IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

VANESSA R YOUNG

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 09A-UI-17471-LT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

BRENDA E STEINLAGE EDGE FX

Employer

Original Claim: 10/04/09 Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(1) - Voluntary Leaving

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

Iowa Code § 96.6(2) - Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed a timely appeal from the October 22, 2009 (reference 01) decision that denied benefits after the resignation notice period. After due notice was issued, a telephone conference hearing was held on December 29, 2009. Claimant participated with Jeremiah Young. Employer participated through Brenda Steinlage. Employer's Exhibit 1 was admitted to the record.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether claimant quit the employment without good cause attributable to the employer or if she was discharged for reasons related to job misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having heard the testimony and having reviewed the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: A decision was mailed to the employer's address of record on October 22, 2009. The appeal was sent by fax with another appeal on October 30, 2009 but was overlooked upon receipt.

Claimant most recently worked full-time as a stylist and told Steinlage on October 3, 2009 she intended to open her own salon in four to six weeks. Steinlage instructed her a half hour later to retrieve her personal belongings, which included money, scissors and combs, from the salon. Claimant generally left these items at the shop and scissors and combs were tools of the trade, without which she was unable to perform her job. Employer followed up with another appeal and evidence of the fax transmission of the first appeal notice.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The first issue to be considered in this appeal is whether the employer's appeal is timely. The administrative law judge determines it is.

Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5. except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary guit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disgualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The employer filed an appeal in a timely manner but it was not received. Immediately upon receipt of information to that effect, a second appeal was filed. Therefore, the appeal shall be accepted as timely.

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant voluntarily left the employment without good cause attributable to the employer, but was discharged for no disqualifying reason prior to the intended resignation date.

Iowa Code § 96.5-1 provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

871 IAC 24.25(38) provides:

Voluntary quit without good cause. In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to lowa Code § 96.5. However, the claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving lowa Code § 96.5, subsection (1), paragraphs "a" through "i," and subsection 10. The following reasons for a voluntary quit shall be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer:

(38) Where the claimant gave the employer an advance notice of resignation which caused the employer to discharge the claimant prior to the proposed date of resignation, no disqualification shall be imposed from the last day of work until the proposed date of resignation; however, benefits will be denied effective the proposed date of resignation.

Claimant's decision to quit because of her intention to open her own salon was not a good-cause reason attributable to the employer. When employer responded by telling her to remove her personal belongings, and those belongings were necessary for the performance of her job, that directive amounts to a discharge from employment. Because the discharge was in response to a resignation notice, no misconduct is established; and since the employer terminated the employment relationship in advance of the resignation notice effective date, the claimant is entitled to benefits from the date of termination until the effective date of the proposed resignation.

DECISION:

The October 22, 2009 (reference 01) decision is affirmed. The employer's appeal is timely. The claimant voluntarily left her employment without good cause attributable to the employer, but was discharged prior to the resignation effective date. Benefits are allowed until October 31, 2009. Thereafter, benefits are withheld until such time as the claimant works in and has been paid insured wages equal to ten times her weekly benefit amount.

Dévon M. Lewis Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

dml/kjw