

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

**ERIN L NEFZGER**

Claimant

**APPEAL 22A-UI-07195-DH-T**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**WALMART ASSOCIATES**

Employer

**OC: 02/27/22**

**Claimant: Respondent (1)**

Iowa Code § 96.5(1) - Voluntary Quit  
Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a - Discharge for Misconduct  
Iowa Code § 96.3(7) - Recovery of Benefit Overpayment  
Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 - Employer/Representative Participation Fact-finding Interview  
Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.1(113)c - Discharge for Violation of Rules  
Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) - Excessive Unexcused Absenteeism  
Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(8) - Current Act

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

The employer/appellant, Walmart Associates, filed an appeal from the March 10, 2022, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits as the record does not show willful or deliberate misconduct regarding the 02/21/2022, dismissal from work. Notices of hearing were mailed to the parties' last known addresses of record for a telephone hearing scheduled for May 3, 2022. Claimant, Erin Nefzger, personally participated. The employer participated through Karel Clark, party representative and Nicholas Clark, manager and coach. Employer's Exhibit R-1 was admitted. Judicial notice was taken of the administrative record.

**ISSUE:**

Was the separation a layoff, discharge for misconduct or a voluntary quit without good cause?  
Was the claimant overpaid benefits?  
Should claimant repay benefits and/or charge employer due to employer participation in fact finding?

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having heard the testimony and reviewed the evidence in the record, the undersigned finds: Claimant started with employer August 8, 2001. Claimant was a fulltime associate with a set schedule. Her last day worked was January 11, 2022, and she was discharged on February 21, 2022, for violating the attendance policy.

Employer has an online electronic employee handbook and claimant was given access when she started work. There are policies regarding attendance and a point system that when an employee accumulates 5 points in a rolling 6-month period, they are eligible for discharge from employment.

Mr. Callahan testified as to the below absences being factored into the discharge: October 1, 6, and 6 again; November 6, and 20; and December 4 and 17 all of 2021. Mr. Callahan did not know why the October 6th date was listed twice. Prior to the October 1 absence, claimant was at zero points. Each of the incidents resulted in one point. This led to claimant having 7 points after the December 17, 2021, incident. Claimant had no recollection as to why claimant missed any of the dates. Meaning he was unable to say whether or not claimant missed due to car trouble, claimant being ill, or any other reason or no reason at all being given. Employer did not know. Mr. Callahan further was unable to report whether the absences were timely reported to employer. Claimant asserts that all of the absences were timely reported and were due to personal illness. Claimant further was never warned of her absences and when she checked on her point total in December 2021, it was at 1½ points, not the five to seven range employer asserts.

Employer's appeal listed fourteen dates of absences/tardies. None of the fourteen dates listed match the seven dates Mr. Callahan testified regarding. Mr. Callahan stated he knew nothing about those date and is relying upon the dates he testified about. Claimant advised the dates Mr. Callahan testified about are dates she was not told about when Mr. Callahan informed her she was being discharged, but it was the dates in the appeal letter, of which, twelve of the absences were excused by Sedgwick (employer's company used to manage their benefits) after her termination, which the employer does not dispute and explains why different dates are provided at the time of the hearing versus the time of appeal.

Records show claimant has received \$3,186.00 in benefits for the six weeks from 03/05/22 through 04/09/22, with her weekly benefit amount being \$531.00. Employer submitted documents for fact-finding but did not participate in the telephone interview. Per the definitions, employer did participate in fact finding. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10(1).

## **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton

disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.1 provides:

Definitions.

Unless the context otherwise requires, the terms used in these rules shall have the following meaning. All terms which are defined in Iowa Code chapter 96 shall be construed as they are defined in Iowa Code chapter 96.

24.1(113) *Separations*. All terminations of employment, generally classifiable as layoffs, quits, discharges, or other separations.

c. *Discharge*. A discharge is a termination of employment initiated by the employer for such reasons as incompetence, violation of rules, dishonesty, laziness, absenteeism, insubordination, failure to pass probationary period.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

Iowa Admin. Code r.871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). Misconduct must be "substantial" to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. *Newman v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984).

In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential

liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. A determination as to whether an employee's act is misconduct does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's policy or rule. A violation is not necessarily disqualifying misconduct even if the employer was fully within its rights to impose discipline up to or including discharge for the incident under its policy.

To the extent that the circumstances surrounding each incident were not similar enough to establish a pattern of misbehavior, the employer has only shown that claimant was negligent. "[M]ere negligence is not enough to constitute misconduct." *Lee v. Employment Appeal Board*, 616 N.W.2d 661, 666 (Iowa 2000). A claimant will not be disqualified if the employer shows only "inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances." 871 IAC 24.32(1)(a). When looking at an alleged pattern of negligence, previous incidents are considered when deciding whether a "degree of recurrence" indicates culpability. Claimant was careless, but the carelessness does not indicate "such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design" such that it could accurately be called misconduct. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)(a); *Greenwell v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, No. 15-0154 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2016). Ordinary negligence is all that is proven here.

An employee is entitled to fair warning that the employer will no longer tolerate certain performance and conduct. Without fair warning, an employee has no reasonable way of knowing that there are changes that need be made in order to preserve the employment. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written), detailed, and reasonable notice should be given. Training or general notice to staff about a policy is not considered a disciplinary warning. Inasmuch as employer has failed to prove they had previously warned claimant about any issue leading to the separation, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or with recurrent negligence in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning.

Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." *Newman v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). The focus of the administrative code definition of misconduct is on deliberate, intentional or culpable acts by the employee. *Id.*

When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Id.* Negligence does not constitute misconduct unless recurrent in nature; a single act is not disqualifying unless indicative of a deliberate disregard of the employer's interests. *Henry v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 391 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986).

Further, poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. *Miller v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). The law limits disqualifying misconduct to substantial and willful wrongdoing or repeated carelessness or negligence that equals willful misconduct in culpability. *Lee v. Employment Appeal Bd.*, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000).

The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989). The term "absenteeism" also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as "tardiness." An absence is an extended tardiness, and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence. The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. *Higgins* at 192.

Second, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper* at 10. The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable

grounds,” *Higgins* at 191, or because it was not “properly reported,” holding excused absences are those “with appropriate notice.” *Cosper* at 10. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. *Higgins, supra*. See, *Gimbel v. Emp’t Appeal Bd.*, 489 N.W.2d 36 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) where a claimant’s late call to the employer was justified because the claimant, who was suffering from an asthma attack, was physically unable to call the employer until the condition sufficiently improved; and *Roberts v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv.*, 356 N.W.2d 218 (Iowa 1984) where unreported absences are not misconduct if the failure to report is caused by mental incapacity.

The employer’s point system or no-fault absenteeism policy is not dispositive of the issue of qualification for benefits; however, an employer is entitled to expect its employees to report to work as scheduled or to be notified as to when and why the employee is unable to report to work.

The employer has failed to establish claimant was warned about their attendance nor that additional points could result in termination of employment. Employer was unable to establish the reasons for the absences nor whether the absences were or were not timely reported. Claimant established that each absence was for a personal illness and were properly reported and therefore excusable for unemployment benefit purposes.

Absences must be unexcused. Employer treats all absences testified to as a no-fault absence. For purposes of unemployment benefits, personal illness of claimant that are properly reported are considered an excused absence. All of the incidents that employer relied upon for discharge cannot be factored into the discharge, for unemployment benefit purposes. This results in no absences and zero points.

With no absences in violation of the policy left, there is no current act from which employer has to discharge claimant from employment.

As such, while employer may have had a good reason to discharge claimant, they did not have a unemployment benefit disqualifying reason to discharge claimant and therefore with no disqualifying reason being proven, no disqualification pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a is imposed.

The next issue is whether claimant has been overpaid benefits. Iowa Code § 96.3(7)a-b, as amended in 2008, provides:

7. Recovery of overpayment of benefits.

a. If an individual receives benefits for which the individual is subsequently determined to be ineligible, even though the individual acts in good faith and is not otherwise at fault, the benefits shall be recovered. The department in its discretion may recover the overpayment of benefits either by having a sum equal to the overpayment deducted from any future benefits payable to the individual or by having the individual pay to the department a sum equal to the overpayment.

b. (1)(a) If the department determines that an overpayment has been made, the charge for the overpayment against the employer’s account shall be removed and the account shall be credited with an amount equal to the overpayment from the unemployment compensation trust fund and this credit shall include both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5. The employer shall not be relieved of charges if benefits are paid because the employer or an agent of the employer failed to respond timely or

adequately to the department's request for information relating to the payment of benefits. This prohibition against relief of charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers.

(b) However, provided the benefits were not received as the result of fraud or willful misrepresentation by the individual, benefits shall not be recovered from an individual if the employer did not participate in the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to section 96.6, subsection 2, and an overpayment occurred because of a subsequent reversal on appeal regarding the issue of the individual's separation from employment.

(2) An accounting firm, agent, unemployment insurance accounting firm, or other entity that represents an employer in unemployment claim matters and demonstrates a continuous pattern of failing to participate in the initial determinations to award benefits, as determined and defined by rule by the department, shall be denied permission by the department to represent any employers in unemployment insurance matters. This subparagraph does not apply to attorneys or counselors admitted to practice in the courts of this state pursuant to section 602.10101.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 provides:

Employer and employer representative participation in fact-finding interviews.

(1) "Participate," as the term is used for employers in the context of the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, means submitting detailed factual information of the quantity and quality that if un rebutted would be sufficient to result in a decision favorable to the employer. The most effective means to participate is to provide live testimony at the interview from a witness with firsthand knowledge of the events leading to the separation. If no live testimony is provided, the employer must provide the name and telephone number of an employee with firsthand information who may be contacted, if necessary, for rebuttal. A party may also participate by providing detailed written statements or documents that provide detailed factual information of the events leading to separation. At a minimum, the information provided by the employer or the employer's representative must identify the dates and particular circumstances of the incident or incidents, including, in the case of discharge, the act or omissions of the claimant or, in the event of a voluntary separation, the stated reason for the quit. The specific rule or policy must be submitted if the claimant was discharged for violating such rule or policy. In the case of discharge for attendance violations, the information must include the circumstances of all incidents the employer or the employer's representative contends meet the definition of unexcused absences as set forth in 871-subrule 24.32(7). On the other hand, written or oral statements or general conclusions without supporting detailed factual information and information submitted after the fact-finding decision has been issued are not considered participation within the meaning of the statute.

(2) "A continuous pattern of nonparticipation in the initial determination to award benefits," pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, as the term is used for an entity representing employers, means on 25 or more occasions in a calendar quarter beginning with the first calendar quarter of 2009, the entity files appeals after failing to participate. Appeals filed but withdrawn before the day of the

contested case hearing will not be considered in determining if a continuous pattern of nonparticipation exists. The division administrator shall notify the employer's representative in writing after each such appeal.

(3) If the division administrator finds that an entity representing employers as defined in Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, has engaged in a continuous pattern of nonparticipation, the division administrator shall suspend said representative for a period of up to six months on the first occasion, up to one year on the second occasion and up to ten years on the third or subsequent occasion. Suspension by the division administrator constitutes final agency action and may be appealed pursuant to Iowa Code section 17A.19.

(4) "Fraud or willful misrepresentation by the individual," as the term is used for claimants in the context of the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, means providing knowingly false statements or knowingly false denials of material facts for the purpose of obtaining unemployment insurance benefits. Statements or denials may be either oral or written by the claimant. Inadvertent misstatements or mistakes made in good faith are not considered fraud or willful misrepresentation.

This rule is intended to implement Iowa Code section 96.3(7)"b" as amended by 2008 Iowa Acts, Senate File 2160.

Because claimant's separation was not disqualifying, benefits were paid to which she was entitled to so long as she met all other eligibility requirements. The unemployment insurance law provides that benefits must be recovered from a claimant who receives benefits and is later determined to be ineligible for benefits, even though the claimant acted in good faith and was not otherwise at fault. However, the overpayment will not be recovered when it is based on a reversal on appeal of an initial determination to award benefits on an issue regarding the claimant's employment separation if: (1) the benefits were not received due to any fraud or willful misrepresentation by the claimant and (2) the employer did not participate in the initial proceeding to award benefits. There is no record of fraud or willful misrepresentation. The employer did participate in the fact-finding. However, with no reversal, the issue of charging employer is moot.

The claimant is not obligated to repay to the agency the benefits she received making the issue of overpayment and repayment moot.

The law also states that an employer is to be charged if "the employer failed to respond timely or adequately to the department's request for information relating to the payment of benefits. . ." Iowa Code § 96.3(7)(b)(1)(a). Here, the employer did respond adequately, benefits were paid, but not reversed. The issue of charging employer is moot since the decision was not reversed.

**DECISION:**

The March 10, 2022, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision granting benefits is **AFFIRMED**. Claimant's discharge was not disqualifying. Benefits are allowed on this issue, making issues of claimant's overpayment and repayment and employer's relief of charges moot.



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Darrin T. Hamilton  
Administrative Law Judge

May 16, 2022

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Decision Dated and Mailed

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