IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

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Appeal Number:04A-UI-11770-DTOC:09/12/04R:OIClaimant:Appellant(2)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board*, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

- 1. The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- 3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)

(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Mark W. Teut (claimant) appealed a representative's October 22, 2004 decision (reference 01) that concluded he was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment from Farmland Foods, Inc. (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on December 7, 2004. This appeal was consolidated for hearing with one related appeal, 04A-UI-11771-DT. The claimant participated in the hearing and was represented by Dennis McElwain, attorney at law. The employer received the hearing notice and responded by faxing a statement to the Appeals Section on December 6, 2004, indicating that it would not be participating in the hearing but providing a written statement in lieu of participation. The employer's statement was admitted to the record as Employer's Exhibit One. Based on the

evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer on November 18, 1999. He worked full time on the A shift from 6:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. or 4:30 p.m., depending on the week. His last day of work was September 14, 2004. The employer suspended him on that date and discharged him on October 4, 2004. The reason asserted for the discharge was the assertion that he had pushed and yelled at another employee, causing a hostile work environment. The claimant had been given a caution regarding causing a hostile work environment on May 20, 2004.

On September 14, the claimant was passing through a narrow (three-foot wide) passage between a wall and a machine. He also had to step over hoses on the floor. As he passed by a coworker in the passage, his right shoulder brushed against the back of the coworker. The coworker had a prior grudge against the claimant due to some reports the claimant had made to the employer about the coworker. The coworker reacted to the contact by becoming angry and yelling at the claimant, calling him a "b - - - -." In response, the claimant suggested that perhaps the coworker should have stepped aside. The coworker reported to the employer that the claimant had pushed and yelled at him; the employer summoned the claimant and sent him home, ultimately discharging him.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The issue in this case is whether the employer discharged the claimant for reasons establishing work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. The issue is not whether the employer was right to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. <u>Infante v. IDJS</u>, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate questions. <u>Pierce v. IDJS</u>, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988).

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. <u>Cosper v. IDJS</u>, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

Iowa Code Section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The focus of the definition of misconduct is on acts or omissions by a claimant that "rise to the level of being deliberate, intentional or culpable." <u>Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The acts must show:

1. Willful and wanton disregard of an employer's interest, such as found in:

a. Deliberate violation of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of its employees, or

b. Deliberate disregard of standards of behavior the employer has the right to expect of its employees; or

- 2. Carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to:
 - a. Manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design; or
 - b. Show an intentional and substantial disregard of:
 - 1. The employer's interest, or
 - 2. The employee's duties and obligations to the employer.

<u>Henry</u>, supra. The reason cited by the employer for discharging the claimant is the allegation that he had pushed and yelled at the coworker on September 14, 2004. However, the claimant denied either pushing or yelling at the coworker. No witness was available at the hearing to provide testimony to the contrary under oath and subject to cross-examination. Where, without satisfactory explanation, relevant and direct evidence within the control of a party whose interests would naturally call for its production at hearing is not produced, it may be inferred that evidence would be unfavorable. <u>Crosser v. Iowa Department of Public Safety</u>, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976). Further, without that information being provided first-hand, the administrative law judge is unable to ascertain whether the coworker or whether the claimant is credible. Under the circumstances, the administrative law judge finds the claimant's first-hand information more credible.

Under the circumstances of this case, the claimant's acknowledged accidental contact with the coworker was the result of inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, inadvertence, or ordinary negligence in an isolated instance, and was a good faith error in judgment or discretion. The employer has not met its burden to show disqualifying misconduct. <u>Cosper</u>, supra. Based upon the evidence provided, the claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

DECISION:

The representative's October 22, 2004 decision (reference 01) is reversed. The employer did discharge the claimant but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if he is otherwise eligible.

ld/kjf