IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

JORGE L MENDEZ

Claimant

APPEAL NO: 15A-UI-07054-LDT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

DECISION

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC

Employer

OC: 05/31/15

Claimant: Appellant (2)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Jorge L. Mendez (claimant) appealed a representative's June 11, 2015 decision (reference 01) that concluded he was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment with Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on July 23, 2015. The claimant participated in the hearing. The employer's representative received the hearing notice and responded on July 21 by registering the name and number of a witness for the employer, Sarah Ochoa, into the Appeals Bureau's call system. However, when the administrative law judge called that number at the scheduled time for the hearing, Ms. Ochoa was not available; therefore, the employer did not participate in the hearing. David Taveras served as interpreter. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the claimant, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

OUTCOME:

Reversed. Benefits allowed.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer on September 2, 2003. He worked full time as a position host on the first shift in the employer's Storm Lake, Iowa pork processing facility. His last day of work was May 29, 2015. The employer discharged him on that date. The reason asserted for the discharge was excessive absenteeism.

The employer has a ten point attendance policy. The claimant's final absence occurred on or about April 28, 2015, and was due to a medical issue. The claimant had called in to report he would be absent. The employer indicated to him that he would need to get medical paperwork

so that the absence would be covered by FMLA (Family Medical Leave), or he would be given a tenth point which would result in discharge.

The claimant's doctor had indicated that it had sent in the necessary paperwork, but the employer indicated that it had not received the paperwork. On May 29 the claimant brought in a copy of the paperwork directly from the doctor's office, but the employer indicated that it was too late, and proceeded to discharge him.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The question is not whether the employer was right to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate matters. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988).

In order to establish misconduct such as to disqualify a former employee from benefits an employer must establish the employee was responsible for a deliberate act or omission which was a material breach of the duties and obligations owed by the employee to the employer. Rule 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 275 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 1979); Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The conduct must show a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. Rule 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon, supra; Henry, supra. In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. Rule 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon, supra; Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984).

Excessive unexcused absenteeism can constitute misconduct. Rule 871 IAC 24.32(7). A determination as to whether an absence is excused or unexcused does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's attendance policy. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Rule 871 IAC 24.32(7); Cosper, supra; Gaborit v. Employment Appeal Board, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa App. 2007). The FMLA provisions in particular were enacted to be an employee protection and shield, not a sword to be used by an employer as a weapon against the employee; the failure to have the medically related absence covered by FMLA does not make the absence unexcused. Because the final absence was related to properly reported illness or other reasonable grounds, no final or current incident

of unexcused absenteeism occurred which establishes work-connected misconduct and no disqualification is imposed. The employer has failed to meet its burden to establish misconduct. *Cosper*, supra. The claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

DECISION:

The representative's June 11, 2015 decision (reference 01) is reversed. The employer did discharge the claimant but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if he is otherwise eligible.

Lungtha A. F. Dangar

Lynette A. F. Donner Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/pjs