# IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

**TOMMY L GILLESPIE** 

Claimant

**APPEAL 17A-UI-05597-JCT** 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

PR PARTYLINES LLC

Employer

OC: 05/07/17

Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

Iowa Code § 96.5(1) - Voluntary Quitting

Iowa Code § 96.3(7) – Recovery of Benefit Overpayment

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 - Employer/Representative Participation Fact-finding Interview

### STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed an appeal from the May 23, 2017, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on June 13, 2017. The claimant participated personally. The employer participated through Peter Cooper, manager. Department Exhibit D-1 was admitted. The administrative law judge took official notice of the administrative records including the fact-finding documents. Based on the evidence, the arguments presented, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

### **ISSUES:**

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

Has the claimant been overpaid any unemployment insurance benefits, and if so, can the repayment of those benefits to the agency be waived?

Can any charges to the employer's account be waived?

### FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed full-time beginning February 4, 2017 as a diesel technician and was separated from employment on April 3, 2017, when he was discharged for safety violations and quality of work.

The claimant had demonstrated an ability to perform the job duties in the past. The employer also required the claimant to possess a commercial driver's license (CDL) as a condition of employment. The claimant had repeatedly failed his CDL test and therefore could not always test drive customer vehicles to check them after his repairs.

The final incident occurred on March 29, 2017, when the employer learned that the rear wheel came off a vehicle serviced by the claimant, causing it to be towed. The claimant serviced the vehicle on March 25, 2017 and released it to the customer. He was then off work due to a work-related injury. On the day he returned, he was discharged.

The employer stated the claimant was to torque the lugnuts to the manufacturer's specification and then document it on the work order. The employer concluded the claimant must have failed to properly torque the lugnuts, causing the wheel to fall off. When confronted, the claimant advised the employer to check the video footage to show he had in fact torqued the lugnuts. Mr. Cooper said he did not need to check it since the claimant was the last person to work on the vehicle, it was his fault and he was discharged.

Based on the claimant's knowledge of the vehicle and expertise, he believed the threads on the studs were worn and may have contributed to the lugnuts coming off. The claimant tested the vehicle himself because it did not require a CDL. Usually tires come off 24 -48 hours if lugnuts are not properly adjusted and the claimant asserted five days is too long if they were to fall off due to being loose or failing to be properly torqued.

The employer had previously suspended the claimant for failure to properly adjust brakes on a vehicle after service on March 15, 2017. He was given a 90 day probation as a result. On December 30, 2016, the claimant had another incident regarding his performance on brakes involving a trailer, after he became distracted and pulled away from the vehicle, causing the repairs to not be completed properly. The claimant was aware that he could lose his job for failure to properly complete repairs.

The administrative record reflects that claimant has a weekly benefit amount of \$464.00 but has not received unemployment benefits since filing a claim with an effective date of May 7, 2017. The administrative record also establishes that the employer did not participate in the fact-finding interview because the expected witness, Angela Cooper, was reportedly out of town.

#### **REASONINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

In an at-will employment environment, an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." *Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984).

It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. Arndt v. City of LeClaire, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all. part or none of any witness's testimony. State v. Holtz, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. Id. Assessing the credibility of the witnesses and reliability of the evidence in conjunction with the applicable burden of proof, as shown in the factual conclusions reached in the above-noted findings of fact, the administrative law judge concludes that the employer has not satisfied its burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law.

The employer has the burden of proof in this matter. See Iowa Code section 96.6(2). Misconduct must be substantial in order to justify a denial of unemployment benefits. Misconduct serious enough to warrant the discharge of an employee is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits. See *Lee v. Employment Appeal Board*, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000). The focus is on deliberate, intentional, or culpable acts by the

employee. See *Gimbel v. Employment Appeal Board*, 489 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). Failure in job performance due to inability or incapacity is not considered misconduct because the actions were not volitional. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. See 871 IAC 24.32(4). When the record is composed solely of hearsay evidence, that evidence must be examined closely in light of the entire record. Schmitz v. Iowa Dep't Human Servs., 461 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). Both the quality and the quantity of the evidence must be evaluated to see whether it rises to the necessary levels of trustworthiness, credibility, and accuracy required by a reasonably prudent person in the conduct of serious affairs. See, Iowa Code § 17A.14 (1). In making the evaluation, the fact-finder should conduct a common sense evaluation of (1) the nature of the hearsay; (2) the availability of better evidence; (3) the cost of acquiring better information; (4) the need for precision; and (5) the administrative policy to be fulfilled. Schmitz, 461 N.W.2d at 608. When it is in a party's power to produce more direct and satisfactory evidence than is actually produced, it may fairly be inferred that the more direct evidence will expose deficiencies in that party's case. See Crosser v. Iowa Dept. of Public Safety, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976).

The credible evidence presented is that the claimant remembers performing repairs and torqueing the lugnuts of the vehicle on March 24, 2017 before it was released to the customer. The employer had video surveillance available but did not review it or offer it at the hearing to corroborate its assertion that the claimant failed to perform his job duties. In contrast, the claimant offered credible first-hand testimony that he did complete the duties, personally test drove it and offered several plausible scenarios that could have occurred over the five day period of releasing the vehicle until it broke, that were unrelated to his maintenance of the vehicle. Mindful of the ruling in *Crosser*, *id.*, and noting that the claimant presented direct, first-hand testimony while the employer relied upon second-hand reports, the administrative law judge concludes that the claimant's recollection of the events is more credible than that of the employer.

Inasmuch as the claimant did attempt to perform the job to the best of his ability but was unable to meet its expectations, no intentional misconduct has been established, as is the employer's burden of proof. Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). While the employer may have had business reasons for discharging the claimant, it has failed to establish the claimant was discharged for a final act that would constitute misconduct. Accordingly, benefits are allowed, provided he is otherwise eligible.

Nothing in this decision should be interpreted as a condemnation of the employer's right to terminate the claimant for violating its policies and procedures. The employer had a right to follow its policies and procedures. The analysis of unemployment insurance eligibility, however, does not end there. This ruling simply holds that the employer did not meet its burden of proof to establish the claimant's conduct leading separation was misconduct under lowa law.

Because the claimant is eligible for benefits, the issues of overpayment and relief of charges are moot.

## **DECISION:**

The May 23, 2017, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is affirmed. The claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided he is otherwise eligible. The claimant is not overpaid benefits. The employer's account is not relieved of future charges associated with this claim.

Jennifer L. Beckman Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

jlb/scn