IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

TED E SWARTSLANDER

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 12A-UI-03316-LT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

MANPOWER INC OF DM

Employer

OC: 07/03/11

Claimant: Respondent (5)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct Iowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Leaving

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed an appeal from the March 30, 2012 (reference 03) decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held by telephone conference call on April 17, 2012. Claimant participated. Employer participated through Onsite Coordinator for Manpower at Vermeer Jennifer Hjortshoj.

ISSUE:

Did claimant voluntarily leave the employment with good cause attributable to employer or did employer discharge claimant for reasons related to job misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of benefits?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full-time as a painter assigned at Vermeer in Pella, Iowa, from January 9, 2012 and was separated from employment on February 16, 2012. He was injured at work on February 13, 2012, which manifested by pain in his fingers while squeezing the trigger of the paint gun. He was working light duty driving the fork lift but was also required to push carts out of their parking spaces by hand, which violated his work restrictions against pushing more than 20 pounds. He did not think that was appropriate light-duty work and notified Manpower. No other light-duty work was available to him and he was not told to wait for Manpower to meet with Vermeer managers. He asked what he was supposed to do if there was no light-duty work available and was told "I guess you're resigning." Claimant checked in at the Des Moines Manpower office on February 17, 2012 and there was no work available there, either.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant did not quit but was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-1 provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

871 IAC 24.26(21) provides:

Voluntary quit with good cause attributable to the employer and separations not considered to be voluntary quits. The following are reasons for a claimant leaving employment with good cause attributable to the employer:

(21) The claimant was compelled to resign when given the choice of resigning or being discharged. This shall not be considered a voluntary leaving.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

871 IAC 24.26(21) provides:

Voluntary quit with good cause attributable to the employer and separations not considered to be voluntary quits. The following are reasons for a claimant leaving employment with good cause attributable to the employer:

(21) The claimant was compelled to resign when given the choice of resigning or being discharged. This shall not be considered a voluntary leaving.

A voluntary quitting means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer and requires an intention to terminate the employment. *Wills v. EAB*, 447 N.W. 2d 137, 138 (lowa 1989); see *also* lowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(35). A voluntary leaving of employment requires an intention to terminate the employment relationship accompanied by an overt act of carrying out that intention. *Local Lodge* #1426 v. Wilson Trailer, 289 N.W.2d 608, 612 (lowa 1980).

Because there was unclear communication between claimant and employer about the interpretation of both parties' statements about the status of the employment relationship; the issue must be resolved by an examination of witness credibility and burden of proof. Because most members of management are considerably more experienced in personnel issues and operate from a position of authority over a subordinate employee, it is reasonably implied that the ability to communicate clearly is extended to discussions about employment status. Since claimant was told there was no work available that met his medical restrictions and that he would be resigning, the separation was not voluntary and claimant's interpretation of the conversation as a discharge was reasonable. Therefore, the burden of proof falls to the employer.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988).

An employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job-related misconduct as the reason for the separation, employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. Inasmuch as claimant was not medically able to perform work the employer had available because of his work injury, employer has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant engaged in misconduct. Benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The March 30, 2012 (reference 03) decision is modified without change in effect. Claimant did not quit but was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided he is otherwise eligible.

Dévon M. Lewis Administrative Law Judge	
Decision Dated and Mailed	

dml/kjw