IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

CHRISTOPHER J MCCABE 239 - 8TH ST SE MASON CITY IA 50401

EXPRESS SERVICES INC PO BOX 720660 OKLAHOMA CITY OK 73172 Appeal Number: 06A-UI-02093-H2T

OC: 01-08-06 R: 02 Claimant: Respondent (1)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319*.

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

- The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- 3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)	
(Decision Dated & Mailed)	

Section 96.5-2-a - Discharge/Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed a timely appeal from the February 14, 2006, reference 02, decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on March 9, 2006. The claimant did participate. The employer did participate through Andre Smith, Staffing Consultant.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was assigned to work at Centron Corporation preparing parts beginning on April 18, 2005 through January 3, 2006 when he was discharged.

The claimant was allegedly sleeping on the job on January 3, 2006. The claimant denies that he was sleeping on the job, but admits that he was spacing off or not working for about two or three minutes. His eyes were not closed. The claimant denies that he ever slept on the job and indicated he could not fall asleep for only two or three minutes. The claimant had been disciplined previously when a supervisor saw him rubbing his temples and his forehead when he had a headache. The claimant had been warned that is job was in jeopardy if he did not work at all times when he was on the line.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. <u>Cosper v. lowa Department of Job Service</u>, 321 N.W.2d 6 (lowa 1982). The employer discharged the claimant and has the burden of proof to show misconduct. Misconduct serious enough to

warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. Newman v. lowa Department of Job Service, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. Miller v. Employment Appeal Board, 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa App. 1988).

The employer has not established that the claimant was sleeping on the job. The only person who was involved in the incident was the claimant. He denies being asleep and no first hand testimony is offered to refute his credible denial. The claimant offered credible testimony including the admission that he did not work every minute while he was at the Centron location. It is normal for human beings to pause while working, to either collect their thoughts, take a sip of coffee or look out the window. The administrative law judge cannot find that a claimant who pauses working for two or three minutes, three times in the course of an eight-month job assignment has committed misconduct. The employer's evidence does not establish that the claimant deliberately and intentionally acted in a manner he knew to be contrary to the employer's interests or standards. There was no wanton or willful disregard of the employer's standards. In short, substantial misconduct has not been established by the evidence. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

DECISION:

The February 14, 2006, reference 02, decision is affirmed. The claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

tkh/tjc