IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

MALCOLM E LINNEAR

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 13A-UI-06331-JTT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

MANPOWER INTERNATIONAL INC

Employer

OC: 05/05/13

Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)(a) – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Malcolm Linnear filed a timely appeal from the May 21, 2013, reference 01, decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on July 3, 2013. Mr. Linnear did not respond to the hearing notice instructions to provide a telephone number for the hearing and did not participate. Callie Adam represented the employer.

ISSUE:

Whether the claimant was discharged for misconduct in connection with the employment that disqualifies the claimant for unemployment insurance benefits.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Manpower International is a temporary employment firm. In May 2013, Malcolm Linnear began a new work assignment through the employment at Manpower. The new assignment was at Bertch Cabinets. Bertch had recently discharged Mr. Linnear from direct employment. During the new assignment, Mr. Linnear was absent one day for personal reasons. In response to that single absence, Bertch Cabinets requested Mr. Linnear's removal from the assignment. The discharge from the assignment prompted Manpower to discharge Mr. Linnear from its employ.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The employer has the burden of proof in this matter. See Iowa Code section 96.6(2). Misconduct must be substantial in order to justify a denial of unemployment benefits. Misconduct serious enough to warrant the discharge of an employee is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits. See Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000). The focus is on deliberate, intentional, or culpable acts by the employee. See Gimbel v. Employment Appeal Board, 489 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of the current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act(s). The termination of employment must be based on a current act. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). In determining whether the conduct that prompted the discharge constituted a "current act," the administrative law judge considers the date on which the conduct came to the attention of the employer and the date on which the employer notified the claimant that the conduct subjected the claimant to possible discharge. See also <u>Greene v. EAB</u>, 426 N.W.2d 659, 662 (Iowa App. 1988).

Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. See 871 IAC 24.32(4). When it is in a party's power to produce more direct and satisfactory evidence than is actually produced, it may fairly be inferred that the more direct evidence will expose deficiencies in that party's case. See Crosser v. lowa Dept. of Public Safety, 240 N.W.2d 682 (lowa 1976).

In order for a claimant's absences to constitute misconduct that would disqualify the claimant from receiving unemployment insurance benefits, the evidence must establish that the claimant's *unexcused* absences were excessive. See 871 IAC 24.32(7). The determination of whether absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. However, the evidence must first establish that the most recent absence that prompted the decision to discharge the employee was unexcused. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation and oversleeping are considered unexcused. On the other hand, absences related to illness are considered excused, provided the employee has complied with the employer's policy regarding notifying the employer of the absence. Tardiness is a form of absence. See Higgins v. Iowa Department of Job Service,

350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984). Employers may not graft on additional requirements to what is an excused absence under the law. See <u>Gaborit v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 743 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). For example, an employee's failure to provide a doctor's note in connection with an absence that was due to illness properly reported to the employer will not alter the fact that such an illness would be an excused absence under the law. <u>Gaborit</u>, 743 N.W.2d at 557.

The evidence in the record establishes a discharge from Manpower International that was based on a single unexcused absence.

While a disqualifying discharge for attendance usually requires *excessive unexcused* absences, a single unexcused absence may in some instances constitute misconduct in connection with the employment that would disqualify a claimant for benefits. See <u>Sallis v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 437 N.W.2d 895 (lowa 1989). In <u>Sallis</u>, the Supreme Court of lowa set forth factors to be considered in determining whether an employee's single unexcused absence would constitute disqualifying misconduct. The factors include the nature of the employee's work, dishonesty or falsification by the employee in regard to the unexcused absence, and whether the employee made any attempt to notify the employer of their absence.

The single unexcused absence during the work assignment arranged by Manpower was not sufficient to establish excessive unexcused absences or misconduct in connection with the assignment. The evidence establishes no aggravating factors in connection with the single absence from the work assignment. Based on the evidence in the record and application of the appropriate law, the administrative law judge concludes that Mr. Linnear was discharged from the assignment and from Manpower International for no disqualifying reason. Accordingly, Mr. Linnear is eligible for benefits, provided he is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged for benefits.

This decision does not address Mr. Linnear's discharge from the direct employment with Bertch Cabinets and has no impact on any decision that has entered to address that separation.

DECISION:

The Agency representative's May 21, 2013, reference 01, decision is reversed. The claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. The claimant is eligible for benefits, provided he is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged.

James E. Timberland Administrative Law Judge	
Decision Dated and Mailed	
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