IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

WILLIAM W CELIA

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 13A-UI-12663-S2T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

WORKSOURCE INC

Employer

OC: 10/13/13

Claimant: Respondent (1)

Section 96.5-1-j – Separation from Temporary Employer Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Worksource (employer) appealed a representative's November 8, 2013, decision (reference 01) that concluded William Celia (claimant) was eligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on December 4, 2013. The claimant participated personally. The employer participated by Kassandra Pickett, Recruiter.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether the claimant was separated from employment for any disqualifying reason.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The administrative law judge, having heard the testimony and considered all of the evidence in the record, finds that: The employer is a temporary employment service. The claimant performed services off and on from August 15, 2011, through November 26, 2012. He signed a document on August 10, 2011, indicating that he was to contact the employer within three days following the completion of an assignment to request placement in a new assignment. The claimant may have been given a copy of the document which may have been part of the contract for hire.

On November 27, 28, 29, and 30, 2012, the claimant properly reported his absence due to having the flu to Worksource and 3E Electric. On December 3, 2012, 3E Electric told the claimant that his assignment ended. On December 3 and 4, 2012, the claimant sought reassignment from the employer but no work was available.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was not separated from the employer for any disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code section 96.5-1-j provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department, but the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:
- j. The individual is a temporary employee of a temporary employment firm who notifies the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment and who seeks reassignment. Failure of the individual to notify the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment within three working days of the completion of each employment assignment under a contract of hire shall be deemed a voluntary quit unless the individual was not advised in writing of the duty to notify the temporary employment firm upon completion of an employment assignment or the individual had good cause for not contacting the temporary employment firm within three working days and notified the firm at the first reasonable opportunity thereafter.

To show that the employee was advised in writing of the notification requirement of this paragraph, the temporary employment firm shall advise the temporary employee by requiring the temporary employee, at the time of employment with the temporary employment firm, to read and sign a document that provides a clear and concise explanation of the notification requirement and the consequences of a failure to notify. The document shall be separate from any contract of employment and a copy of the signed document shall be provided to the temporary employee.

For the purposes of this paragraph:

- (1) "Temporary employee" means an individual who is employed by a temporary employment firm to provide services to clients to supplement their work force during absences, seasonal workloads, temporary skill or labor market shortages, and for special assignments and projects.
- (2) "Temporary employment firm" means a person engaged in the business of employing temporary employees.

Under the lowa Code the employer must advise the claimant of the three day notice requirement and give the claimant a copy of that requirement. The notice requirement cannot be a part of the contract for hire. It appears the employer did not provide the claimant with the proper notice requirements and has, therefore, failed to satisfy the requirements of lowa Code section 96.5-1-j. In addition, the claimant sought reassignment within the three days and the employer did not have work available. Benefits are allowed.

In the alternative the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was not discharged for misconduct.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

871 IAC 24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. Excessive absences are not misconduct unless unexcused. Absences due to properly reported illness can never constitute job misconduct since they are not volitional. Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The employer must establish not only misconduct but that there was a final incident of misconduct which precipitated the discharge. The last incident of absence was a properly reported illness which occurred in November 2012. The claimant's absence does not amount to job misconduct because it was properly reported. The employer has failed to provide any evidence of willful and deliberate misconduct which would be a final incident leading to the discharge. The claimant was discharged but there was no misconduct.

The claimant's and the employer's testimony is inconsistent. The administrative law judge finds the claimant's testimony to be more credible because he was an eye witnesses to the events for which he was separated from employment. The employer was not.

DECISION:

The representative's November 8, 2013	3, decision (reference 01) is affirmed.	The claimant was
separated from the employer for good	I cause attributable to the employer.	The claimant is
eligible to receive unemployment insura	nce benefits.	

Beth A. Scheetz Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

bas/css