IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

GUADALUPE CORDOVA GARCIA

Claimant

APPEAL 18A-UI-02310-NM-T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

SWIFT PORK COMPANY

Employer

OC: 01/21/18

Claimant: Respondent (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

Iowa Code § 96.5(1) - Voluntary Quitting

Iowa Code § 96.3(7) – Recovery of Benefit Overpayment

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 - Employer/Representative Participation Fact-finding Interview

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed an appeal from the February 8, 2018, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on April 18, 2018. The claimant participated and was represented by attorney Phil Miller. Also participating on behalf of the claimant were Brian Ulin and Carina Cordova. The employer participated through Hearing Representative Thomas Kuiper and Human Resource Generalist Jennifer Glosser. Claimant's Exhibits 2 through 8 were received into evidence.

ISSUES:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

Has the claimant been overpaid any unemployment insurance benefits, and if so, can the repayment of those benefits to the agency be waived?

Can any charges to the employer's account be waived?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full time as a butt trimmer on the cut floor from January 27, 2001, until this employment ended on January 9, 2018.

On December 11, 2017, claimant was released to return to work after suffering a work-related knee injury. The release stated claimant could return to work as of that date, without restriction, but recommended she see a back specialist, as it was possible her on-going pain was related to a problem with her back. (Exhibit 2). On December 12, 2017, claimant returned to work. She was assigned to work on the "upper" cut floor, which required her to climb between 20 and 30 stairs between four and six times during her shift. When claimant was given that work assignment, she told the employer she was still experiencing knee pain and asked to be moved

to the "lower" cut floor where there were not any stairs. The employer refused to change claimant's assignment, explaining that the reason they were doing so was because they needed her in the area assigned and she had been released to return without restriction. Glosser testified claimant was told if she refused to perform her job duties she would be discharged, at which point claimant asked to leave to give her time to contact her attorney. Claimant then left work and Glosser testified the employer did not hear from her again. According to Glosser, after several weeks had passed without hearing from claimant, the decision was made to separate her from employment.

Claimant testified she left work on December 12 because the employer told her if she was not going to perform the work she was assigned she had to leave and she was in too much pain to perform the assigned work. Claimant denied she was told she would be discharged if she did not perform the work assigned that day. According to claimant she called the employer's nurses the following day to report she was still in pain and informed them she wanted a second opinion. Claimant testified she was told by the nurses that because the doctor had released her to return to work without restriction there was nothing else the employer could do for her. Claimant did not report to work, but testified she continued to call in daily until her separation on January 9, 2018. Claimant testified in January she called her own doctor and made an appointment to be seen. Claimant could not remember the doctor's name, exactly when she made the appointment, or when she saw the doctor, but testified the doctor placed a restriction on her stating she could not climb stairs. Claimant testified this was the only restriction placed on her, but did not provide a copy of the restriction or doctor's report.

The claimant filed a new claim for unemployment insurance benefits with an effective date of January 21, 2018. The claimant filed for and received a total of \$5,676.00 in unemployment insurance benefits for the weeks between January 21 and April 14, 2018. Both the employer and the claimant participated in a fact finding interview regarding the separation on February 7, 2018. The fact finder determined claimant qualified for benefits.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant's separation from the employment was without good cause attributable to the employer.

Iowa Code section 96.5-1-d provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department. But the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:
- d. The individual left employment because of illness, injury or pregnancy upon the advice of a licensed and practicing physician, and upon knowledge of the necessity for absence immediately notified the employer, or the employer consented to the absence, and after recovering from the illness, injury or pregnancy, when recovery was certified by a licensed and practicing physician, the individual returned to the employer and offered to perform services and the individual's regular work or comparable suitable work was not available, if so found by the department, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.25(35) provides:

Voluntary quit without good cause. In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to lowa Code section 96.5. However, the claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving lowa Code section 96.5, subsection (1), paragraphs "a" through "i," and subsection 10. The following reasons for a voluntary quit shall be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer:

- (35) The claimant left because of illness or injury which was not caused or aggravated by the employment or pregnancy and failed to:
- (a) Obtain the advice of a licensed and practicing physician;
- (b) Obtain certification of release for work from a licensed and practicing physician;
- (c) Return to the employer and offer services upon recovery and certification for work by a licensed and practicing physician; or
- (d) Fully recover so that the claimant could perform all of the duties of the job.

The court in Gilmore v. Empl. Appeal Bd., 695 N.W.2d 44 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004) noted that:

"Insofar as the Employment Security Law is not designed to provide health and disability insurance, only those employees who experience illness-induced separations that can fairly be attributed to the employer are properly eligible for unemployment benefits." White v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 487 N.W.2d 342, 345 (Iowa 1992) (citing Butts v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 328 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Iowa 1983)).

In 1995, the Iowa Administrative Code was amended to include an intent-to-quit requirement added to rule 871-24.26(6)(b), the provision addressing work-related health problems. *Hy-Vee, Inc. v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 710 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2005).

Here, claimant was on leave due to a problem with her knee. On December 11, 2017, claimant's treating physician released her to return to work without restriction. On December 12, 2017, claimant went to work, but failed to offer her services, as she refused to perform the job assignment given to her. The employer allowed claimant additional time to speak with her lawyer or get an updated medical diagnosis/directive, but claimant failed to do so. Rather, claimant waited several weeks, until sometime in January, to make an appointment to seek additional medical treatment or diagnosis. Claimant offered no reasonable explanation for this delay. Claimant made no attempt to provide the employer with any updated medical diagnosis or directive and, while she offered testimony that a restriction was put in place when she did see the doctor, no documentation of said restriction was offered. Accordingly, when the claimant still had not shown up to work or provided any updated medical information by January 9, 2018, the employer was reasonable in assuming she had resigned.

In the alternative, even if it was not claimant's intent to resign, the employer has shown sufficient grounds to discharge claimant for disqualifying misconduct.

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7); Cosper, supra; Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. Gaborit, supra. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional

disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct **except for illness or other reasonable grounds** for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) (emphasis added); see *Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187, 190, n. 1 (Iowa 1984) holding "rule [2]4.32(7)...accurately states the law." The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. *Higgins* at 192. Second, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper* at 10. The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," *Higgins* at 191, or because it was not "properly reported," holding excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." *Cosper* at 10.

The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. The term "absenteeism" also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as "tardiness." An absence is an extended tardiness, and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984). Absences due to illness or injury must be properly reported in order to be excused. Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

An employer's point system or no-fault absenteeism policy is not dispositive of the issue of qualification for benefits; however, an employer is entitled to expect its employees to report to work as scheduled or to be notified as to when and why the employee is unable to report to work. Claimant last appeared at work on December 12, 2017 and did not return to work prior to being separated on January 9, 2018. Claimant left work on December 12 after experiencing pain in her knee; however, she had just been cleared to return to work without restriction by the physician treating her knee pain. The last time claimant spoke with the employer about her medical situation was December 13, 2017. Claimant made no attempt to seek additional medical treatment or diagnosis until sometime in January 2018 and was not in communication with the employer about her medical situation for approximately one month prior to her separation. Because of the lack of communication with the employer, claimant's absences from December 13, 2017 through January 9, 2018 are unexcused. Any reasonable employee would understand that missing approximately one month of work without excuse or communication could result in termination of employment. Benefits are withheld.

The next issue in this case is whether the claimant was overpaid unemployment insurance benefits.

Iowa Code § 96.3(7) provides, in pertinent part:

- 7. Recovery of overpayment of benefits.
- a. If an individual receives benefits for which the individual is subsequently determined to be ineligible, even though the individual acts in good faith and is not otherwise at fault, the benefits shall be recovered. The department in its discretion may recover the overpayment of benefits either by having a sum equal to the overpayment deducted from any future benefits payable to the individual or by having the individual pay to the department a sum equal to the overpayment.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871- 24.10 provides:

Employer and employer representative participation in fact-finding interviews.

- (1) "Participate," as the term is used for employers in the context of the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.6, subsection 2, means submitting detailed factual information of the quantity and quality that if unrebutted would be sufficient to result in a decision favorable to the employer. The most effective means to participate is to provide live testimony at the interview from a witness with firsthand knowledge of the events leading to the separation. If no live testimony is provided, the employer must provide the name and telephone number of an employee with firsthand information who may be contacted, if necessary, for rebuttal. A party may also participate by providing detailed written statements or documents that provide detailed factual information of the events leading to separation. At a minimum, the information provided by the employer or the employer's representative must identify the dates and particular circumstances of the incident or incidents, including, in the case of discharge, the act or omissions of the claimant or, in the event of a voluntary separation, the stated reason for the quit. The specific rule or policy must be submitted if the claimant was discharged for violating such rule or policy. In the case of discharge for attendance violations, the information must include the circumstances of all incidents the employer or the employer's representative contends meet the definition of unexcused absences as set forth in 871—subrule 24.32(7). On the other hand, written or oral statements or general conclusions without supporting detailed factual information and information submitted after the fact-finding decision has been issued are not considered participation within the meaning of the statute.
- (2) "A continuous pattern of nonparticipation in the initial determination to award benefits," pursuant to lowa Code § 96.6, subsection 2, as the term is used for an entity representing employers, means on 25 or more occasions in a calendar quarter beginning with the first calendar quarter of 2009, the entity files appeals after failing to participate. Appeals filed but withdrawn before the day of the contested case hearing will not be considered in determining if a continuous pattern of nonparticipation exists. The division administrator shall notify the employer's representative in writing after each such appeal.
- (3) If the division administrator finds that an entity representing employers as defined in Iowa Code § 96.6, subsection 2, has engaged in a continuous pattern of nonparticipation, the division administrator shall suspend said representative for a period of up to six months on the first occasion, up to one year on the second occasion and up to ten years on the third or subsequent occasion. Suspension by the division administrator constitutes final agency action and may be appealed pursuant to Iowa Code § 17A.19.
- (4) "Fraud or willful misrepresentation by the individual," as the term is used for claimants in the context of the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to lowa Code § 96.6, subsection 2, means providing knowingly false statements or knowingly false denials of material facts for the purpose of obtaining unemployment insurance benefits. Statements or denials may be either oral or written by the claimant. Inadvertent misstatements or mistakes made in good faith are not considered fraud or willful misrepresentation.

This rule is intended to implement Iowa Code § 96.3(7)"b" as amended by 2008 Iowa Acts, Senate File 2160.

Because the claimant's separation was disqualifying, benefits were paid to which she was not entitled. The unemployment insurance law provides benefits must be recovered from a claimant who receives benefits and is later determined to be ineligible for benefits, even though the claimant acted in good faith and was not otherwise at fault. However, the overpayment will not be recovered when it is based on a reversal on appeal of an initial determination to award benefits on an issue regarding the claimant's employment separation if: (1) the benefits were not received due to any fraud or willful misrepresentation by the claimant and (2) the employer did not participate in the initial proceeding to award benefits. The employer will not be charged for benefits if it is determined they did participate in the fact-finding interview. Iowa Code § 96.3(7). In this case, the claimant has received benefits but was not eligible for those benefits. Since the employer did participate in the fact-finding interview claimant is obligated to repay to the agency the benefits she received and the employer's account shall not be charged.

DECISION:

nm/rvs

The February 8, 2018, (reference 01) decision is reversed. The claimant voluntarily left her employment without good cause attributable to the employer. Benefits are withheld until such time as she has worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times her weekly benefit amount, provided she is otherwise eligible. The claimant has been overpaid unemployment insurance benefits in the amount of \$5,676.00 and is obligated to repay the agency those benefits. The employer did participate in the fact-finding interview and its account shall not be charged.

Nicole Merrill Administrative Law Judge	
Decision Dated and Mailed	