IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - El

Claimant: Respondent (1)

LATYA L WELLS Claimant	APPEAL NO: 07A-UI-03473-DT
	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION
ACCESS DIRECT TELEMARKETING INC Employer	
	OC: 07/30/06 R: 04

Section 96.5-2-a - Discharge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Access Direct Telemarketing, Inc. (employer) appealed a representative's March 26, 2007 decision (reference 01) that concluded Latya L. Wells (claimant) was qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on May 2, 2007. The claimant participated in the hearing. Mike Sloan of TALX Employer Services appeared on the employer's behalf and presented testimony from two witnesses, Renee Harmon and Melissa Sutton. During the hearing, Employer's Exhibit One was entered into evidence. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer on December 13, 2004. She worked full time as a telephone sales representative in the employer's Keokuk, Iowa telemarketing call center. Her last day of work was March 6, 2007. The employer discharged her on March 7, 2007. The reason asserted for the discharge was using foul language on the call floor.

On March 6 a coworker, Ms. Sutton, reported to a supervisor that she had heard the claimant talking on her personal cell phone while on the call floor making reference to another employee who was a quality assurance representative as a "nasty fat "b - - - -." Ms. Sutton is a friend of the other employee; the claimant and the other employee had several prior arguments resulting from the other employee's prior relationship with the claimant's boyfriend. Other sales representatives were in the same area as the claimant and Ms. Sutton, but did not report hearing any inappropriate language. The claimant denied using any such foul language on the floor either on that day or regarding the other employee. Based on the assertion by Ms. Sutton, the employer determined to discharge the claimant.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. <u>Cosper v. IDJS</u>, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The question is not whether the employer was right to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. <u>Infante v. IDJS</u>, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate matters. <u>Pierce v. IDJS</u>, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988).

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The focus of the definition of misconduct is on acts or omissions by a claimant that "rise to the level of being deliberate, intentional or culpable." <u>Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The acts must show:

1. Willful and wanton disregard of an employer's interest, such as found in:

a. Deliberate violation of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of its employees, or

b. Deliberate disregard of standards of behavior the employer has the right to expect of its employees; or

- 2. Carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to:
 - a. Manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design; or
 - b. Show an intentional and substantial disregard of:
 - 1. The employer's interest, or
 - 2. The employee's duties and obligations to the employer.

<u>Henry</u>, supra. The reason cited by the employer for discharging the claimant is the assertion she used foul language while on the call floor. The employer has not established that this in fact occurred by a preponderance of the evidence. The employer has not met its burden to show disqualifying misconduct. <u>Cosper</u>, supra. Based upon the evidence provided, the claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

DECISION:

The representative's March 26, 2007 decision (reference 01) is affirmed. The employer did discharge the claimant but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if she is otherwise eligible.

Lynette A. F. Donner Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/pjs