

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

ELIZALDE LAGUNA PARRA
Claimant

SWIFT PORK COMPANY
Employer

APPEAL 19A-UI-05056-DG-T
**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

OC: 05/26/19
Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge/Misconduct
Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) – Absenteeism

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Employer filed an appeal from a decision of a representative dated June 14, 2019, (reference 01) that held claimant eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. After due notice, a hearing was scheduled for and held on July 18, 2019. Claimant participated personally with the assistance of a Spanish Interpreter. Employer participated by Zenna Boyd, Human Resources Manager.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The administrative law judge, having heard the testimony and considered all of the evidence in the record, finds: Claimant last worked for employer on May 29, 2019. Claimant was separated from the employment on May 29, 2019, because claimant violated employer's attendance policy, and for providing false information to employer.

Claimant began working for employer as a full-time production worker on November 1, 2004. Claimant was granted vacation leave in April, 2019. Claimant visited family in Mexico beginning on or about April 12, 2019. While claimant was on vacation he became ill and was hospitalized on May 3, 2019. Claimant contacted employer and explained what had occurred. Claimant sent a signed doctor's note to employer which stated that he was released back to work without any restrictions on May 9, 2019. Employer sent claimant FMLA paperwork which claimant completed and sent back to employer on or about May 10, 2019. Claimant went back to work on May 13, 2019 and he worked through May 29, 2019.

Employer told claimant that he was being suspended from work on May 29, 2019. Claimant asked why, and if he was being fired. Claimant was told he was being suspended indefinitely without pay because he had violated employer's attendance policy, and he had provided false information to employer while he was in Mexico. Employer explained that a human resources officer had viewed photos of claimant out dancing and partying on May 7, and May 10, 2019.

Those pictures showed that claimant was not ill as he had reported to employer. Claimant explained that he was out with family for a Mother's Day supper on May 10, 2019 after he was released from the hospital on May 9, 2019. Claimant maintains that he was not out doing anything on May 7, 2019.

Employer has not contacted claimant since May 29, 2019. There is a pending grievance and an investigation pending with the labor union. Claimant is not being paid during the suspension period. Claimant did not know that his employment was in jeopardy prior to being escorted from the premises on May 29, 2019.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was separated from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed.

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. *Discharge for misconduct.* If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." *Newman v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Id.* Negligence does not constitute misconduct unless recurrent in nature; a single act is not disqualifying unless indicative of a deliberate disregard of the employer's interests. *Henry v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 391 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. *Miller v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). Generally, continued refusal to follow reasonable instructions constitutes misconduct. *Gilliam v. Atlantic Bottling Co.*, 453 N.W.2d 230 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990); however, "Balky and argumentative" conduct is not necessarily disqualifying. *City of Des Moines v. Picray*, (No. ___-___, Iowa Ct. App. filed ___, 1986).

It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of*

LeClaire, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.* In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id.*

When the record is composed solely of hearsay evidence, that evidence must be examined closely in light of the entire record. *Schmitz v. Iowa Dep't Human Servs.*, 461 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). Both the quality and the quantity of the evidence must be evaluated to see whether it rises to the necessary levels of trustworthiness, credibility, and accuracy required by a reasonably prudent person in the conduct of serious affairs. See, Iowa Code § 17A.14 (1). In making the evaluation, the fact-finder should conduct a common sense evaluation of (1) the nature of the hearsay; (2) the availability of better evidence; (3) the cost of acquiring better information; (4) the need for precision; and (5) the administrative policy to be fulfilled. *Schmitz*, 461 N.W.2d at 608.

The Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that if a party has the power to produce more explicit and direct evidence than it chooses to present, the administrative law judge may infer that evidence not presented would reveal deficiencies in the party's case. *Crosser v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Safety*, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976). Mindful of the ruling in *Crosser*, *id.*, and noting that the claimant presented direct, first-hand testimony while the employer relied upon second-hand witness reports, the administrative law judge concludes that the claimant's recollection of the events is more credible than that of the employer and it has not met its burden of proof.

In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation.

A determination as to whether an employee's act is misconduct does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's policy or rule. A violation is not necessarily disqualifying misconduct even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the incident under its policy.

Where an employer is aware of the nature of the claimant's illness and has fair warning that he may be absent for an extended period of time due to that illness, failure of the employee to contact the employer is not misconduct as the absences are excused. This is so where the claimant had no telephone and was bedridden with scarlet fever. *Floyd v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 338 N.W.2d 536 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983).

An employer's attendance policy is not dispositive of the issue of qualification for unemployment insurance benefits. A properly reported absence related to illness or injury is excused for the purpose of the Iowa Employment Security Act. Excessive absences are not necessarily unexcused. Absences must be both excessive and unexcused to result in a finding of misconduct. A failure to report to work without notification to the employer is generally considered an unexcused absence. However, one unexcused absence is not disqualifying since it does not meet the excessiveness standard. Because his absences were otherwise related to properly reported illness or other reasonable grounds, no final or current incident of

unexcused absenteeism occurred which establishes work-connected misconduct and no disqualification is imposed.

Employer did not provide sufficient evidence of deliberate conduct in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. Claimant's conduct does not evince a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in a deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees. Benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The June 14, 2019, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is affirmed. The claimant was separated from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

Duane L. Golden
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

dlg/scn