

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

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**IRMA I ORIHUELA**  
Claimant

**TUR-PAK FOODS INC**  
Employer

**APPEAL 16A-UI-01539-NM-T**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**OC: 12/20/15**  
**Claimant: Appellant (2)**

Iowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quitting  
Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct  
Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) – Absenteeism

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

The claimant filed an appeal from the January 27, 2016, (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits based upon her voluntary quit. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on February 26, 2016. The claimant Irma Orihuela participated and was represented by attorney, Frank Tenuta. The employer Tur-Pak Foods Inc. participated through plant manager, Nathan Phipps.

**ISSUE:**

Did claimant voluntarily leave the employment with good cause attributable to the employer or did employer discharge the claimant for reasons related to job misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of benefits?

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full time as a general laborer from October 3, 2011, until this employment ended on October 9, 2015, when she was terminated.

On October 8, 2015, claimant began to not feel well while at work. Claimant went to the restroom where she became physically ill. Claimant determined she was too ill to keep working and went to punch out. After she punched out claimant told Suzanna, the nearest line lead (yellow hat), that she was sick and needed to go home. Claimant believed Suzanna was her line lead that day. There were several supervisors (blue hats) nearby having lunch, but the yellow hat was closer so that is who claimant talked to. Claimant then went home. The next day, October 9, claimant was feeling better and went back to work at the time of her next scheduled shift. When she arrived at work claimant was told to go upstairs and talk with Phipps. Phipps informed claimant that she was no longer employed because she had left work the previous day without telling a supervisor. The employer's policies require employees to either notify their supervisor or line lead if they need to leave work for any reason. The employer disputes that claimant notified anyone she was leaving that day. Any employee who walks off

the job is deemed to have voluntarily quit under the employer's policies. Claimant had never received any discipline for attendance related issues in the past, though she did receive a suspension for fighting. Claimant explained to Phipps what had happened the day before, but her employment was ended nevertheless.

### **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant did not quit but was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-1 provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

A voluntary quitting means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer and requires an intention to terminate the employment. *Wills v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 447 N.W. 2d 137, 138 (Iowa 1989); see also Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(35). A voluntary leaving of employment requires an intention to terminate the employment relationship accompanied by an overt act of carrying out that intention. *Local Lodge #1426 v. Wilson Trailer*, 289 N.W.2d 608, 612 (Iowa 1980). Where a claimant walked off the job without permission before the end of his shift saying he wanted a meeting with management the next day, the Iowa Court of Appeals ruled this was not a voluntary quit because the claimant's expressed desire to meet with management was evidence that he wished to maintain the employment relationship. Such cases must be analyzed as a discharge from employment. *Peck v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 492 N.W.2d 438 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

Here, the claimant became sick while at work. Claimant notified a line lead that she was sick and was going home. At the time, claimant believed she had followed the proper procedures for leaving due to illness. Claimant testified she did not intend to quit when she left work and this is evidenced by her return to work at the time of her next scheduled shift. There is no evidence that claimant intended to end her employment relationship on the day she went home. Because there is no evidence that claimant intended to quit, the separation will be treated as a discharge.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Newman v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. *Miller v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).

A determination as to whether an employee's act is misconduct does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's policy or rule. A violation is not necessarily disqualifying misconduct even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the incident under its policy. An employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation.

Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7); *Cosper*, supra; *Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007).

The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. *Higgins* at 192. Second, the absences must be

unexcused. *Cosper* at 10. The requirement of “unexcused” can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for “reasonable grounds,” *Higgins* at 191, or because it was not “properly reported,” holding excused absences are those “with appropriate notice.” *Cosper* at 10.

The employer contends claimant’s absence when she left early due to illness was unexcused because she did not properly report it. Claimant argues she did properly report the absence to her line lead. Even assuming the employer is correct and claimant’s absence was unexcused, one unexcused absence is not considered excessive. Claimant had no prior issues with attendance and had never received disciplinary action for attendance related issues.

An employee is entitled to fair warning that the employer will no longer tolerate certain performance and conduct. Without fair warning, an employee has no reasonable way of knowing that there are changes that need be made in order to preserve the employment. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written), detailed, and reasonable notice should be given.

Inasmuch as employer had not previously warned claimant about the issue leading to the separation, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or with recurrent negligence in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. Training or general notice to staff about a policy is not considered a disciplinary warning. A warning for fighting at work is not similar to a warning for attendance and the employer’s simple accrual of a certain number of warnings counting towards discharge does not establish repeated negligence or deliberation and is not dispositive of the issue of misconduct for the purpose of determining eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits. Benefits are allowed.

**DECISION:**

The January 27, 2016, (reference 02) decision is reversed. Claimant did not quit but was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided she is otherwise eligible. Any benefits withheld shall be paid to claimant.

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Nicole Merrill  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

nm/pjs