

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

**BROOKE T SMITH**  
Claimant

**APPEAL NO. 19A-UI-02951-S1-T**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**DAVE'S PLACE LLC**  
Employer

**OC: 03/10/19**  
**Claimant: Appellant (2)**

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge for Misconduct

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

Brooke Smith (claimant) appealed a representative's March 27, 2019, decision (reference 01) that concluded she was not eligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits after her separation from employment with Dave's Place (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was scheduled for April 29, 2019. The claimant participated personally. The employer participated by Ashley Ruffcorn, Human Resources Director.

**ISSUE:**

The issue is whether the claimant was separated from employment for any disqualifying reason.

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

The administrative law judge, having heard the testimony and considered all of the evidence in the record, finds that: The employer is a management group that owns Dave's Place and Lexington Square. Lexington Square hired the claimant on March 26, 2018, as a full-time hourly head housekeeper. On July 4, 2018, Dave's Place hired the claimant as a full-time salaried environmental services supervisor in central supply to work at both Dave's Place and Lexington Square. She signed for receipt of the employer's handbook on July 4, 2019. The claimant's supervisor told the claimant that if she worked late, she could arrive at work late the following day. The supervisor did not tell the employer what he told the claimant.

On January 31, 2019, two people who were not the claimant's direct supervisor talked to her about absenteeism. The discussion was characterized as a "coaching" and not a warning. The employer did not give the claimant a copy of the coaching but told the claimant it was possible for her to be terminated. The document stated that the next infraction would result in a verbal warning.

The claimant continued her practice of getting authorization from her direct supervisor to work late and for absences. On March 11, 2019, the claimant properly reported she would be tardy due to illness. She was tardy in reporting to work due to illness. On March 12, 2019, the employer terminated her from both locations for excessive absenteeism.

## REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was not discharged for misconduct.

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits, regardless of the source of the individual's wage credits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The disqualification shall continue until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r.871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(4) provides:

(4) Report required. The claimant's statement and employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of

misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. In cases where a suspension or disciplinary layoff exists, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct shall be resolved.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. Excessive absences are not misconduct unless unexcused. The claimant's tardiness was repeatedly excused by her direct supervisor. He allowed her to work late and report late the following day. An employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, the employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written), detailed, and reasonable notice should be given.

Absences due to properly reported illness can never constitute job misconduct since they are not volitional. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The employer must establish not only misconduct but that there was a final incident of misconduct which precipitated the discharge. The last incident of absence was a properly reported illness which occurred on March 11, 2019. The claimant's absence does not amount to job misconduct because it was properly reported. The employer has failed to provide any evidence of willful and deliberate misconduct which would be a final incident leading to the discharge. The claimant was discharged but there was no misconduct.

The claimant's and the employer's testimony is inconsistent. The administrative law judge finds the claimant's testimony to be more credible because she was an eye witnesses to the events for which she was terminated. The employer did not provide the testimony of the claimant's direct supervisor.

**DECISION:**

The representative's March 27, 2019, decision (reference 01) is reversed. The employer has not met its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

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Beth A. Scheetz  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

bas/rvs