IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

SHAUN T BROWN

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 11A-UI-13835-LT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

SPHERION STAFFING LLC

Employer

OC: 06/19/11

Claimant: Appellant (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(1)j – Voluntary Leaving (Temporary Assignment) Iowa Code § 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed an appeal from the August 5, 2011 (reference 01) decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a telephone conference hearing was held on November 16, 2011. Claimant participated. Employer participated through on-site manager at HP for Spherion Teresa Ray. Department's Exhibit D-1 was admitted to the record. Employer's Exhibit 1 was admitted to the record.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether claimant's appeal was timely and if he quit by not reporting for additional work assignments within three business days of the end of the last assignment.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having heard the testimony and having reviewed the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: A disqualification decision was mailed to the claimant's address of record on August 5, 2011. He did not receive the decision prior to the appeal deadline. His address changed in September. The first notice of disqualification was through a call to the IWD office during the week of October 16, 2011 to find out about why he was not receiving mail at his new address. The appeal was sent immediately upon notice of that decision.

The claimant was last assigned at HP in the warehouse from September 16, 2011, to June 23, 2011. On site HP client service supervisor for Spherion Robert told claimant the assignment had ended because the work slowed down. After the assignment ended, the claimant failed to report to the employer within three working days as required by written policy. The HP site personnel have daily contact with the West Des Moines office so employees may call either site for work. There were no other assignments available on the separation date of June 23 but were in the days following the separation. Claimant did not contact either office but eventually responded to employer's messages in late July 2011 that work was available.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The first issue to be considered in this appeal is whether the claimant's appeal is timely. The administrative law judge determines it is.

Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1. paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

While the administrative law judge is skeptical that the claimant changed his address with IWD in September 2011 but did not find out about the August 5 decision until the week of October 16, the claimant did not have an opportunity to appeal the fact-finder's decision because the decision was not received. Without notice of a disqualification, no meaningful opportunity for appeal exists. See *Smith v. Iowa Employment Security Commission*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). Therefore, the appeal shall be accepted as timely.

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant voluntarily left employment without good cause attributable to the employer.

Iowa Code § 96.5-1-j provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department, but the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:

j. The individual is a temporary employee of a temporary employment firm who notifies the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment and who seeks reassignment. Failure of the individual to notify the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment within three working days of the completion of each employment assignment under a contract of hire shall be deemed a voluntary quit unless the individual was not advised in writing of the duty to notify the temporary employment firm upon completion of an employment assignment or the individual had good cause for not contacting the temporary employment firm within three working days and notified the firm at the first reasonable opportunity thereafter.

To show that the employee was advised in writing of the notification requirement of this paragraph, the temporary employment firm shall advise the temporary employee by requiring the temporary employee, at the time of employment with the temporary employment firm, to read and sign a document that provides a clear and concise explanation of the notification requirement and the consequences of a failure to notify. The document shall be separate from any contract of employment and a copy of the signed document shall be provided to the temporary employee.

For the purposes of this paragraph:

- (1) "Temporary employee" means an individual who is employed by a temporary employment firm to provide services to clients to supplement their work force during absences, seasonal workloads, temporary skill or labor market shortages, and for special assignments and projects.
- (2) "Temporary employment firm" means a person engaged in the business of employing temporary employees.

871 IAC 24.26(19) provides:

Voluntary quit with good cause attributable to the employer and separations not considered to be voluntary quits. The following are reasons for a claimant leaving employment with good cause attributable to the employer:

(19) The claimant was employed on a temporary basis for assignment to spot jobs or casual labor work and fulfilled the contract of hire when each of the jobs was completed. An election not to report for a new assignment to work shall not be construed as a voluntary leaving of employment. The issue of a refusal of an offer of suitable work shall be adjudicated when an offer of work is made by the former employer. The provisions of lowa Code § 96.5(3) and rule 24.24(96) are controlling in the determination of suitability of work. However, this subrule shall not apply to substitute school employees who are subject to the provisions of lowa Code § 96.4(5) which denies benefits that are based on service in an educational institution when the individual declines or refuses to accept a new contract or reasonable assurance of continued employment status. Under this circumstance, the substitute school employee shall be considered to have voluntarily quit employment.

The purpose of the statute is to provide notice to the temporary agency employer that the claimant is available for work at the conclusion of each temporary assignment so they may be reassigned and continue working. In this case, the claimant gave the employer no notice of availability for work beyond the date of separation and, therefore, is considered to have quit the

employment, even though claimant may have returned to work for the temporary agency at some later date. Benefits are denied.

DECISION:

The August 5, 2011 (reference 01) decision is affirmed. The claimant's appeal is timely. The claimant's separation was not attributable to the employer. Benefits are withheld until such time as the claimant works in and has been paid for wages equal to ten times his weekly benefit amount, provided he is otherwise eligible.

Dévon M. Lewis
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

dml/css