

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

**ERIC D LOW**  
Claimant

**APPEAL NO. 15A-UI-04293-S2T**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**WINNEBAGO INDUSTRIES**  
Employer

**OC: 03/08/15**  
**Claimant: Appellant (2)**

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge for Misconduct  
Section 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

Eric Low (claimant) appealed a representative's March 19, 2015, decision (reference 01) that concluded he was not eligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits after his separation from employment with Winnebago (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on April 28, 2015. The claimant participated personally. The employer participated by Susan Gardener, Personnel Administrator. Exhibit D-1 was received into evidence.

**ISSUE:**

The issue is whether the appeal was filed in a timely manner and, if so, whether the claimant was separated from employment for any disqualifying reason.

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

The administrative law judge, having heard the testimony and considered all of the evidence in the record, finds that: The claimant was hired on February 24, 2014, as a full-time production assembler/fabricator. The claimant signed for receipt of the employer's handbook on February 24, 2014. The employer issued the claimant a verbal warning for attendance on November 3, 2014, and a written warning for attendance on November 7, 2014. On November 10, 2014, the employer issued the claimant a two-day suspension for attendance. The employer notified the claimant that further infractions could result in termination from employment. Of the claimant's twelve absences, seven were properly reported for medical issues, one was not properly reported and for a medical issue, one was properly reported and for blizzard conditions, and three were not properly reported and for unknown reasons.

After November 10, 2014, the claimant was not absent again until February 16, 2015. The claimant properly reported he had to leave early because he was ill. On February 17, 2015, the claimant properly reported he was ill and could not work. On February 18, 2015, the employer terminated the claimant for excessive absenteeism.

A disqualification decision was mailed to claimant's last-known address of record on March 19, 2015. He did not receive the decision. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by March 29, 2015. The appeal was not filed until April 8, 2015, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision.

### **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

The first issue to be considered in this appeal is whether the claimant's appeal is timely. The administrative law judge determines it is.

Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The claimant did not have an opportunity to appeal the fact-finder's decision because the decision was not received. Without notice of a disqualification, no meaningful opportunity for appeal exists. See *Smith v. Iowa Employment Security Commission*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). Therefore, the appeal shall be accepted as timely.

The next issue is whether the claimant was discharged for misconduct.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(8) provides:

- (8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. Excessive absences are not misconduct unless unexcused. Absences due to properly reported illness can never constitute job misconduct since they are not volitional. Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The employer must establish not only misconduct but that there was a final incident of misconduct which precipitated the discharge. The last incident of absence was a properly reported illness which occurred on February 16 and 17, 2015. The claimant's absence does not amount to job misconduct because it was properly reported. The employer has failed to provide any evidence of willful and deliberate misconduct which would be a final incident leading to the discharge. The claimant was discharged but there was no misconduct.

**DECISION:**

The March 19, 2015, reference 01, decision is reversed. The claimant's appeal is timely. The employer has not met its proof to establish job related misconduct. Benefits are allowed.

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Beth A. Scheetz  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

bas/pjs