# IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

**AARON TESDAL** 

Claimant

**APPEAL 21A-UI-18376-SN-T** 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

**SWIFT PORK COMPANY** 

Employer

OC: 02/16/20

Claimant: Appellant (2)

lowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct lowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) – Excessive Unexcused Absenteeism lowa Code § 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

### STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant, Aaron Tesdal, filed an appeal from the September 2, 2020, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits based upon the conclusion he voluntarily quit work. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on November 1, 2021. The hearing was held jointly with appeal 21A-Ul-18378-SN-T and 21A-Ul-18379-SN-T. The claimant participated. The employer did not participate. Official notice was taken of the agency records. Exhibits D-1 and D-2 were received into the record.

# **ISSUES:**

Whether the claimant's appeal is timely? Whether there are reasonable grounds to be considered otherwise timely?

Whether the claimant's separation is disqualifying?

# FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds:

The claimant was employed full-time as a brisket saw operator from September 2019, until this employment ended on February 27, 2020, when he was discharged.

The employer has a no fault attendance policy. The attendance policy instructs employees to call in prior to the start of their shift. The employer does not excuse absences that are properly reported and justified due to the employee's illness. After an employee accrues 10 attendance points, then they are immediately terminated.

On February 27, 2021, the claimant was terminated because he accrued 10 attendance points. Although the claimant could not remember when the employer said these attendance incidents occurred, the final incident as well as several of the other more recent incidents would have been accrued because he was sick due to Covid19.

A disqualification decision was mailed to the claimant's address of record on September 2, 2020. (Exhibit D-1) The claimant did not receive the decision. The claimant did not receive the decision because he was incarcerated in July 2020. The first notice of disqualification was the overpayment decisions of August 10, 2021. The appeal was sent four days after receipt of that decision. (Exhibit D-2)

#### **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge claimant's appeal is otherwise timely. He further concludes the claimant's separation from employment is not disqualifying.

lowa Code section 96.6(2) provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of issuing the notice of the filing of the claim to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. All interested parties shall select a format as specified by the department to receive such notifications. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsections 10 and 11, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disgualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was issued, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The claimant did not have an opportunity to appeal the fact-finder's decision because the decision was not received. Without notice of a disqualification, no meaningful opportunity for appeal exists. See *Smith v. Iowa Employment Security Commission*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (lowa 1973). The claimant timely appealed the overpayment decision, which was the first notice of disqualification. Therefore, the appeal shall be accepted as timely.

The next issue is whether the claimant's separation from employment is disqualifying. The administrative law judge concludes that his separation is non-disqualifying.

lowa Code § 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the lowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (lowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7); Cosper, supra; Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. Gaborit, supra. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) (emphasis added); see Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 350 N.W.2d 187, 190, n. 1 (Iowa 1984) holding "rule"

[2]4.32(7)...accurately states the law." The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 437 N.W.2d 895 (lowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. Higgins at 192. Second, the absences must be unexcused. Cosper at 10. The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," Higgins at 191, or because it was not "properly reported," holding excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." Cosper at 10.

The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. The term "absenteeism" also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as "tardiness." An absence is an extended tardiness, and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 350 N.W.2d 187 (lowa 1984). Absences due to illness or injury must be properly reported in order to be excused. Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 321 N.W.2d 6 (lowa 1982).

In this case, the employer has failed to meet its burden. The record does not contain information suggesting the claimant was excessively absent due to circumstances within his control. In fact, the claimant states the final absences that led to his termination were due to illness beyond his control. These absences are per se not to be considered as grounds for misconduct under lowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7). Benefits are granted, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

## **DECISION:**

The September 2, 2020, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is reversed. The claimant's appeal is timely. The claimant's separation from employment is non-disqualifying. Benefits are granted, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.



Sean M. Nelson Administrative Law Judge Unemployment Insurance Appeals Bureau 1000 East Grand Avenue Des Moines, Iowa 50319-0209 Fax (515) 725-9067

November 29, 2021
Decision Dated and Mailed

smn/ol