IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

PIERRE MONTGOMERY

Claimant

APPEAL 21A-UI-00391-ED-T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

TWIN CITY TANNING WATERLOO LLC

Employer

OC: 08/30/20

Claimant: Respondent (2)

lowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quitting lowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct lowa Code § 96.3(7) – Overpayment of Benefits IAC R. 871-24.10

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer/appellant filed an appeal from the December 2, 2020 (reference 04) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits based upon his separation from employment. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on February 8, 2021. The claimant, Pierre Montgomery, did not participate. The employer, Twin City Tanning Waterloo LLC, participated through Scott Simcox and Jesse Crayne. No exhibits were received.

ISSUES:

Did claimant voluntarily quit the employment with good cause attributable to employer? Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct? Was the claimant overpaid benefits? Should the employer be charged?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant began employment on December 30, 2019 and ended employment on September 17, 2020. He worked full-time in the waste water department. Claimant's immediate supervisor was Jesse Crayne.

On September 17, 2020 claimant reported to work. Upon arrival, claimant was approached by Mr. Crayne about a water line that claimant had opened the day before at approximately 3:00 p.m. Claimant had walked away from the valve without shutting it off, leaving the water line running for approximately 3 to 3.5 hours until it was discovered by maintenance. This caused significant issues including no volume in the treatment tank and water running through the building.

Upon the discovery of his mistake, claimant became upset and left the employer's premises without communicating with anyone. Claimant did not tell Mr. Crayne that he was leaving. Claimant never returned to work for any further scheduled shifts. After September 17, the only

communication between claimant and employer was a text message Mr. Crayne received on November 15, 2020 from claimant. In the text, claimant apologized for the incident and requested to work at Twin City Tanning Waterloo LLC again.

Claimant was going to receive a reprimand for the incident that occurred on September 16, 2020, however, he was not going to be laid off or discharged from employment. There was continuing work available to him had he not quit. Employer did participate in the fact finding interview through Scott Simcox.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant's separation from employment was a voluntary quit without good cause attributable to the employer. Benefits are denied.

It is my duty, as the administrative law judge and the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (lowa 2007). The administrative law judge, as the finder of fact, may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (lowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.* In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other evidence you believe; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id.* I assessed the credibility of the witnesses who testified during the hearing and considering the applicable factors listed above, and using my own common sense and experience, I find the employer's version of events to be credible.

First it must be determined whether claimant quit or was discharged from employment. A voluntary quitting means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer and requires an intention to terminate the employment. *Wills v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 447 N.W. 2d 137, 138 (lowa 1989). A voluntary leaving of employment requires an intention to terminate the employment relationship accompanied by an overtact of carrying out that intention. *Local Lodge #1426 v. Wilson Trailer*, 289 N.W.2d 608, 612 (lowa 1980). Where a claimant walked off the job without permission before the end of his shift saying he wanted a meeting with management the next day, the lowa Court of Appeals ruled this was not a voluntary quit because the claimant's expressed desire to meet with management was evidence that he wished to maintain the employment relationship. Such cases must be analyzed as a discharge from employment. *Peck v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 492 N.W.2d 438 (lowa Ct. App. 1992).

lowa Code §96.5(1) provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

lowa Code § 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the lowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (lowa 1979).

Misconduct must be "substantial" to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. *Newman v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (lowa Ct. App. 1984). When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Id.* Negligence does not constitute misconduct unless recurrent in nature; a single act is not disqualifying unless indicative of a deliberate disregard of the employer's interests. *Henry v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 391 N.W.2d 731 (lowa Ct. App. 1986). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. *Miller v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 423 N.W.2d 211 (lowa Ct. App. 1988).

Claimant knew that he was supposed to work a full day's shift on September 17, 2020. Claimant only worked approximately one hour. Claimant did not tell anyone he was leaving his shift early. Claimant left after discovery of a significant mistake he had made the day prior. Claimant no longer desired to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer and carried out his intention to terminate the employment by walking off the job. He did not request to speak to management when he left. As such, claimant voluntarily quit.

Claimant has the burden of proving that the voluntary leaving was for good cause attributable to the employer. lowa Code § 96.6(2). "Good cause" for leaving employment must be that which is reasonable to the average person, not the overly sensitive individual or the claimant in particular. *Uniweld Products v. Indus. Relations Comm'n*, 277 So.2d 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).

In this case claimant voluntarily quit rather than continuing with his assigned work. This is not a good cause reason attributable to the employer to voluntarily quit.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(27) provides:

Voluntary quit without good cause. In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to lowa Code § 96.5. However, the claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving lowa Code § 96.5, subsection (1), paragraphs "a" through "i," and subsection 10. The following reasons for a voluntary quit shall be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer:

(27) The claimant left rather than perform the assigned work as instructed.

Because claimant voluntarily quit by walking off the job without a good cause reason attributable to the employer, benefits are denied.

Alternatively, even if the administrative law judge found that claimant was discharged instead of voluntarily quitting, claimant's actions in failing to notify his direct supervisor that he was leaving prior to his shift ending were an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests. An employer has the right to expect an employee to follow reasonable directions. *Myers v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 373 N.W.2d 507 (lowa Ct. App. 1985). Generally, continued refusal to follow reasonable instructions constitutes misconduct. *Gilliam v. Atlantic Bottling Co.*, 453 N.W.2d 230 (lowa Ct. App. 1990). Claimant's actions were job-related misconduct, even without prior warning. Benefits must be denied.

Benefits paid in connection with this employer are withheld until such time as claimant is deemed eligible.

lowa Code § 96.3(7)a-b, as amended in 2008, provides:

- 7. Recovery of overpayment of benefits.
- a. If an individual receives benefits for which the individual is subsequently determined to be ineligible, even though the individual acts in good faith and is not otherwise at fault, the benefits shall be recovered. The department in its discretion may recover the overpayment of benefits either by having a sum equal to the overpayment deducted from any future benefits payable to the individual or by having the individual pay to the department a sum equal to the overpayment.
- b. (1) (a) If the department determines that an overpayment has been made, the charge for the overpayment against the employer's account shall be removed and the account shall be credited with an amount equal to the overpayment from the unemployment compensation trust fund and this credit shall include both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5. The employer shall not be relieved of charges if benefits are paid because the employer or an agent of the employer failed to respond timely or adequately to the department's request for information relating to the payment of benefits. This prohibition against relief of charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers.
- (b) However, provided the benefits were not received as the result of fraud or willful misrepresentation by the individual, benefits shall not be recovered from an individual if the employer did not participate in the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to

section 96.6, subsection 2, and an overpayment occurred because of a subsequent reversal on appeal regarding the issue of the individual's separation from employment.

(2) An accounting firm, agent, unemployment insurance accounting firm, or other entity that represents an employer in unemployment claim matters and demonstrates a continuous pattern of failing to participate in the initial determinations to award benefits, as determined and defined by rule by the department, shall be denied permission by the department to represent any employers in unemployment insurance matters. This subparagraph does not apply to attorneys or counselors admitted to practice in the courts of this state pursuant to section 602.10101.

lowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 provides:

Employer and employer representative participation in fact-finding interviews.

- (1) "Participate," as the term is used for employers in the context of the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to lowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, means submitting detailed factual information of the quantity and quality that if unrebutted would be sufficient to result in a decision favorable to the employer. The most effective means to participate is to provide live testimony at the interview from a witness with firsthand knowledge of the events leading to the separation. If no live testimony is provided, the employer must provide the name and telephone number of an employee with firsthand information who may be contacted, if necessary, for rebuttal. A party may also participate by providing detailed written statements or documents that provide detailed factual information of the events leading to separation. At a minimum, the information provided by the employer or the employer's representative must identify the dates and particular circumstances of the incident or incidents, including, in the case of discharge, the act or omissions of the claimant or, in the event of a voluntary separation. the stated reason for the quit. The specific rule or policy must be submitted if the claimant was discharged for violating such rule or policy. In the case of discharge for attendance violations, the information must include the circumstances of all incidents the employer or the employer's representative contends meet the definition of unexcused absences as set forth in 871—subrule 24.32(7). On the other hand, written or oral statements or general conclusions without supporting detailed factual information and information submitted after the fact-finding decision has been issued are not considered participation within the meaning of the statute.
- (2) "A continuous pattern of nonparticipation in the initial determination to award benefits," pursuant to lowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, as the term is used for an entity representing employers, means on 25 or more occasions in a calendar quarter beginning with the first calendar quarter of 2009, the entity files appeals after failing to participate. Appeals filed but withdrawn before the day of the contested case hearing will not be considered in determining if a continuous pattern of nonparticipation exists. The division administrator shall notify the employer's representative in writing after each such appeal.
- (3) If the division administrator finds that an entity representing employers as defined in lowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, has engaged in a continuous pattern of nonparticipation, the division administrator shall suspend said representative for a period of up to six months on the first occasion, up to one year on the second occasion and up to ten years on the third or subsequent occasion. Suspension by the division

administrator constitutes final agency action and may be appealed pursuant to lowa Code section 17A.19.

(4) "Fraud or willful misrepresentation by the individual." as the term is used for claimants in the context of the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to lowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, means providing knowingly false statements or knowingly false denials of material facts for the purpose of obtaining unemployment insurance benefits. Statements or denials may be either oral or written by the claimant. Inadvertent misstatements or mistakes made in good faith are not considered fraud or willful misrepresentation.

This rule is intended to implement lowa Code section 96.3(7)"b" as amended by 2008 lowa Acts, Senate File 2160.

Because the claimant's separation was disqualifying, benefits were paid to which he was not entitled. The unemployment insurance law provides that benefits must be recovered from a claimant who receives benefits and is later determined to be ineligible for those benefits, even though the claimant acted in good faith and was not otherwise at fault. However, the overpayment will not be recovered when it is based on a reversal on appeal of an initial determination to award benefits on an issue regarding the claimant's employment separation if: (1) the benefits were not received due to any fraud or willful misrepresentation by the claimant and (2) the employer did not participate in the initial proceeding to award benefits. The employer will not be charged for benefits if it is determined that they did participate in the factfinding interview. lowa Code § 96.3(7).

In this case, the claimant has received benefits but was not eligible for those benefits. Since the employer did participate in the fact-finding interview the claimant is obligated to repay to the agency the benefits he received in connection with this employer's account, and this employer's account shall not be charged.

DECISION: Emily Drenkow Carrisine as claimant is deemed eligible.

syment insurance decision is reversed. Claimant ause attributable to the employer. Benefits are

Emily Drenkow Carr Administrative Law Judge

February 19, 2021 Decision Dated and Mailed

ed/scn