# IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

**LILY A PAREDES** 

Claimant

**APPEAL 15A-UI-14204-DGT** 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

**DOLGENCORP LLC** 

Employer

OC: 11/29/15

Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Employer filed an appeal from a decision of a representative dated December 17, 2015, (reference 01) that held claimant eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. After due notice, a hearing was scheduled for and held on January 19, 2016. Claimant participated personally. Employer participated by Eric Stone, District Manager. Employer's Exhibits 1 through 5 and claimant's Exhibit A were admitted into evidence.

#### ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

## **FINDINGS OF FACT:**

The administrative law judge, having heard the testimony and considered all of the evidence in the record, finds: Claimant last worked for employer on December 2, 2015. Employer discharged claimant on December 2, 2015, because a cash deposit was not properly safeguarded, and funds were lost in the store that claimant manages.

On or about September 27, 2015 claimant took time off to attend a family sporting event and a co-worker covered the store for part of that day. During that time approximately \$500.00 was not accounted for, and the funds were not sealed and deposited in accordance with company rules.

Claimant was trained by her former manager in 2011. During that time she was trained and instructed not to deposit Saturday's cash receipts because the store invariably ran out of currency to provide change for customers. When that occurred a manager would have to drive to a grocery store or another business and try to get change while the customer waited. The former manager felt that practice was not good for business and the store kept Saturday's deposit until Monday.

Claimant's employment was terminated for violating the store's deposits policy. Claimant had not been warned about being in violation of that policy, and she thought she was doing the right thing by keeping Saturday's deposits on hand to accommodate small town customers.

## **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(4) provides:

(4) Report required. The claimant's statement and the employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. In cases where a suspension or disciplinary layoff exists, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct shall be resolved.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based upon such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based upon a current act. A lapse of 11 days from the final act until discharge when claimant was notified on the fourth day that his conduct was grounds for dismissal did not make the final act a "past act." Where an employer gives seven days' notice to the employee that it will consider discharging him, the date of that notice is used to measure whether the act complained of is current. *Greene v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 426 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). An unpublished decision held informally that two calendar weeks or up to ten work days from the final incident to the discharge may be considered a current act. *Milligan v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, No. 10-2098 (Iowa Ct. App. filed June 15, 2011).

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." Newman v. lowa Dep't of Job Serv., 351 N.W.2d 806 (lowa Ct. App. 1984). When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Id.* Negligence does not constitute misconduct unless recurrent in nature; a single act is not disqualifying unless indicative of a deliberate disregard of the employer's interests. Henry v. lowa Dep't of Job Serv., 391 N.W.2d 731 (lowa Ct. App. 1986). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. Miller v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). Generally, continued refusal to follow reasonable instructions constitutes misconduct. Gilliam v. Atlantic Bottling Co., 453 N.W.2d 230 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990); however, "Balky and argumentative" conduct is not necessarily disqualifying. City of Des Moines v. Picray, (No. -, Iowa Ct. App. filed , 1986).

When the record is composed solely of hearsay evidence, that evidence must be examined closely in light of the entire record. *Schmitz v. Iowa Dep't Human Servs.*, 461 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). Both the quality and the quantity of the evidence must be evaluated to see whether it rises to the necessary levels of trustworthiness, credibility, and accuracy required by a reasonably prudent person in the conduct of serious affairs. See, Iowa Code § 17A.14 (1). In making the evaluation, the fact-finder should conduct a common sense evaluation of (1) the nature of the hearsay; (2) the availability of better evidence; (3) the cost of acquiring better information; (4) the need for precision; and (5) the administrative policy to be fulfilled. *Schmitz*, 461 N.W.2d at 608.

The lowa Supreme Court has ruled that if a party has the power to produce more explicit and direct evidence than it chooses to present, the administrative law judge may infer that evidence not presented would reveal deficiencies in the party's case. *Crosser v. Iowa Dep't of Pub.* 

Safety, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976). Mindful of the ruling in *Crosser*, *id.*, and noting that the claimant presented direct, first-hand testimony while the employer relied upon second-hand witness reports, the administrative law judge concludes that the claimant's recollection of the events is more credible than that of the employer and it has not met its burden of proof.

In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation.

A determination as to whether an employee's act is misconduct does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's policy or rule. A violation is not necessarily disqualifying misconduct even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the incident under its policy.

The conduct for which claimant was discharged was merely an isolated incident of poor judgment and inasmuch as employer had not previously warned claimant about the issue leading to the separation, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or with recurrent negligence in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. An employee is entitled to fair warning that the employer will no longer tolerate certain performance and conduct. Without fair warning, an employee has no reasonable way of knowing that there are changes that need be made in order to preserve the employment. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written), detailed, and reasonable notice should be given. Training or general notice to staff about a policy is not considered a disciplinary warning. Verbal reminders or routine evaluations are not warnings.

Employer did not provide sufficient evidence of deliberate conduct in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. Claimant's conduct does not evince a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in a deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees. Benefits are allowed.

## **DECISION:**

dlg/pjs

The decision of the representative dated December 17, 2015 (reference 01) is affirmed. Claimant is eligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits, provided claimant meets all other eligibility requirements.

Duane L. Golden	
Administrative Law Judge	
Decision Dated and Mailed	