IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

TIFFINIE M MARSHALL

Claimant

APPEAL 17A-UI-11459-JP-T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

ALL CLEAR WINDOW CLEANING INC

Employer

OC: 10/15/17

Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

Iowa Code § 96.5(1) - Voluntary Quitting

Iowa Code § 96.3(7) – Recovery of Benefit Overpayment

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 – Employer/Representative Participation Fact-finding Interview

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed an appeal from the November 3, 2017, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on November 29, 2017. Claimant did not register for the hearing and did not participate. Employer participated through office manager MaryJo Pina. Official notice was taken of the administrative record, including claimant's benefit payment history and the fact-documents, with no objection.

ISSUES:

Did claimant voluntarily leave the employment with good cause attributable to the employer or did employer discharge the claimant for reasons related to job misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of benefits?

Has the claimant been overpaid unemployment insurance benefits, and if so, can the repayment of those benefits to the agency be waived?

Can charges to the employer's account be waived?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full-time as a sales employee from April 11, 2017, and was separated from employment on August 28, 2017 when she was discharged.

On July 11, 2017, claimant went on an approved maternity leave. Prior to starting her maternity leave, claimant informed the employer she would be gone from the employer for a couple weeks after she had her baby. Claimant was supposed to let the employer know when she was ready to return from maternity leave. On July 21, 2017, claimant had her baby. Around the second week of August 2017, Ms. Pina attempted to contact claimant because the employer had not

heard from her since she went on maternity leave. Ms. Pina was not successful in reaching claimant, but she left a voicemail for claimant. Claimant did not respond to Ms. Pina's voicemail. While claimant was on maternity leave, the employer had an employee filling in at claimant's sales position. Around the middle of August 2017, the employer decided to keep that employee in claimant's sales position. On August 25, 2017, claimant called the owner (Chad) about returning to work for the employer. Chad informed claimant that her position was filled, but he was going to have her work in the office at two other companies he owned (Corridor Motors and Advance Tinting Solutions). On August 28, 2017, claimant started working for the other two companies and was separated from this employer (ALL CLEAR WINDOW CLEANING INC). Claimant was paid the same rate as her sales position and with the same hours. When claimant went to work for the other companies, she had to complete new tax paperwork.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant did not quit but was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed.

Iowa Code section 96.5(1) provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits, regardless of the source of the individual's wage credits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

While claimant has the burden of proving that the voluntary leaving was for good cause attributable to the employer, the employer has the burden to establish the separation was a voluntary quitting of employment rather than a discharge. Iowa Code § 96.6(2). A voluntary quitting means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer and requires an intention to terminate the employment. Wills v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 447 N.W. 2d 137, 138 (Iowa 1989); see also Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(35). A voluntary leaving of employment requires an intention to terminate the employment relationship accompanied by an overt act of carrying out that intention. Local Lodge #1426 v. Wilson Trailer, 289 N.W.2d 608, 612 (Iowa 1980). Where a claimant walked off the job without permission before the end of his shift saying he wanted a meeting with management the next day, the Iowa Court of Appeals ruled this was not a voluntary quit because the claimant's expressed desire to meet with management was evidence that he wished to maintain the employment relationship. Such cases must be analyzed as a discharge from employment. Peck v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 492 N.W.2d 438 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

Although claimant did not promptly return Ms. Pina's phone call in August 2017, she did contact the owner on August 25, 2017 and expressed her desire to return to work for the employer. Therefore, claimant did not have a desire to quit her employment with the employer. Claimant was separated from this employer when they discharged her and thus the burden of proof falls to the employer.

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits, regardless of the source of the individual's wage credits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The disqualification shall continue until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(4) provides:

(4) Report required. The claimant's statement and employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. In cases where a suspension or disciplinary layoff exists, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct shall be resolved.

Iowa Admin. Code r.871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. lowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (lowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. lowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (lowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what

misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." *Newman v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Id.* Negligence does not constitute misconduct unless recurrent in nature; a single act is not disqualifying unless indicative of a deliberate disregard of the employer's interests. *Henry v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 391 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. *Miller v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).

In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. Claimant was on an approved maternity leave starting July 11, 2017. While claimant was on her approved maternity leave, the employer had another employee fill in for her at her sales position. On August 25, 2017, when claimant informed the employer she was ready to return to work, it informed her that her sales position with this employer was filled and she would have to work for the owner's other companies. Inasmuch as the employer decided to end claimant's employment with this employer (ALL CLEAR WINDOW CLEANING INC) and have her work for the owner's other companies, the employer has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant engaged in job disqualifying misconduct with this employer. Benefits are allowed.

As benefits are allowed, the issues of overpayment, repayment, and the chargeability of the employer's account are moot.

DECISION:

The November 3, 2017, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is affirmed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible. Any benefits claimed and withheld on this basis shall be paid.

Jeremy Peterson Administrative Law Judge	
Decision Dated and Mailed	
jp/rvs	