IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

WILLIAM J SIMPSON 104½ N 13TH ST MARSHALLTOWN IA 50158

SWIFT & COMPANY

c/o EMPLOYERS UNITY INC
P O BOX 749000

ARVADA CO 80006-9000

Appeal Number: 04A-UI-10151-DT

OC: 01/11/04 R: 02 Claimant: Appellant (1)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board*, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

- The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)
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(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge Section 96.6-2 – Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

William J. Simpson (claimant) appealed a representative's September 3, 2004 decision (reference 03) that concluded he was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment from Swift & Company (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on October 12, 2004. The claimant participated in the hearing. Jeremy Cook appeared on the employer's behalf. During the hearing, Exhibits A-1 and A-2 were entered into evidence. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUES:

Was the claimant's appeal timely? Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The representative's decision was mailed to the claimant's last known address of record on September 3, 2004. The claimant had been out of town for work from approximately September 5 through September 12, 2004; he received the decision when he arrived home on September 12, 2004. At that time he also received a related decision issued on September 8, 2004 that concluded he was overpaid unemployment insurance benefits (reference 04). The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by September 13, 2004. The claimant went into his local Agency office on September 13, 2004. He asked a representative at the Agency office what was going on, why he was overpaid. The representative gave him an appeal form and told him to mail it in. The representative did not offer to take the claimant's appeal that day and did not observe or point out that the appeal of the disqualification decision was due that day. The claimant filed his appeal when it was postmarked on September 16, 2004, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision.

The claimant started working for the employer on November 19, 2001. He worked full time as a third-shift supervisor on the loading dock at the employer's Marshalltown, lowa meat packaging facility. His last day of work was January 14, 2004. The employer discharged him on that date. The stated reason for the discharge was inappropriate behavior.

On January 14 the employer became aware of several complaints against the claimant by subordinates, including that the claimant required an injured employee to drive him and another employee to various locations, that he had made sexually explicit comments regarding another subordinate's wife, and that he had he had pornographic material on his computer that he had shown to subordinates.

The claimant denied making the sexually explicit comments regarding the subordinate's wife, although he admitted saying that she was attractive. He admitted making sexually explicit comments regarding women in general, but denied it was in the context of this subordinate's wife. He admitted that he had the injured employee drive him and the other employee, indicating that the injured employee was the only employee with a license, and that the employee had been well enough to drive himself to the hospital. The claimant admitted that he had at least one pornographic e-mail on his computer; he maintained that he had kept it for "investigatory purposes," however, he had not reported the matter to his supervisor, human resources, or the information technology personnel.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The preliminary issue in this case is whether the claimant timely appealed the representative's decision.

Iowa Code Section 96.6-2 provides in pertinent part:

The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week

with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. . . . Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. <u>Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.</u>, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); <u>Johnson v. Board of Adjustment</u>, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. Messina v. IDJS, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The lowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also In re Appeal of Elliott, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. Hendren v. IESC, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); Smith v. IESC, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did not have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

The claimant was in an Agency office asking about his situation on the deadline for appeal. The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was at least partially due to Agency error or misinformation pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal should be treated as timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code Section 96.6-2. Therefore, the administrative law judge has jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See, Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979); Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979), and Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company v. Employment Appeal Board, 465 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa App. 1990).

The substantive issue in this case is whether the employer discharged the claimant for reasons establishing work-connected misconduct. The issue is not whether the employer was right or even had any other choice but to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code Section 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982); Iowa Code Section 96.5-2-a.

Iowa Code Section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The claimant's assertion that he kept the pornography for "investigatory purposes" is not plausible; the claimant's testimony is not credible. The claimant's inappropriate behavior shows a willful or wanton disregard of the standard of behavior the employer has the right to expect from an employee, as well as an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests and of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. The employer discharged the claimant for reasons amounting to work-connected misconduct.

DECISION:

The representative's September 3, 2004 decision (reference 03) is affirmed. The employer discharged the claimant for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits as of January 14, 2004. This disqualification continues until the claimant has been paid ten times his weekly benefit amount for insured work, provided he is otherwise eligible. The employer's account will not be charged.