IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

Claimant: Respondent (2-R)

	68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - El
BRANDY E MARTIN Claimant	APPEAL NO. 12A-UI-04917-JTT
	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION
CARE INITIATIVES Employer	
	OC: 06/05/11

Section 96.5(2)(a) – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed a timely appeal from the April 19, 2012, reference 05, decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on May 21, 2012. Claimant Brandy Martin did not respond to the hearing notice instructions to provide a telephone number for the hearing and did not participate. David Williams of TALX represented the employer and presented testimony through Sarah Thomas and Tabitha Wilker.

ISSUE:

Whether the claimant was discharged for misconduct in connection with the employment that disqualifies the claimant for unemployment insurance benefits.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Brandy Martin was employed by Care Initiatives, doing business as Oakwood Nursing and Rehabilitation in Albia, as a full-time overnight certified nursing assistant from November 2011 and last performed work for the employer on January 21, 2012. Ms. Martin called in an absence on January 22, 2012 at the scheduled start of her shift. Ms. Martin asserted she had a flat tire, but declined the employer's offer to come collect her for work. Ms. Martin was then absent from shifts on January 23 and and 25 without notifying the employer. The employer attempted to contact Ms. Martin by telephone on January 23 and 24 without success. On January 26, the employer took Ms. Martin off the schedule.

The employer's attendance policy required that Ms. Martin telephone the employer at least two hours prior to the start of her shift if she needed to be absent. The employer's attendance policy also indicated that a single no-call, no-show absence would be grounds for termination of the employment if the absence occurred within the first 90 days of the employment. The policy also indicated that two no-call, no-show absences would be grounds for termination beyond the first 90 days of employment. The employer had reviewed the attendance policy with Ms. Martin during orientation.

The employer did not hear anything further from Ms. Martin until February 3. On that day, Ms. Martin telephoned the employer and asserted she had been dealing with a suicidal teenaged daughter. Ms. Martin told the employer she had not had phone with her. Ms. Martin told the employer she would not be returning to the employment.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The employer has the burden of proof in this matter. See Iowa Code section 96.6(2). Misconduct must be substantial in order to justify a denial of unemployment benefits. Misconduct serious enough to warrant the discharge of an employee is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits. See <u>Lee v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000). The focus is on deliberate, intentional, or culpable acts by the employee. See <u>Gimbel v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 489 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of the current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act(s). The termination of employment must be based on a current act. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). In determining whether the conduct that prompted the discharge constituted a "current act," the administrative law judge considers the date on which the conduct came to the attention of the employer and the date on which the employer notified the claimant that the conduct subjected the claimant to possible discharge. See also <u>Greene v. EAB</u>, 426 N.W.2d 659, 662 (Iowa App. 1988).

Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. See 871 IAC 24.32(4). When it is in a party's power to produce more direct and satisfactory evidence than is actually produced, it may fairly be inferred that the more direct evidence will expose deficiencies in that party's case. See <u>Crosser v. lowa Dept. of Public Safety</u>, 240 N.W.2d 682 (lowa 1976).

In order for a claimant's absences to constitute misconduct that would disqualify the claimant from receiving unemployment insurance benefits, the evidence must establish that the claimant's *unexcused* absences were excessive. See 871 IAC 24.32(7). The determination of whether absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. However, the evidence must first establish that the most recent absence that prompted the decision to discharge the employee was unexcused. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation and oversleeping are considered unexcused. On the other hand, absences related to illness are considered excused, provided the employee has complied with the employer's policy regarding notifying the employer of the absence. Tardiness is a form of absence. See <u>Higgins v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984).

The weight of the evidence in the record establishes a discharge for excessive unexcused absences. Ms. Martin was absent on January 22 for personal reasons. Ms. Martin's purported reason for being absent on that day was a flat tire, but Ms. Martin waited until the scheduled start of her shift to notify the employer of the absence and then declined the employer's offer to collect her for work. The absence was an unexcused absence under the applicable law. Ms. Martin was then absent two more days without notifying the employer before the employer took her off the schedule. The no-call, no-show absences were grounds for discharge from the employment under the employer's written policy. Regardless, the three consecutive unexcused absences were excessive and constituted misconduct in connection with the employment.

Based on the evidence in the record and application of the appropriate law, the administrative law judge concludes that Ms. Martin was discharged for misconduct. Accordingly, Ms. Martin is disqualified for benefits until she has worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times her weekly benefit amount, provided she is otherwise eligible. The employer's account shall not be charged for benefits paid to Ms. Martin.

lowa Code section 96.3(7) provides that benefits must be recovered from a claimant who receives benefits and is later determined to be ineligible for benefits, even though the claimant acted in good faith and was not otherwise at fault. The overpayment recovery law was updated in 2008. See lowa Code section 96.3(7)(b). Under the revised law, a claimant will not be required to repay an overpayment of benefits if all of the following factors are met. First, the prior award of benefits must have been made in connection with a decision regarding the claimant's separation from a particular employment. Second, the claimant must not have engaged in fraud or willful misrepresentation to obtain the benefits or in connection with the Agency's initial decision to award benefits. Third, the employer must not have participated at the initial fact-finding proceeding that resulted in the initial decision to award benefits. If Workforce Development determines there has been an overpayment of benefits, the employer will not be charged for the benefits, regardless of whether the claimant is required to repay the benefits.

Because the claimant has been deemed ineligible for benefits, any benefits the claimant has received would constitute an overpayment. Accordingly, the administrative law judge will remand the matter to the Claims Division for determination of whether there has been an

overpayment, the amount of the overpayment, and whether the claimant will have to repay the benefits.

DECISION:

The Agency representative's April 19, 2012, reference 05, decision is reversed. The claimant was discharged for misconduct. The claimant is disqualified for unemployment benefits until she has worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times her weekly benefit allowance, provided she meets all other eligibility requirements. The employer's account will not be charged.

This matter is remanded to the Claims Division for determination of whether there has been an overpayment, the amount of the overpayment, and whether the claimant will have to repay the benefits.

James E. Timberland Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

jet/kjw