is established to the satisfaction of the department that the delay in submission was due to department error or misinformation or to delay or other action of the United States postal service or its successor.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2) or other factors outside the appellant's control. The existence of the criminal proceeding was not a legal barrier precluding the claimant from filing a timely appeal of the disqualification decision, and the claimant's determination to wait until after resolution of the criminal proceeding was a personal decision for which he must bear the consequences, and for which the employer should not be penalized. Further, even after the resolution of the criminal charges, the claimant did not act in a timely manner to promptly proceed with his appeal; waiting to take care of personal matters and speak with his attorney is not good cause for delaying his appeal.

The administrative law judge therefore concludes that because the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to lowa Code § 96.6-2, the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal, regardless of whether the merits of the appeal would be valid. See, <u>Beardslee v. IDJS</u>, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979); <u>Franklin v. IDJS</u>, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979), and <u>Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 465 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa App. 1990).

DECISION:

The March 3, 2006 (reference 01) decision is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely, and the decision of the representative remains in effect. Benefits are denied.

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