IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

STACY B YOUNG

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 11A-UI-10319-JTT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

WELLS FARGO BANK NA

Employer

OC: 07/03/11

Claimant: Appellant (1)

Section 96.5(2)(a) – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Stacy Young filed a timely appeal from the July 27, 2011, reference 01, decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on August 25, 2011. Ms. Young participated. Kelly Landolphi of Barnett Associates represented the employer and presented testimony through Linda Nesbit, loan administration manager. Exhibits Two through Twelve were received into evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether the claimant was discharged for misconduct in connection with the employment that disqualifies the claimant for unemployment insurance benefits.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Stacy Young was employed by Wells Fargo Bank on a full-time basis from 2001 until June 30, 2011, when Loan Administration Manager Linda Nesbit, in consultation with the human resources department and a vice president, discharged her from the employment for repeated tardiness. Ms. Nesbit was Ms. Young's immediate supervisor during the last two years of the employment. During that time, Ms. Young worked as a securities administration analyst. Her work hours were 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday.

The final instances of tardiness that triggered the discharge occurred on June 27 and 28, 2011. On June 27, Ms. Nesbit was standing in the vicinity of Ms. Young's work area and observed Ms. Young arrive at 8:07 a.m. Ms. Young provided no explanation for the late arrivals. Ms. Young marked on her time sheet that she had arrived on time. Ms. Young had also been late to work on Jun 22 due to transportation issues. These incidents followed eight other instances of tardiness during 2011 and five more from 2010. The employer had counseled Ms. Young six times for tardiness during the same period. In connection with a written warning issued in April 2011, the employer warned Ms. Young that another late arrival in 2011 would result in her discharge from the employment. Ms. Young was then late the three additional times in June.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The employer has the burden of proof in this matter. See Iowa Code section 96.6(2). Misconduct must be substantial in order to justify a denial of unemployment benefits. Misconduct serious enough to warrant the discharge of an employee is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits. See Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000). The focus is on deliberate, intentional, or culpable acts by the employee. See Gimbel v. Employment Appeal Board, 489 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of the current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act(s). The termination of employment must be based on a current act. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). In determining whether the conduct that prompted the discharge constituted a "current act," the administrative law judge considers the date on which the conduct came to the attention of the employer and the date on which the employer notified the claimant that the conduct subjected the claimant to possible discharge. See also <u>Greene v. EAB</u>, 426 N.W.2d 659, 662 (lowa App. 1988).

Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. See 871 IAC 24.32(4). When it is in a party's power to produce more direct and satisfactory evidence than is actually produced, it may fairly

be inferred that the more direct evidence will expose deficiencies in that party's case. See Crosser v. Iowa Dept. of Public Safety, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976).

In order for a claimant's absences to constitute misconduct that would disqualify the claimant from receiving unemployment insurance benefits, the evidence must establish that the claimant's *unexcused* absences were excessive. See 871 IAC 24.32(7). The determination of whether absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. However, the evidence must first establish that the most recent absence that prompted the decision to discharge the employee was unexcused. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation and oversleeping are considered unexcused. On the other hand, absences related to illness are considered excused, provided the employee has complied with the employer's policy regarding notifying the employer of the absence. Tardiness is a form of absence. See <u>Higgins v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984).

The evidence in the record establishes a pattern of habitual tardiness, along with falsification of time sheet information. Each of Ms. Young's late arrivals was an unexcused absence. The unexcused absences were excessive and constituted misconduct in connection with the employment.

Based on the evidence in the record and application of the appropriate law, the administrative law judge concludes that Ms. Young was discharged for misconduct. Accordingly, Ms. Young is disqualified for benefits until she has worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times her weekly benefit amount, provided she is otherwise eligible. The employer's account shall not be charged for benefits paid to Ms. Young.

DECISION:

The Agency representative's July 27, 2011, reference 01, decision is affirmed. The claimant was discharged for misconduct. The claimant is disqualified for unemployment benefits until she has worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times her weekly benefit amount, provided she meets all other eligibility requirements. The employer's account shall not be charged.

James E. Timberland Administrative Law Judge	
Decision Dated and Mailed	
iet/kiw	