IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

GINA M O'CONNOR

Claimant

APPEAL 14A-UI-13280-LT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

KIRKWOOD COMMUNITY COLLEGE – AREA 1

Employer

OC: 11/16/14

Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed an appeal from the December 15, 2014, (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits based upon a discharge from employment. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on January 22, 2015. Claimant participated. Her witness with the most direct knowledge, Nancy Ormiston, was not available when called and did not return the voice mail message. Employer participated through human resources generalist, Sheri Hlavacek ,and dean of industrial technologies, Jeff Mitchell. Employer's Exhibit 1 was received. Claimant's Exhibit A was received.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full-time as an industrial technology department assistant from 1996, and was separated from employment on November 13, 2014, when she was discharged. The employer discharged her because of a final incident in which it accused her of referring to an autistic student as a "rain man" and telling program coordinators Andrea Clark (also claimant's supervisor) and Anna Gilbertson he is the "mean autistic student" on October 31, 2014. She helped him calm down when he was not able to find his instructor for a meeting but did not speak with anyone about him after he left. The employer considered this a violation of the professional conduct part of the personnel policy. She had been warned about customer service issues in the past, but nothing related to professional conduct or inappropriate discussions. (Employer's Exhibit 1) On July 28, 2014, the mother of a welding student contacted claimant with questions about her son and later complained claimant was unresponsive and implied Anna Gilbertson would not return her phone call. Claimant did not do this and the employer did not confront or warn her about the allegation. The most recent incident prior to October 31 was an allegation dating to September 17 about internal customer service.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

When the record is composed solely of hearsay evidence, that evidence must be examined closely in light of the entire record. *Schmitz v. Iowa Dep't Human Servs.*, 461 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). Both the quality and the quantity of the evidence must be evaluated to see whether it rises to the necessary levels of trustworthiness, credibility, and accuracy required by a reasonably prudent person in the conduct of serious affairs. See, Iowa Code § 17A.14 (1). In making the evaluation, the fact-finder should conduct a common sense evaluation of (1) the nature of the hearsay; (2) the availability of better evidence; (3) the cost of acquiring better information; (4) the need for precision; and (5) the administrative policy to be fulfilled. *Schmitz*, 461 N.W.2d at 608. The Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that if a party has the power to produce more explicit and direct evidence than it chooses to present, the administrative law judge may infer that evidence not presented would reveal deficiencies in the party's case. *Crosser v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Safety*, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976). Mindful of the ruling in *Crosser, id.,* and noting that the claimant presented direct, first-hand testimony while the employer relied upon second- or third-hand reports, the administrative law judge concludes that the claimant's recollection of the events is more credible than that of the employer.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(4) provides:

(4) Report required. The claimant's statement and the employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. In cases where a suspension or disciplinary layoff exists, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct shall be resolved.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

A determination as to whether an employee's act is misconduct does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's policy or rule. A violation is not necessarily disqualifying misconduct even if the employer was fully within its rights to impose discipline up to or including discharge for the incident under its policy. A lapse of 11 days from the final act until discharge when claimant was notified on the fourth day that his conduct was grounds for dismissal did not make the final act a "past act." Where an employer gives seven days' notice to the employee that it will consider discharging him, the date of that notice is used to measure whether the act complained of is current. *Greene v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 426 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). An unpublished decision held informally that two calendar weeks or up to ten work days from the final incident to the discharge may be considered a current act. *Milligan v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, No. 10-2098 (Iowa Ct. App. filed June 15, 2011).

Inasmuch as the final incident occurred on October 31 at the latest, and the employer discharged claimant 14 days later and did not even mention the final incident, it has not established a current or final act of misconduct, and, without such, the history of other incidents need not be examined. Even if the incident were considered current, the employer has not rebutted claimant's credible denial of the reported incident. In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. A warning for not answering the phone is not similar to name-calling and the employer's simple accrual of a certain number of warnings counting towards discharge does not establish repeated negligence or deliberation and is not dispositive of the issue of misconduct for the purpose of determining eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits.

DECISION:

The December 15, 2014, (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision is affirmed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided she is otherwise eligible.

Dévon M. Lewis Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

dml/pjs