IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

JAMES W RHODES

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 08A-UI-08019-LT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

HEARTLAND EXPRESS INC OF IOWA

Employer

OC: 08/03/08 R: 12 Claimant: Respondent (5)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge/Misconduct Iowa Code § 96.5(1)d – Voluntary Leaving/Illness or Injury

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed a timely appeal from the August 28, 2008, reference 01, decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a telephone conference hearing was held on September 23, 2008. Claimant participated. Employer participated through Lea Peters.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether claimant quit the employment without good cause attributable to the employer or if he was discharged for reasons related to job misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having heard the testimony and having reviewed the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed as a full-time over-the-road driver from June 2002 until July 18, 2008, when he was involuntarily separated at the expiration of his medical leave of absence period because he was not yet able to return to full duty without restriction. He injured his back at work in June 2003 and had been working with a light duty restriction against loading and unloading until April 28, 2008. He was on a medical leave from April 28, 2008, because his physician told him he could not pass a DOT physical because of hypertension and atrial fibrillation. The restriction is likely to be permanent, but the leave period expired on July 18. Claimant provided relevant medical information to employer and was advised that he must provide an unrestricted medical release to be reinstated. He remains under medical care but switched his care to a different physician through the Veterans' Administration after he lost his health insurance.

He has worked as a truck mechanic and truck driving school instructor, which generally require a commercial driver's license (CDL). He has work experience as a service manager and boat yard manager, neither of which require a CDL. He is also applying for jobs as a flag car driver, service writer for repair orders and auto or truck parts salesperson, which do not require a CDL.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant did not quit but was discharged for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-1-d provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department. But the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:
- d. The individual left employment because of illness, injury or pregnancy upon the advice of a licensed and practicing physician, and upon knowledge of the necessity for absence immediately notified the employer, or the employer consented to the absence, and after recovering from the illness, injury or pregnancy, when recovery was certified by a licensed and practicing physician, the individual returned to the employer and offered to perform services and the individual's regular work or comparable suitable work was not available, if so found by the department, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.25(35) provides:

Voluntary quit without good cause. In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to lowa Code § 96.5. However, the claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving lowa Code § 96.5, subsection (1), paragraphs "a" through "i," and subsection 10. The following reasons for a voluntary quit shall be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer:

- (35) The claimant left because of illness or injury which was not caused or aggravated by the employment or pregnancy and failed to:
- (a) Obtain the advice of a licensed and practicing physician;
- (b) Obtain certification of release for work from a licensed and practicing physician;
- (c) Return to the employer and offer services upon recovery and certification for work by a licensed and practicing physician; or
- (d) Fully recover so that the claimant could perform all of the duties of the job.

The court in Gilmore v. Empl. Appeal Bd., 695 N.W.2d 44 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004) noted that:

"Insofar as the Employment Security Law is not designed to provide health and disability insurance, only those employees who experience illness-induced separations that can fairly be attributed to the employer are properly eligible for unemployment benefits." White v. Employment Appeal Bd., 487 N.W.2d 342, 345 (lowa 1992) (citing Butts v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 328 N.W.2d 515, 517 (lowa 1983)).

The statute provides an exception where:

The individual left employment because of illness, injury or pregnancy upon the advice of a licensed and practicing physician, and upon knowledge of the necessity for absence immediately notified the employer, or the employer consented to the absence, and after recovering from the illness, injury or pregnancy, when recovery was certified by a licensed and practicing physician, the individual returned to the employer and offered to perform services and ... the individual's regular work or comparable suitable work was not available, if so found by the department, provided the individual is otherwise eligible. lowa Code § 96.5(1)(d).

Section 96.5(1)(d) specifically requires that the employee has recovered from the illness or injury, and this recovery has been certified by a physician. The exception in section 96.5(1)(d) only applies when an employee is fully recovered and the employer has not held open the employee's position. *White*, 487 N.W.2d at 346; *Hedges v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 368 N.W.2d 862, 867 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); see also *Geiken v. Lutheran Home for the Aged Ass'n*, 468 N.W.2d 223, 226 (Iowa 1991) (noting the full recovery standard of section 96.5(1)(d)).

In the present case, the evidence clearly shows Gilmore was not fully recovered from his injury until March 6, 2003. Gilmore is unable to show that he comes within the exception of section 96.5(1)(d). Therefore, because his injury was not connected to his employment, he is considered to have voluntarily quit without good cause attributable to the employer, and is not entitled to unemployment ... benefits. See *White*, 487 N.W.2d at 345; *Shontz*, 248 N.W.2d at 91.

The claimant is not required to return to the employer to offer services after the medical recovery, because he had already been involuntarily terminated from the employment. Thus, the separation was a discharge.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer

has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

Iowa Code § 96.5-1-d provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department. But the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:
- d. The individual left employment because of illness, injury or pregnancy upon the advice of a licensed and practicing physician, and upon knowledge of the necessity for absence immediately notified the employer, or the employer consented to the absence, and after recovering from the illness, injury or pregnancy, when recovery was certified by a licensed and practicing physician, the individual returned to the employer and offered to perform services and the individual's regular work or comparable suitable work was not available, if so found by the department, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

In spite of the expiration of the medical leave period, since claimant was still under medical care and had not yet been released to return to work as of the date of separation, no misconduct has been established. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

DECISION:

The August 28, 2008, reference 01, decision is modified without change in effect. The claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

Dévon M. Lewis Administrative Law Judge	
Decision Dated and Mailed	

dml/kjw