IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

CAMERON G CROSBY PO BOX 127

COLLEGE SPRINGS IA 51637

1105 IOWA AVE

INTIER AUTOMOTIVE SEATING OF AMERICA INC 2700 N BROADWAY RED OAK IA 51566 Appeal Number: 06A-UI-00049-H2T

OC: 07-10-05 R: 01 Claimant: Respondent (1)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319*.

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

- The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- 3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)	
(Decision Dated & Mailed)	

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge/Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed a timely appeal from the December 22, 2005, reference 02, decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on January 19, 2006. The claimant did participate. The employer did participate through Marla Smith, Human Resources Manager. Employer's Exhibit One was received.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed as a wire welder full time beginning November 29, 2004 through November 29, 2005, when he was discharged.

On November 24 the claimant allegedly sabotaged the company robot by breaking off the sensors. Prior to lunch on November 24 the claimant was having trouble keeping up with the robot operators and told the other employees, "you guys are not going to run very much after lunch." The operators returned from lunch and discovered the robot had been sabotaged, prohibiting three employee from working for three hours. The claimant admits to making the comment about not running prior to lunch but denies that he did anything to harm company equipment. No one saw the claimant sabotage the robot. After lunch the claimant was reported to have been acting like he thought the fact that the robot breakdown was funny.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. <u>Cosper v.</u> lowa Department of Job Service, 321 N.W.2d 6 (lowa 1982). The employer discharged the

claimant and has the burden of proof to show misconduct. Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. Newman v. lowa Department of Job Service, 351 N.W.2d 806 (lowa App. 1984). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. Miller v. Employment Appeal Board, 423 N.W.2d 211 (lowa App. 1988).

The employer's evidence does not establish that the claimant deliberately and intentionally acted in a manner he knew to be contrary to the employer's interests or standards. The lack of eye witnesses to tie the claimant to the sabotage in light of his denial mean the employer is not able to establish that the claimant committed the misconduct. While the employer may have had good cause to discharge, conduct which might warrant a discharge from employment will not necessarily sustain a disqualification from job insurance benefits. Budding v. lowa Department of Job Service, 337 N.W.2d 219 (lowa App. 1983). Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

DECISION:

The December 22, 2005, reference 02, decision is affirmed. The claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

tkh/kjw