

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

JUSTIN P RICHMOND
Claimant

3M COMPANY
Employer

APPEAL 21A-UI-11566-JC-T
**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

OC: 06/14/20
Claimant: Respondent (1R)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct
Iowa Code § 96.3(7) – Recovery of Benefit Overpayment
Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 – Employer/Representative Participation Fact-finding Interview
PL116-136, Sec. 2104 – Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer/appellant, 3M Company, filed an appeal from the April 7, 2021 (reference 03) Iowa Workforce Development (“IWD”) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on July 22, 2021. The claimant, Justin P. Richmond, did not respond to the notice of hearing to furnish a phone number with the Appeals Bureau and did not participate in the hearing. The employer participated through Thomas Kuiper, hearing representative for Talx UCM Services/Equifax. Sarah Hopkins also testified. The administrative law judge took official notice of the administrative records. Based on the evidence, the arguments presented, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUES:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?
Has the claimant been overpaid any unemployment insurance benefits, and if so, can the repayment of those benefits to the agency be waived?
Can any charges to the employer’s account be waived?
Is the claimant eligible for Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed full-time as a coding operator and was separated from employment on March 19, 2021 when he was discharged.

The employer has points based attendance policy, which provides point values for attendance infractions and upon receipt of 5 points in a rolling twelve month policy, an employee is subject to discharge. Absences that are covered by FMLA do not count towards the accrual of points. The policy is a no-fault policy, which means the employer does not consider a reason for

absence before issuing a point. Claimant was trained on the policy when hired. Claimant had been issued a verbal warning on September 12, 2020 and written warning on September 30, 2020 for accrual of points.

Claimant was absent from work from February 10, 2021 until discharge on March 19, 2021. The final incident happened when claimant failed to submit FMLA paperwork to employer. When claimant did not, employer determined his absences would not be covered or excused and retroactively applied attendance points to his absence, causing him to "point out". Claimant had maintained contact with the employer, but was having difficulty communicating with the employer's leave of absence coordinator. Employer did not have reason to believe claimant was not in fact under medical care for a personal illness or injury. No release from his doctor had been obtained prior to discharge. He was subsequently discharged.

The administrative record reflects that claimant has received unemployment benefits and also received federal unemployment insurance benefits through Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC). The administrative record also establishes that the employer did not participate in the fact-finding interview or make a witness with direct knowledge available for rebuttal. The employer did not participate because no notice of interview was received by the employer's agent, Talx UCM Services Inc.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged but not for misconduct.

Iowa law disqualifies individuals who are discharged from employment for misconduct from receiving unemployment insurance benefits. Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a. They remain disqualified until such time as they requalify for benefits by working and earning insured wages ten times their weekly benefit amount. *Id.*

Iowa Administrative Code rule 871-24.32(1)a provides:

"Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

In an at-will employment environment, an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job*

Service, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be “substantial.” *Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984). The focus is on deliberate, intentional, or culpable acts by the employee. See *Gimbel v. Employment Appeal Board*, 489 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

In the specific context of absenteeism the administrative code provides:

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

871 IAC 24.32(7); See *Higgins v. IDJS*, 350 N.W.2d 187, 190 n. 1 (Iowa 1984)(“rule [2]4.32(7)...accurately states the law”).

In order to show misconduct due to absenteeism, the employer must establish the claimant had excessive absences that were unexcused. Thus, the first step in the analysis is to determine whether the absences were unexcused. The requirement of “unexcused” can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for “reasonable grounds,” *Higgins* at 191, or because it was not “properly reported,” holding excused absences are those “with appropriate notice.” *Cosper* at 10. Absences due to properly reported illness are excused, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. *Iowa Admin. Code* r. 871-24.32(7); *Cosper, supra*; *Gaborit v. Emp’t Appeal Bd.*, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007).

The second step in the analysis is to determine whether the unexcused absences were excessive. Excessive absenteeism has been found when there has been seven unexcused absences in five months; five unexcused absences and three instances of tardiness in eight months; three unexcused absences over an eight-month period; three unexcused absences over seven months; and missing three times after being warned. *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 192 (Iowa 1984); *Infante v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984); *Armel v. EAB*, 2007 WL 3376929*3 (Iowa App. Nov. 15, 2007); *Hiland v. EAB*, No. 12-2300 (Iowa App. July 10, 2013); and *Clark v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv.*, 317 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa App. 1982). Excessiveness by its definition implies an amount or degree too great to be reasonable or acceptable.

The claimant’s final absence from February 10, 2021 through March 19, 2021 was properly reported and due to illness. Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. *Gaborit v. Emp’t Appeal Bd.*, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Therefore, the final absence was due to illness and properly reported, would be considered excused.

Iowa Admin. Code r.871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

Even had the claimant's leave period expired, since claimant was still under medical care and had not yet been released to return to work without restriction as of the date of separation, no disqualifying reason for the separation has been established. Based on the evidence presented, the administrative law judge concludes the employer has not established that the claimant had excessive absences which would be considered unexcused for purposes of unemployment insurance eligibility. Because the last absence was related to properly reported illness or other reasonable grounds, no final or current incident of unexcused absenteeism occurred which establishes work-connected misconduct. Since the employer has not established a current or final act of misconduct, and, without such, the history of other incidents need not be examined. Accordingly, benefits are allowed.

Nothing in this decision should be interpreted as a condemnation of the employer's right to terminate the claimant for violating its policies and procedures. The employer had a right to follow its policies and procedures. The analysis of unemployment insurance eligibility, however, does not end there. This ruling simply holds that the employer did not meet its burden of proof to establish the claimant's conduct leading separation was misconduct under Iowa law.

Because the claimant is eligible for benefits, the issues of overpayment of regular unemployment insurance benefits and relief of charges are moot.

The issue of whether claimant was able and available for work (due to illness/injury) effective March 19, 2021 is remanded to the Benefits Bureau for an initial investigation.

The final issue to address is whether the claimant is eligible for Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC).

PL116-136, Sec. 2104 provides, in pertinent part:

(b) Provisions of Agreement

(1) Federal pandemic unemployment compensation.--Any agreement under this section shall provide that the State agency of the State will make payments of regular compensation to individuals in amounts and to the extent that they would be determined if the State law of the State were applied, with respect to any week for which the individual is (disregarding this section) otherwise entitled under the State law to receive regular compensation, as if such State law had been modified in a manner such that the amount of regular compensation (including dependents' allowances) payable for any week shall be equal to

(A) the amount determined under the State law (before the application of this paragraph), plus

(B) an additional amount of \$600 (in this section referred to as "Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation").

....

(f) Fraud and Overpayments

(2) Repayment.--In the case of individuals who have received amounts of Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation to which they were not entitled, the State shall require such individuals to repay the amounts of such Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation to the State agency...

Because the claimant is allowed regular unemployment insurance benefits, he is also eligible for FPUC, provided he is otherwise eligible. The employer is not charged for these federal benefits.

The parties are reminded that under Iowa Code § 96.6-4, a finding of fact or law, judgment, conclusion, or final order made in an unemployment insurance proceeding is binding only on the parties in this proceeding and is not binding in any other agency or judicial proceeding. This provision makes clear that unemployment findings and conclusions are only binding on unemployment issues, and have no effect otherwise.

DECISION:

The April 7, 2021 (reference 03) unemployment insurance decision is AFFIRMED. The claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided he is otherwise eligible. He is not overpaid benefits. The employer's account cannot be relieved of charges associated with the claim for regular unemployment insurance benefits. The claimant is also eligible for FPUC, provided he is otherwise eligible.

REMAND:

The issue of whether claimant was able and available for work (due to illness/injury) effective March 19, 2021 is remanded to the Benefits Bureau for an initial investigation.



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August 2, 2021
Decision Dated and Mailed

jlb/lj